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BETWEEN FREEDOM AND CONTROL:
Joufhalism's Role in the Media System.
A Study of Print Journalism in Postcommunist Poland
1

INTRODUCTION
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dramatic political,
economic and social change, which occurred almost simultaneously throughout the
region, has been the subject of a variety of studies. Different theories on the
collapse of communism have approached this from perspectives based on
assumptions such as the system's inability to "modernise" or secure progress,
relative deprivation, loss of legitimacy, and institutional dysfunction, to name just a
few (Wnuk-Lipinski 1995,Juchler 1996).
All of these studies were based on some kind of "transformation" concept, or more
recently, "transition", which is extended to studies of mass media in postcommunist
societies. "Transition" conceptually can have very different meanings and needs to
be clarified. It suggests that there is a movement from one stage to another, that is,
from communism/ authoritarianism to capitalism/ democracy. The problem with
this view is its inherent value-ladenness: these labels referring to different political
systems have the connotations of "control" on one hand and "freedom" on the
other. This duality is too simplistic, and does not accurately describe the way media
systems function.
The research presented here challenges the idea that political and economic labels
can be used exclusively to describe ~ media system. Such labels tend to redefine
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the media systems of postcommunist countries as "progressing" from one type to
another. Theoretically, it can be said that all media systems are in transition, in the
sense of continuous adaptation, and that this is a process of mediation, adjustment,
and trying to reach a compromise between freedom and control. The role of the
journalist, at the centre of this transitional process, will be examined.
This research on the press in postcommunist Poland is geared towards three
outcomes. Firstly, previous research on the media, specifically the press, in Poland
and other postcommunist or "transitional" countries will be analysed to suggest a
more general theory which can be used to describe and compare media systems.
Secondly, based on the general theory, a model for describing media systems,
including those in transition, will be proposed, using Poland as an example.
Thirdly, the role of journalists in Polish print media today is examined within this
framework.
In examining the practice of journalism in postcommunist Poland, this study

recognises that journalists are a product of society, and more specifically, a media
system. I intend to address two main issues. The first is to identify the components
of a media system and to describe how media systems may vary according to the
interaction of these components. The second issue I will inquire into is the role of
the journalist within the media system. The analysis will be based on the following
questions.
On what basis can we describe, or cl~, different media systems? Is it valid to
classify a media system according to political, cultural and economic conditions? Is
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the concept of a "free" media a valid one for describing media systems, and if not,
which term could be used instead?
Secondly, how can we describe the journalist's role in the Polish media system?
Does the role of the journalist vary depending on the type of media system, and if
so, how? Studying the practice of journalism in Poland, a country that is
undergoing political, economic and cultural change, may offer an answer to these
questions.

1. 1 Research Methods

This research methodology comprises a literature review and an empirical survey
of Polish journalists. The review focused on developments in the Polish media and
other societies in transition; a range of relevant materials were gathered from
journalism, media studies and sociological journals.
Polish newspaper and magazine articles, particularly the English-language
newspaper The Warsaw Voice, available on the internet, are the main sources of
up-to-date information. Other sources acquired through the internet included
international journalists' and media research organisations: the Open Media
Research Institute (OMRI), Freedom Forum, Freedom House, and the Committee to
Protect Journalists.
Statistics- are mainly drawn from research conducted by the Press Research Centre
in Krakow, Poland (OBP), the Polish Bureau for Foreign Investment (PAIZ), the
private market research organisation SMG/KRC Poland, and the official polling
centft! CJJOS.
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The empirical survey involved face-to-face in-depth interviews with Polish
journalists from a variety of national newspapers, conducted in Krakow and
Warsaw in October and December 1998. These were semi-structured interviews
intended to assess journalists' opinions on their role, their attitude to social change
in Poland and its effects on their working conditions.

1.2

Limitations of the research

The literature included in this research can be divided into two categories. The
first group of studies are recent analyses of "transitional" media systems in
postcommunist and communist societies. The second type of literature I have
reviewed represents different theoretical approaches to the study of the mass media
and journalism.
The empirical research, due to its in-depth nature, was limited in number. A total
of nine journalists were interviewed. All of the journalists interviewed worked for
national publications of different frequencies of publication, and various political
and non-political orientations. These publications were chosen to represent the
wide variety of newspapers in Poland. Only nationwide newspapers were selected
for this research, due to the difficulties of obtaining sufficient material from the
regions. Also, high-circulation newspapers were chosen over smaller publications. 1
The newspapers fhct fenltnalists worked for represent tliree different types when
classified by frequency of appe~rance (daily, weekly, or monthly): four dailies,

The newspapers with a circulation of over 250 000 were: G~Wjborcza, Rzeczpospolita, Super
Express, ~d Polity/ca. These are the highest figures for Polish nafMia1 newspapers. Tygodnik Powszechny,
Wiez and ~eta Pols/ca have circulations of less than I 00 000. (S'ource: OBP, Krakow, 1998)
1
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three weeklies, and one monthly. They can also be classified by µ.Jlitical orientation
as two right-wing, two left-wing, one centre-right, one centre-left, and two nonpolitical. 2 Divided according to date of establishment (µ.Jstcommunist or
communist), the newspapers fall into two groups of four. 3 A variety of other daily
and weekly newspapers were also studied.

2

Political orientation according;to journalists working for the newspaper.
Publications established in the communist era (pre 1989): Tygodnik Powszechny, Rzeczpospolita,
Polityka, Wiez. Post-communist (1989 and after): Gazeta Wyborcza, Super &press, Zycie, Gazeta Polska.
3

9

2

LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, approaches to the study of media systems and journalism are
discussed. Of particular interest are those studies that focus on the idea of the
"transitional" media system, a term which has been used to describe postcommunist
media systems. Another way to describe media systems is in terms of whether they
are "free" or "repressed". This chapter will show that such labels are value-based
and therefore not valid categories for the classification of media systems.

2.1

The Concept of "Transition"

Before outlining recent theories of the media in countries that are said to be
"transitional", it should be noted that the idea of "transition" can have several
meanings. At the most basic level, "transition" can be simply defined as the
movement from one state to another. Applied to the postcommunist countries in
Eastern Europe, "transition" refers to the political and economic change from
communism to capitalism. However, applying this term means implying a
"direction", or the idea of a "progress toward" a particular political or economic
destination. It becomes too easy to project ideas of what "should" be happening
onto the actual situation.
In fact, a transition from one social order to another involves multiple institutional
changes itr areas outside politics or economics, which do not necessarily occur
simultaneously. It has been observed by theorists such as Dahrendorf ( 1990) that
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socio-cultural change is much slower than legal changes. Thus, a society may have
ad.opted new political and economic institutions, but its political culture, traditions,
values, or social mood may still reflect the old order. A theory of transition needs to
take into account these "soft variables relating to culture and consciousness"
(Sztompka 1998:46).
The significance of culture - shared beliefs, customs, language - is worth noting,
since journalism, as part of a particular society, will reflect aspects of that society's
culture. While this means that each media system is unique, in a sense it is also a
reminder that journalism's most basic function - communication - which is based
on culture, is fundamentally the same. Of course, the practice of journalism may be
more or less restricted at different times, or in different places.
The point is that the similarities between media systems, however basic, should not
be neglected. This avoids the division of society according to the ideological
categories of capitalist or communist. After all, as Jakob Juchler, a specialist on
postcommunism, observes, these two types of society are not fundamentally
different. Although there are many differences, both labels refer to modern,
industrialised societies, with similar institutions of state and established divisions of
labour (Juchler 1994:22).
Studies of media systems in ''transition" take significantly different approaches.
Several of these will be sum,marised briefly, before deciding which approach, if any,
is most ~l in understanding media systems. As suggested above, a suitable
theory wqµld be applicable to aIJ.y media system, not just the media in societies
which are

~~id

to be in transitipri. The aim is to analyse media systems as they are,
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not for what they will be. Surely, in every society, communication is continually
adapting to the conditions in which it takes place.

2.2 STUDIES OF "TRANSITIONAL" MEDIA SYSTEMS
2.2.1 The Transitional Press System - Mass Media in Bulgaria
In a recent study of the media in postcommunist Bulgaria, Ekaterina Ognianova
(1997) outlines a theory of the transitional press system. Ognianova reviews several
media system classification theories, pointing out that these are usually based on the
assumption that the type of media system that exists in a country depends on that
country's political system. However, Ognianova stresses the importance of also
including the economic system in the model, a factor which was used by Ralph
Lowenstein, for example, and extended by John Merrill (1979, cited in Ognianova
1997), in their theories of media systems.
Lowenstein and Merrill also expanded the fluidity of the media system categories,
describing systems as "authoritarian tending" or "libertarian tending". Robert
Picard (1982-3, cited in Ognianova 1997) added the "duo-directional" category to
these, which refers to media systems falling on a continuum between libertarianism
and authoritarianism. This concept, along with Herbert Altschull's (1995, cited in
Ognianova 199 7) classifications based on economic systems, influenced
Ognianova's transitional press system concept (Ognianova 1997:4-6). The
transitional press system is definJ ks one whlch can be fo"nd in "a -sooiety that is
in transition from one ecqpomic order to another" (Ognianoxa 1997:11).
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The factor which distinguishes the transitional press system from Pi.card's duodirectional system is the possibility of the coexistence of differing prescriptive press
concepts within the system. Applied to Bulgaria, this model showed that elements of
authoritarian, communist, libertarian and social responsibility ideologies were
found within the press system. This model of media system classification according
to economic categories, yet allowing for a variety of prescriptive concepts, "suggests
a possible solution to the old problem in press typologies of confusing descriptive
and prescriptive press concepts" (Ognianova 1997:13).
Open market systems and centralized economy systems may also contain a variety
of prescriptive concepts that shape the working environments and practices of their
media personnel. However, Ognianova asserts that there are differences between
these and transitional systems. Prescriptive concepts within the transitional media
system are continuously, often dramatically, changing. Moreover, there are more
likely to be opposing press concepts in a transitional press system, with greater
conflict between them, than in the other systems.
While the concept of the transitional media system is a flexible one, it defines
transition as economic change. This means that although multiple competing
ideologies may exist in such a system, these are not as important in defining it as the
state of the economy. The advantage of this is that it is easy to classify media
systems. However, there are several disadvantages.
The model is somewhat vague, for according to Ognianova, it is not important
what kind of economic order a society is changing from or to, merely that it is
changing. Thus the transitional concept can be applied to press systems which are
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in fact quite different in other ways. There could be some difficulty in comparing
countries like Bulgaria, Poland, Hong Kong, Yugoslavia, China or Russia. All of
these societies could be said to be experiencing political and economic transition of
some kind, but putting them in the same category may reveal more differences
amongst them than similarities. In this case, why bother to categorise at all?
Focussing on economic change simplifies the classification, but not the
comparison. This is not the only type of change to consider. Political, social and
cultural change do not necessarily parallel economic change. For example, Hong
Konz is undergoing economic and political changes characterised by increasing
control and domination by the Chinese Communist Party, and would therefore be
classified as transitional. Bulgaria, or other eastern European postcornrnunist
countries, are also transitional. Yet the demands on journalists in each of these
countries from various groups (such as public, politicians, public relations
organisations) are not the same. And if we want to examine the role of the
journalist in the media system, this is of more importance than the economy.
Transitional media systems seem to have a monopoly on change. Open market
and centralized systems are not seen to change because their economic order does
not. This gives a false picture of one dynamic and two static systems. It also gives
us a question that is hard to answer: when does a transitional system stop being in
tr.ansition, and become one of the other two types?
Instead, we could say that every system is transitional, because every system is
dynamic, regardless of the type of economy. While the economic order may remain
unchanged in an open market or centralized system, the system may change in
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other ways. The changes may seem small, like a new law on the media, or gradual,
like the infiltration of foreign words or jargon into common use. But they will
impact on a journalist's work.
The following studies of media systems which could be described as transitional
take a different approach to the model described above, explaining developments in
journalism as part of political, social and cultural change.

2.2.2 Post-Soviet Russia

A study of post-Soviet Russia by Brian McNair (1994) illustrates the discrepancies
between economic, political and cultural factors. In post-Soviet Russia, the
weakness of the economy and decline of state economic control are forcing more
newspapers to look to private sponsors or western companies. Still, most
newspapers are still dependent on government subsidy for survival.
Politically, the press law of February 1992 guarantees press freedom and editorial
independence from proprietors or politicians, and prevents publication of material
that may incite racial hatred or violate national security. This law was based on the
Soviet model, which had been generally regarded as progressive. However, there
were some objections to the inclusion of media restrictions which could be
implemented in the case of 'emergency', which was seen as a provision for
potentially excessive state power (McNair 1994: 129).
Still, the political and economic changes in the Russian media are occurring
against a background o{ tlle "authoritarian tradition" (McNair 1994: 131). McNair
notes that "the readiness with which politicians in the new Russia have shown
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themselves willing to attempt to control the media where they can is the logical
continuation of Soviet practice over seventy years, when media were openly viewed
as instruments of ideological mobilization" (McNair 1994:130).
President Boris Yeltsin demonstrated this traditional attitude by first appointing,
and then sacking, Yegor Yakovlev, head of the state broadcasting company
Ostankino. Both Yeltsin and his opponents proposed setting up supervisory
committees to watch over Russia's broadcasters. In March 1993, the Congress of
People's Deputies set up a council of politicians from various groups in parliament
for this purpose. In January 1993, Yeltsin set up a new Federal Information Centre,
which supposedly enabled journalists to have increased access to information on
government bodies, but to journalists its function appeared to be political control.
Fortunately for journalists, in May 1993 the Constitutional Court ruled that this
centre was illegal (McNair 1994:128).
The authoritarian tradition affects not only politicians but also journalists. This
means that journalists are still coming to terms with western journalistic ideas such
as "objectivity", which are being introduced by European and American journalists.
Western European training has now been made available to Russian journalists to
help them question, rather than simply obey, political elites (McNair 1994:131). As
I have mentioned earlier, cultural change is a complex process that takes time.

2.2.3 China in the 1990s
The effects of cultural change on jourpalism can also be seen in China (Liu Hong
1998). In China, most newspapers have not been S\W'sidised by the state for the last
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15 years, which means they are forced to rdy on the market - but at the same time
they are still controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, so "they are required to go
on functioning as ideological tools used by the party-state" (Hong 1998:34).
Journalists are put into the difficult position of having to satisfy both the Communist
Party, their advertisers, and what they perceive as "public interest".
According to Hong, the content of daily newspapers has become more
commercialised, based on light entertainment rather than political information, in
order to satisfy both the government and the advertisers. This reflects the extension
of political consciousness into the realm of economics in Chinese society. Rather
than associating prestige with political status, Chinese now look to the area of
economics as a source of status. Journalists in China have had to adapt to the
changing situation which means that "idealism has had to be abandoned for realism
and even pragmatism" (Hong 1998:37).
Alan P.L.Liu (1993) found that there has been a dramatic increase in the mass
media industry in China since 1980, with a growth in the number and range of
titles available. However, the number of newspapers is still relatively small
considering the size of China's population. Liu asserts that it is through television,
radio and audio cassettes that China has truly developed a mass culture. Like Hong,
Liu suggests that the public are disillusioned with politics. "In the West, mass
culture is considered a debasement of cultural standards, whereas in mainland
China it represents the people's revulsion against excessive politicization and
regimentation" (Liu 1993 : 124).
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Liu concludes that the spread of mass communications in China has had a
"liberating effect" and has exposed the reality that "under the Maoist facade lay a
diverse, plural and partly segmented society. Next, free communications have
dissolved, to a significant extent, the artificial nationalism created by government
propaganda. Important groups in society, each in its own way, declared their
alienation from the regime" (Liu 1993:140). This conclusion is a reminder that
political conditions are but one indicator of the state of a media system; a question
worth asking is what use the public can make of communications media. I will
address this question later in this chapter.

2.2.4 The Former German Democratic Republic

Another analysis of a "transitional" media system which reveals the centrality of
culture is Hagen's ( 1997) study of the former communist German Democratic
Republic, now part of the Federal Republic of Germany. The research was
conducted through content analysis of East and West German newspapers, and
interviews with journalists. The study first looked at the opening of the market in
the GDR, which enabled West German publishers to take over the largest
newspapers. The differences in economic structure are only briefly dealt with, as
the study focused on examining the cultural differences between East and West
German journalists.
West German journalists surveyed for the study felt that East German journalists
were not skilled in the areas of news editing and investigation, attributed to their
lack of experience with a wider range of information. However, the study found
that only a few differences in content or style exist between East and West German
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newspapers. Tiris is said to be a result of journalists beginning to adapt to their
present situation, that is, East German journalists are gradually becoming socialised
into practising West German style journalism, rather than continuing with their
previous journalistic methods.

2.2.5 Former Yugoslavia
A particularly interesting example of a media system which could be labelled
transitional is that of former Yugoslavia. Seen from an economic perspective, the
country is in transition from communism presumably to capitalism, which would
imply that ownership of the media has changed from state to private enterprises.
However, this does not provide a complete picture of the complex Yugoslavian
media system, which was regionally and culturally divided. The current crisis
dramatically illustrates the strength of the ideology of nationalism, which has
become more influential since the decline of communism.
Under communism, Yugoslavian society was governed by an official culture of
"self-managing socialism" which was perceived as less authoritarian than other
systems in the region (Radojkovic 1994: 13 7). The media were decentralised, with
each territory controlling its own press, radio and television. In 1991, after
Yugoslavia's political system became a multi-party democracy, attempts to privatise
the media were made, but only political parties had the finances to participate.
Further changes made the system even more subject to political control, such as the
power of government officials to allocate editorial or management positions.
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As Yugoslavia disintegrated into separate territories, the ideology of nationalism

came to dominate. News is regulated, with government agencies the only official
sources of information, and there is minimal exchange of news between the states.
Journalists have no choice but to take part in a nationalistic "media war", spreading
propaganda to accompany the real civil war, instead of furthering democratisation.
Miroljub Radojkovic describes the media systems here as "confined information
spaces" (Radojkovic 1994:14 7). This term is certainly appropriate, considering the
reaction of Serbia' s state-controlled media to the crisis in Kosovo, and the attempts
by the government to block out alternative sources of information. However, this
has not been entirely successful, due to the use of the internet. We cannot merely
put this down to Yugoslavia's political or economic status. The communistauthoritarian culture is more important in defining this media system.

2.3

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MASS MEDIA AND
JOURNALISM

2.3.1 Classification of Media Systems as Free or Repressive
The studies by Hong, McNair and Hagen have all revealed, in different ways, that
cultural factors are as significant as politics or economics in shaping the media
system. However, these studies do not provide a comprehensive theory which can
be applied to different media systems. Such a theory is proposed by Paul S. N. Lee
and Leonard L. Chu (1995). Lee and Chu propose a classification based on five
factors: political structure, economic structure, media proprietors' culture, media
practitioners' culture, and audience's culture.
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As the determining factors used in Lee and Chu's model are not limited to politics

and economics, but include cultural factors, far greater importance is placed on the
role of the actors involved, namely audience, media practitioners and proprietors,
besides political and economic elites. The definitions of structure and culture used
by Lee and Chu are taken from Almond and Verba (1963 and 1989). Structure is
defined as an observable pattern of activities, whereas culture refers to values (Lee
and Chu 1995:91).
Based on the interaction among the above five factors, each factor having two
possible outcomes, four ideal-type media systems were identified: Free System,
Relatively Free System, Relatively Repressive System and Repressive System. The
latter are basically watered-down versions of the former.
A combination of libertarian government and diffused economic interests,
professional journalists' culture and idealistic proprietors, and a participant
audience, adds up to a "free" system. In a free system, media content is diverse, a
"marketplace of ideas". Individual rights are respected by journalists, who feel that
they are part of a responsible professional community. Their duty is not to promote
the government but to take on a ''watchdog" role. Since this is an ideal type, the
media systems of most western democracies are closest to the free system category,
but cannot be called free, because media content is not truly diverse but dominated
by white middle class interests.
The opposite of the free system is the repressive system, characterised by
authoritarian political elites, monopolistic economic elites, profiteering proprietors
and self-oriented media practitioners. In this system, the audience is "passive or
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apathetic", as media content does not reflect their interests, and does not attempt to.
Journalists take on the role of propagandists, conveyors of government policies.
Lee and Chu stated that media systems could change, or be changing, from one

type to another. Noting this, they analysed the media in Hong Kong in 1995, two
years prior to its return to Chinese rule. According to Lee and Chu, Hong Kong's
media is in transition from a relatively free system to a repressive system. This is
based on predictions of increased political restrictions, economic domination by the
state, the growth of a media practitioners' culture that values jobs above the ethical
aims of the profession, and an increasingly apathetic audience.
Lee and Chu's theory is significant in that it emphasises the importance of cultural
factors, and provides categories for them. However, these categories depend on the
dominance of one ideology, rather than allowing for several as Ognianova's model
did. There is another problem with this model: although both structure and culture
are incorporated in the model, it still depends on political and economic categories
as the basis of determining whether a media system is "free" or "repressive".
Lee and Chu affirmed that the labels of capitalist and socialist were not important

in determining the economic category. However, they maintain that diffused capital
interests enable a free system. They also use the distinction between libertarian and
authoritarian political elites to point out that libertarian politics and a free system go
together. However, this could be giving us a false picture.
Even though many western democracies do have liberal political systems and
diffused capital interests, media content can be restricted by commercial or political
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interests - yet they are described as almost "free". This gives a rather biased view of
some media systems, such as those found in western Europe, the United States, and
Australia. The meaning of a "free" mass media should be considered more
carefuIIy. Can media systems be described as "free"?

2.3.2 The Development of the idea of "Freedom of the Press"
The idea of "press freedom" is promoted by organisations such as Freedom Forum,
Committee for the Protection of Journalists, and Freedom House. Freedom House,
the U.S. based organisation which releases an annual report on "Press Freedom
Worldwide", compares the mass media in the countries of the world with numerical
"ratings". This approach suggests that "freedom" can be measured subjectively.
The rating for each country is calculated with an assessment of four categories,
each one divided into print and broadcast media. The four categories are A) legal
restrictions (15 points each for print and broadcast, giving a total of 30 points), B)
"political pressures" (30 points), C) "economic influences" (30 points), and D)
"repressive actions" against journalists (10 points). Countries are regarded as
"free" if their ratings are from 0 to 30, "partly free" if they score from 31 to 60,
and if they receive 61to100 points, they are "not free" (Freedom House 1999).
According to the Freedom House annual "Country Ratings" report released on
January I, 1999, many countries are described as "free". Yet the Freedom House
definition of freedom, although presented as measurable in numerical terms, is not
as precise as it may appear. Benin, for example, is classified as "free", although the
media never reach the majority of the population, who are illiterate. It is
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questionable whether the mass media can be described as "free" in countries such
as Benin, where only a privileged minority have access to them.
The report on Benin also mentions that two journalists had to serve six months in
prison for slander, yet this was not noted as a "repressive action". In South Korea,
also "free", a journalist served two years for defamation of the president. "Free"
Bolivia's media laws from 1925 still apply, under which defamation of a public
official is punishable by two years in prison, and twice that for criticising the
president or vice president. Journalists who commit defamation offences can be
imprisoned by law in Poland, Panama, Greece, and Ireland, all of which are labelled
as "free".
Israel's media are also regarded as "free", although the defence emergency
regulations enable the government and military to ban publications, restrict
distribution, and "censor any material veported from Israel or the occupied
territories regarded as sensitive on national security grounds" (Freedom House
1999: I 7). In Ireland, censorship of material on northern Ireland is still practised,
and there are increasing numbers of illegal pirate radio stations.
The line between "free" and "partly free" media systems seems to be blurred,
which becomes apparent when comparing some countries in these two categories.
For example, the Seychelles, which scored well into the "partly free" category, has
much in common with Sao Tome and Principe, or St. Kitts - Nevis. Yet the latter
were rated as "free" with scores of 30 and 18 respectively.
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In the Seychelles, the government has a monopoly on nearly all media. According
to the report, broadcast media are supervised by "independent, bipartisan directors
... but the government still determines content". News reports are described as
having a "marked partisan tone", but we are also told that coverage of the general
election balanced government and opposition views, and that there are several
opposition publications (Freedom House 1999:32).
In Sao Tome and Principe, "broadcast and some print media are owned and
controlled by the government". Print media are subject to a law against "abuse of
press freedom". This law also amounts to a form of government control. In the
islands of St. Kitts and Nevis, the broadcast media are also government owned and
controlled, and moreover "are regularly accused of favoring the ruling party". In
both of these countries, opposition publications are available (Freedom House
1999:31). However, this does not distinguish them from the Seychelles. There is no
clear way of distinguishing between these three countries; comparison seems to be
based on subjective judgements on how partisan media are.
Considering all of the examples above, we can conclude that the media systems of
different countries are too complex to be labelled as either "free" or "not free". Not
only are these terms too simplistic, but they are also difficult to measure. As we
have seen, the definition of "freedom" presented by Freedom House appears
objective, but is in fact based on subjective criteria.
The idea of a "free" media, or "freedom of the press" is often used but rarely
analysed. It has a long history in Anglo-American journalism, beginning with
Milton in the 17th century. Milton wrote on freeing the press from the state in an
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era of supreme state power. John Henningham (1992:8), in an examination of
"press freedom", points out that the idea of a free press continued into the 18th and
19th centuries with the growth of capitalism. It could be explained in terms of

Adam Smith's classical theories of free exchange on the market, as a choice between
competing ideas. Freedom meant freedom for the individual to choose and freedom
for journalists from government control.

John Henningham believes that "press freedom" in practice today does not live up
to Smith's theory of freedom of choice. The "choice" in Australia has been
narrowed considerably by the growth of monopolies, which have "grave
implications for the concept of press freedom" (Henningham 1992:9).
However, this idea of press freedom needs to be re-examined. Henningham's belief
that a broad choice is an indicator of press freedom is questionable. It is possible for
a wide range of titles to exist on a free market, published by a variety of owners,
which are nonetheless not "free". In other words, these titles are controlled by
several specific political or economic interests, rather than two or three. But fifty
versions of the truth are not necessarily any more accurate than two or three.
Instead, the different publications are likely to specialise in their own particular
version. This may be observed in Poland.
Henningham further suggests that journalists themselves may define the limits of
"press freedom". In Australia, Henningham argues, journalists do have a certain
amount of "freedom" from government control. For example, they are free to
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conduct investigative journalism, because there are no laws against it - and yet they
have displayed a lack of commitment to it.
Another way in which journalists can limit their "freedom" is by failing to respond
to public criticism, according to Henningham. If journalists cannot earn themselves
a better reputation by raising their standards, and public opinion of the media is
low, governments can easily restrict press freedom without fearing that they will
lose votes for doing so.
However, there is some evidence to suggest that Australian journalists are not as
dismissive of investigative journalism as Henningham believes. A study by Julianne
Schultz ( 1998) found that most journalists did feel that investigative journalism was
an ideal that needed to be aspired to, but they also felt hindered by the management
of their news organisations.
"This demonstrates that Australian journalists recognise that the ideal is
constrained by the commercial reality," noted Schultz ( 1998: 134). There are many
ways in which the commercial reality interferes. Linking the concept of "freedom
of the press" to the absence of state control obscures other constraints such as those
within news organisations, as Ralph Negrine (I 994:23) observes:
"[A]lthough today's press is structurally and organizationally outside the control of
the state, it daily confronts pressures and constraints which limit its freedom. Like
all other institutions, it cannot enjoy absolute freedom. No editor is absolutely free
to do what he/she desires. Their working contexts impose certain limits on what
they are able to do; for example, how many journalists they can employ and how

27

much news space they have on the paper. Such 'limits' on the freedom of the press
are often overlooked, yet their consequences may be just as severe as those which
the state can impose."
The definition of "freedom of the press" is not universal. How the media system is
viewed depends on the viewer. What one person experiences as a "free" media
system may seem restricted to another. There is certainly no agreement on this by
media practitioners in Poland - for some journalists, Poland has a "free" media, but
others are more sceptical. Some think that the media have too much freedom to be
rude and nasty. Poland will be examined later in more detail; the point here is that
the idea of a "free" media does not really help us to describe media systems, but
refers to an ideal. In that case, what kind of terms can be used?

2.3.3 Mass Media as a System
The study by Lee and Chu mentioned above, and also Ognianova's research, have
analysed the media by viewing it as a system. The concept of a system, which is
common to the natural and social sciences, is a useful tool for analysis. The system
concept enables researchers to conduct analysis at a macro level, as it refers to an
entity in terms of its interrelated parts. Also at a micro level, it provides a broader
perspective than the study of separate individual units.
Systems theory, developed in the field of sociology in the 1950s and 1960s, was
based on the idea that in a system, each part has a function which is important for
the survival of the whole. It is the interaction between the various parts that
maintains the system. This theory began to influence mass communication theories
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which until then were based on a simplistic model of unidirectional communication
- summarised by Harold Lasswell as Mw Says Mzat to Mzom through Mzat
Medium to Mzat Effect. As communication theorists realised, the communication
process depends not only on a source communicator, but also on message mediators
and receivers.
The model of a mass media system constructed by Melvin DeFleur and Sandra].
Ball-Rokeach (1989) shows how various groups are interconnected in the mass
communication process. This approach first places the media system within the
society's normative code which sets the limits within which the system can operate.
The model recognises the complexity of the category "audience", which is divided
by factors such as age, gender, socio-economic status, and interests. The audience is
subject to investigation by research organisations, which provide information about
it to media personnel.
Media content does not flow directly to the audience, but through distributors.
These are a network of local outlets linked to larger organisations. The relationship
between distributors and audience is largely one-way, with audience feedback
reaching the distributor through market research. The producers of media content
are primarily interconnected with their sponsors, distributors and research
organisations.
The category "producers" consists of production subsystems, differentiated by
medium. DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach point out that although each medium is
different, each nonetheless relates to the entire system in the same way; also, the
different media are interconnected. All are involved with subsystems of control,
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meaning the legislative system, the official regulative agencies which enforce the
laws, and voluntary associations which provide ethical codes.
The model specifically describes the media system of the United States of America.
The structure of this system "has been heavily influenced by the general social,
political, economic, and cultural conditions that were current during the period
when our mass media were developing and that remain important sociocultural
forces in the society within which they operate", note DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach
(1989:137). Basically, a media system is a component of the social system. Media
systems function according to social norms.
Systems theory offers a more accurate alternative way of classifying media systems.
Systems theorists operate with two basic categories: closed systems and open
systems. These categories can describe social systems as a whole, of which the mass
media are a part. Whether the media system is open or closed depends on the social
system. In this research, these categories explain differences between media systems
in terms of two types of interaction that may occur within systems. In other words,
they describe how the various actors in the media system relate to each other.
Although "open" and "closed" represent extremes, they can be used as ideal types
to describe existing media systems.
Closed systems are simple, focussing on repetition of the same tasks. They depend
on unchanging interaction between the internal parts, with "limited monitoring of
the external environment. . . . The system can't maintain itself when parts wear out
or communication links break down" (Baran and Davis 1995:255). Closed systems
are unable to adapt to any difficulties that may arise, because communicaticm is too
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simple and inflexible. For example, authoritarian regimes, like communist Poland,
attempt to maintain power over the states they rule by controlling the media. Such
systems are closed because there are barriers in place which do not allow for a flow
of communication.
These barriers affect both the producers and the consumers of media content.
Firstly, journalists are given access to approved sources only. Secondly, the mass
media are subject to censorship. The public may be punished for trying to access
opposition or foreign media. In summary, closed systems could be said to be closed
to outside influences and closed to opportunity. A contemporary example of a
closed system is North Korea, where the "the masses are treated to total ignorance,
the few drips of information coming their way through the formidable party
machine" (Dariewicz 2000: 138).
Open systems, by contrast, can adapt to change while retaining stability. The
system has the capacity to "monitor its environment and adjust to both internal and
external changes. The parts of open systems can alter their functions so that if one
part fails, others can adjust and take over its function. These systems are capable of
growth and change over time" (Baran and Davis 1995:255). Poland today, and
most other countries, have media systems of varying degrees of openness.
Open media systems, unlike closed systems, are characterised by the existence of
multiple, and multiplying channels of communication. This research does not
intend to substitute "open" for "free". Rather, open systems can be described as
those which offer increasing opportunities for the mass media to expand and adapt.
There is no value attached to this definition. Unlike the idea of a "free" media, the
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idea of an open system does not suggest that it is "good". In closed systems, almost
nothing new is pennissible; in open systems, almost anything is possible. This
includes the growth of monopolies, control of the media by competing interest
groups, pressure from advertisers, and bribery of journalists.
In fact, an open system could be in a state of chaos. In the Philippines, where

journalists call themselves free, "intense competition in a crowded market, the lack
of trained journalists, 'checkbook' [sic] journalism, and the business interests of
media owners are among the problems that stunt the professional development of
Philippine journalism" (Coronel 2000:149). As the study of the Polish press will
show, the Polish media system is very similar. The media system has become more
open, but it has not become "free": Polish journalists are in fact faced with new
problems as their system changes.
Although the ideas of open and closed systems are useful, the theory as a whole is
more problematic. I have two main criticisms of the theory. The first problem is
that systems theory assumes that the separate parts all function together to maintain
the system. Communication is taken to be a link, serving this purpose. But this is
not necessarily true. Communication can be disruptive. In Poland, the government
tried to filter out damaging information through the official media, but
underground and overseas media were able to publicise it. According to systems
theory, the failure of one part would cause the whole to break down, but in Poland
the parts continued to function, albeit badly.
Secondly, the systems model of mass media constructed by DeFleur and BallRokeach focuses on "visible" structures, and leaves out several other factors which
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are also important. These are cultural factors, which I have already mentioned. The
existence of links between large institutional structures and media producers is
made clear, but this alone does not explain the production process. Media
personnel are labelled as producers, suggesting that they actively create content.
This is not inaccurate, but the theory neglects to elucidate on the process by which
this content is created.
The process of media content production needs to be given more attention than the
above model allows for. While it does place media production within a social
environment, the model does not acknowledge the complexity within this
subsystem. There are many types of "producer", working together to create
content. The process itself may have an influence on media output. To understand
'non-political', internal restrictions within the media and more specifically, the
effects of these on the journalist, a journalism-centred approach is more useful.

2.3.4 The Social Determinants of Journalism
Brian McNair (1998) outlined a sociology of journalism which recognises that
journalism is socially determined. McNair argues that journalism is often viewed
either as competition, following the pluralistic ideal, or dominance, following the
demands of a particular interest. However, neither of these are adequate
descriptions of the practice of journalism, which is never a simple matter of
ideological control, or lack of it. McNair's approach is an attempt to escape such
traditional dichotomous categories which can hinder a more thorough analysis of
journalism. The emphasis is not on order and stability, but on "unpredictability and
randomness" (McNair 1998:165).
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McNair points out that journalism itself is essentially ideological, and as in any
form of human communication, a particular ideology may be consciously or
unconsciously incorporated in mass communication. "Journalists construct their
narratives around their own values and beliefs but these are necessarily informed by
the contribution of a wide range of information sources, who thus acquire the
power to become "definers" of journalistic reality" (McNair 1998:6).
According to McNair, there are five factors which can be seen to influence media
practice. These "social determinants of journalism" are professional and
organisational factors, the political environment, the economic environment, the
technological environment, and source tactics and strategies. Taking all these
aspects into account, it becomes clear that ''the journalist is a cog in a wheel over
whose speed and direction he or she may have little or no control" (McNair
1998:62).
Professional and organisational determinants of journalism are those which
surround the profession itself - professional culture and bureaucratic constraints.
To begin with, journalism as a profession is practised according to a code of ethics,
which gives it authority and believability. The concept of "objectivity" is
particularly important. This concept emerged in the nineteenth century with the
development of the commercial market and the commodification of journalism,
McNair notes. Before the need to sell, and thus the need to appear as producers of
universal truth became the priority, newspapers were readily committed to political
parties (McNair 1998:67-8).
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The organisational constraints on journalism result from the fact that the journalist
is an employee of a bureaucratic organisation - a point that has already been
mentioned above - and must conform to its rules. Also, there are different
constraints on journalism depending on medium - "the various media of print,
television and radio journalism each tend to prefer different modes of
communication, utilising different properties of language" (McNair 1998:63).
The organisational aspects of the process of media production are the most
significant, according to Rodney Tiffen. Tiffen examines "newsmaking" through
three separate, but related, factors: production, input, and values. Production is
constrained by the deadline and the news hole. Input is determined by the
medium's resources, such as subscriptions to agencies, specialist and generalist
reporters. Values are the "shared understandings" between media practitioners that
"stem from perceptions of audience demand and professional aspirations"; these
determine what is newsworthy (Tiffen 1993:176).
The political environment refers to a combination of the political system and the
political culture, but distinguishing between the two because "within, for example,
systems defined as 'democratic' there may be great variation in the way journalists
approach their work" (McNair 1998:89). Therefore, a lack of formal restrictions
does not guarantee that journalists will not be subject to the strict ideological
limitations of an authoritarian culture. Depending on the political environment,
politicians may attempt to control media through different strategies which can
include physical force, the law, censorship, and informal lobbying.
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It is difficult to separate the economic environment from the political environment,

but McNair points to two specifically economic aspects - firstly, the fact that
journalism is the product of an industry owned by particular individuals or
conglomerates; secondly, it is a commodity for sale on the market, and therefore
"must be both functional and desirable" (McNair 1998:101). McNair concludes
that proprietors may be able to exert a certain influence over their publications,
"but they cannot buck market trends or ignore the views of their audience"
(McNair 1998:123).
An important factor to consider when studying contemporary journalism is the

technological environment. Technological developments have changed the way
news is produced and received. In short, "news is more simultaneous, and there is
more of it, but it is at the same time more 'bitty' and unrefined"(McNair 1998: 127).
Indeed, this 'new' news may lack depth. However, the breakdown of the timespace barrier can aid the breakdown of authoritarian control of news - "news gets
out" (McNair 1998:129). This includes the use of the internet as a public sphere which can be observed in the current war in Kosovo.
Finally, there is the significance of sources, linked to journalists through news
management tactics, involving an intermediary group of source professionals such
as public relations consultants. "Not just routine news coverage but the output of
journalism in general is increasingly the product of activity taking place out in the
world beyond the journalist's immediate working environment - communicative
work which is deliberately designed and organised to shape news in ways
favourable to the individual or organisation initiating it," McNair ( 1998: 141)
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observed. Public relations tactics can, of course, be best employed by those who can
afford to pay for them, which tends to result in bias towards the rich and powerful.

2.3.5 Mass Media in a Process of Change

McNair's sociology of journalism focuses on the profession as it operates within a
social system. As mentioned, this study is interested in the social processes that
shape media systems, which are themselves involved in the process of change. This
view is also held by John D.H. Downing, who affirms that "media institutions are
perpetually being set the task of interpreting and reinterpreting the world's flux"
(Downing 1996:235).
Downin.g's study of media in Eastern Europe was concerned with the relationship
between media and change, concluding that a theory which would best describe
this would need to incorporate the idea of movement and not be based on static
categories. "Culture" in its common usage is such a category, Downing asserts,
"which is why it must always be intimately coupled with the term 'communication'
in order to signify the flux that actually characterizes cultural process" (Downing
1996:237). Downing also indicates that culture is not a unified set of beliefs, but
consists of a variety of cultures - for example, alternative, oppositional cultures that
conflicted with the official culture in communist Eastern Europe.
There is also the problem of terms such as "civil society, public sphere, social
movements, hegemony and counter-hegemonic currents" which easily become
idealised and simplified. As Downing makes clear, the reality of public debate is not
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as neat as an us-and-them divide (for example, disagreement amongst the
opposition could be observed in Poland in the Solidarity era).
In any case, what is significant here is that these processes of debate "are sparked,
sustained, diffused and amplified by media (in the broadest sense). Social and
cultural movements live off and through such discussion within and around such
media" (Downing 1996:238). Downing's phrase "media (in the broadest sense)"
draws attention to a vital part of media systems - that communication also spreads
beyond the official broadcast and print media. I will return to this point later.
Another set of issues which should be called to attention are those surrounding
media and memory. Memory can refer firstly to the recovery of the historical past,
secondly, to the re-usage of inherited media practices, and thirdly, to the
rediscovery of tradition and national identity. For example, in Russia, Hungary and
Poland, previously forbidden aspects of the past became public again. At the same
time, media practitioners were caught up in the authoritarian tradition, as McNair's
study of Russia found.
Another interesting set of memories resurfaced in the media - nostalgia for the
security of the communist era. This also resurfaced in politics - postcommunist
governments once again came to power in these three countries. Downing
concludes that "memory and media interact in multiple fashions to assist both
cultural change and coagulation" (Downing 1996:240).
Downing appeals for a less rigid media theory which is based on change, and
therefore does not use static categories. As systems theorists have already indicated,
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it is impossible to divide media from society, therefore the theory needs to recognise
the interrelatedness of all aspects of the media system, rather than separate them for
the purpose of individual analysis. Chaos theory is suggested as a way of
understanding such complex processes as communication, but Downing points out
that this mathematical abstraction is too far removed from human behaviour to be
wholly accurate - obviously, humans do not always behave in predictable ways.
However, Downing believes that there are some concepts from chaos theory which
could be applied to a study of media, namely iteration, refraction and synapse. The
idea of iteration is an interesting one. The well-known statement about the tiny
butterfly flapping its wings making a hurricane on the other side of the world
comes from this idea. It means that communication is not simply a matter of
repetition; a message is not just passed from a source to a receiver. Instead, a
message or idea can reverberate, becoming increasingly significant as it is passed
on.
However, ideas do not only multiply in the communication process. Change or
diversity would not be possible if this were the case. Downing uses the term
refraction to describe the ways in which "messages" are actually transmitted. Like
light or heat waves as they pass through a substance, communicated ideas are
distorted by passing through the communicator. That is, messages are not
transmitted or received in a "pure" form, but are mediated by a series of valuefilters. This means that communication is a process involving a series of distortions,
or alterations.
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Synapse literally means a junction of two nerve cells, which can cross long
distances to connect all parts of the body. It calls to mind the way in which
communication can also connect distant places, and cross boundaries. The concepts
of iteration, refraction and synapse, although vague, are a useful way of explaining
how communication itself works.
Moreover, these concepts show how change is incorporated in the process of
communication. In Poland, for example, people read underground newspapers
which criticised the government and promoted democratic values. Having read the
newspapers, people passed them on, and discussed them in conversations with their
friends. Underground ideas were not only circulated, but iterated. With the
combined force of numerous underground papers, posters calling for
demonstrations, prohibited books, foreign radio broadcasts, the message of protest
was compounded until it was no longer tolerable.
Downing does not elaborate on how the conceptual suggestions discussed above
can be used in a model of mass media communication. However, he adds that
theoretical approaches must also include the dimension of power relations (political,
economic, or cultural; hegemonic or oppositional). Without this dimension, as was
noted above, a study of media systems as part of society would be too simplistic,
ignoring the significance of human activity.

2.3.6 Power Relations in the Mass Media
The significance of power relations is discussed in more detail by Joseph Turow
(1997). Turow divides the actors involved in the mass communication process into
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power roles, defined by the typical activities that these actors engage in and the type
of leverage they may exercise. This approach does provide some insight into the
functioning of the mass media industry, as it highlights the many components that
are part of the mass communication process. These include auxiliaries, who provide
material supplies to producers, creators with "talent to conceive and arrange mass
media material", and all the necessary distributors, exhibitors, linking pins, and
facilitators.
As in Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur's model, journalists are in the producercategory,

whose activities are described as the creation of "material for release to the public
via mass media". Producers have "control over people and ideas that might get
exposure to the public via mass media".
The role of authorityis to "[p]rovide government (or governmentally sanctioned)
regulation and arbitration among other power roles", by means of political and
military power. Monetary resources are controlled by the investor and the client.
The union has the power of "solidarity and threats of work stoppage", and public
advocacy can exert pressure through boycott or lobbying. The power of the public
rests on "[a]n individual decision to choose or not choose particular content" or to
"complain through legal or other channels".
However, one of the shortcomings of this power-role theory is the simplification of
its categories, and exclusion of others. Particularly for a study of journalism, more
attention needs to be given to the producer role. As I have already noted, media
organisations are internally divided, both by specialised tasks and by "power''. A
subeditor of a newspaper does a different job to that paper's sports reporter, and a
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freelance journalist may have less influence over a newspaper's content than its
chief of staff. Tiris does not mean that one has more power than the other.
It is difficult to attribute "power" to one actor over another, because media content

production is a matter of co-operation, and cannot be controlled by power alone.
Proprietors, for example, can be seen as having power over their news
organisations, but in practice this is not so straightforward; as Tiffen points out,
"[p]erfect proprietorial control would require an improbable omniscience" (Tiffen
1993:177). This is not to say that proprietors are uninvolved in the process of

media content production; they are involved, and some can be very dominating.
But this is not necessarily so, and always varies. The point here is that actors should
not be seen in terms of their power, but in terms of their role. However, the
concept of "role" itself requires further investigation.

2.3. 7 The "Role" Concept
Can the role concept be used to distinguish between media systems? In Lee and
Chu's approach, different media systems are characterised by different sets of roles.
The basic system types used by Lee and Chu, authoritarian and libertarian, were
influenced by Siebert, Petersen and Schramm's categorisations of the mass media.
According to Siebert, Petersen and Schramm, there are four distinct "rationales of
the mass media", reflecting four different political philosophies. The libertarian
theory of a "free" press, described above, is one such perspective that developed in
a specific historical context, namely 17th cenmry England and America. The role
of the journalist, according to this theory, is essentially that of "watchdog''
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checking on the government. However, journalists may also be "informers",
"entertainers" and "vendors" of a commodity for sale on the marketplace.
Libertarians believe that the media should be privately owned and accessible to
anyone with the economic means to do so.
Libertarian theory, as mentioned, was a reaction to the earlier authoritarian
theory. Authoritarian theory, originating in 16th and 17th century England, holds
that the task of the mass media is to promote government policies and prevent
criticism. The media may be either privately or publicly owned, but should be
government controlled. We could call journalists in this type of situation
"partisans".
By contrast, the Soviet-totalitarian model, influenced by Marxism, Leninism, and
Stalinism, defines the mass media as exclusively state-owned and controlled. The
mass media must reinforce the political system and the ideology of MarxismLeninism-Stalinism, and eradicate any forms of dissent; therefore the media can
only be accessible to devoted communist party members. The role of the journalist
that corresponds to this theory is that of "party propagandist".
The fourth theory identified by Siebert, Petersen and Schramm is the ZOth century
social responsibility model of the mass media, based on the idea of obligation. To a
certain extent, social responsibility view of the mass media resembles the
libertarian one - the media should inform, entertain, and sell, but questions the
libertarian assumption that the free market is open to all. This theory maintains
that mass media have an obligation to promote discussion which is open to all
members of society. Social responsibility is defined in professional ethics and
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controlled by community opinion and action. Journalists in a social responsibility
model would be "guardians" of morals or "agents of civil society".
Gurevitch and Blumler (1976:277, cited in Siune 1984:57) also provide examples
of different roles that may complement each other, in their study of the political
communication system.
Party spokesmen

Media Personnel

Audience

I.

Gladiator

Editorial Guide

Partisan

2.

Rational Persuader

Moderator

Liberal citizen

3.

Information Provider

Watchdog

Monitor

4.

Actor/Performer

Entertainer

Spectator

What these four different sets of roles show are not different media systems, but
examples of different perspectives on the same system. Although these observations
refer to the political communication system, they also serve to make a more general
point: roles are complementary, that is, they come in a set. Roles can be defined in
terms of relationships between different groups, in this case media personnel,
politicians, and public.
Attention needs to be given to the concept of role. At first glance, the definition of
role seems simple - it is a person's job or function. However, what it in fact refers
to is a person's expected function. There is more than one side to a role - it is an
idea which can only be formed in interaction between, and within the different
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groups. If we are to take the position that roles are formed in interaction, we
should look at the relationship between actors than the actors themselves. This
more complex understanding of the role concept has several implications.
To begin with, there is the question of perspective, which has already been
mentioned. As Gurevitch and Blumler's example and Petersen, Siebert and
Schramm's example have shown, there are a variety of viewpoints on the mass
media. Ognianova referred to these as "prescriptive press concepts". This means
that the same group of actors can be ascribed a variety of roles, depending on the
viewpoint. Within a media system, each group may have a different interpretation
of the role of another group. For example, while the public might see journalists as
"entertainers", politicians could define them as "propagandists". The journalists,
though, may think of themselves as "watchdogs".
Because roles are not fixed, but created in interaction, they can be either redefined
or reinforced, depending on what kind of two-way communication exists between
the groups. Journalists may adapt their behaviour, and take on the role of
"entertainers" in response to their perceptions of public demand, or they may
become more politically engaged if political links increase. However, their role
could also become more established as the profession becomes more unified and
defines itself more clearly - for example, as "neutral informers".
There may be contradictions between the expectations on a group and its
expectations of itself. For example, politicians could expect journalists to be
"political campaigners" while the public may expect them to be "neutral
informers", and media owners may prefer journalists who are "entertainers". These
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role expectations conflict with each other, but also with the journalists' perceived
view of themselves as "informed commentators". Which type of role will dominate
would depend on the amount of leverage held by the different groups.
Each group of actors is not necessarily homogenous. What is called "public
opinion" in fact consists of a spectrum of diverse opinions. Within the journalistic
profession, there may be differing ideas of the journalist's role. Some journalists
think that the journalist's role is that of a "neutral information provider", but others
see it as that of "commentator". An individual may define her or his personal role
differently from that of the group, believing, for instance, that other journalists are
concerned with "objectivity" whereas she or he is a "commentator". It could be
argued that, with the lack of a unifying code of ethics, and less frequent contact
with members of the media organisations other than one's own, an overall 'role'
may be less defined.
Each actor may feel that he or she has not just one role but a number of roles, both
over time and at any given time. A journalist can believe that his or her role is
essentially that of a ''provider of information", but can also be an "entertainer"
when news is not so serious, a "political campaigner" during elections, and a
"commentator" on issues he or she feels strongly about. Although each actor may
believe that they have one main role, these supplementary roles should also be
considered.
To summarise the above, the concept of role is more complex than it at first
appears. A role can be seen as a product of communication between actors, and is
based on expectations. Actors form these expectations on the basis of their cultural
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background. For example, as McNair found, the authoritarian culture of Soviet
Russia continued to influence the way many journalists approached their work,
and how politicians and public viewed them. Journalists in Britain, the United
States and Australia have the libertarian model as their background, but may be
influenced by social responsibility ethics.
A more complex interpretation of roles can further our understanding of the
journalist's position within the media system. Journalists may perceive their
expected roles, actual roles and personally desirable roles as different. By looking
at the differences between these, and the system's capacity to accommodate these,
we can see how flexible the system is. An examination of journalists' ideas of their
role can also reveal whether there are differences amongst journalists as a group,
or whether there is a sense of belonging to a journalistic community.
Political culture, traditions, and moral code are a few of the many cultural factors
that can contribute to understandings of roles. This raises the question of whether
we are dealing with structure or culture. As noted, Lee and Chu used the
definition of structure as institutionalised behaviour, and culture as
institutionalised values. In systems theory, actors ave part of structures. However,
behaviour and values are difficult to separate, reinforcing each other. It could be
said that interaction is structured. In other words, it occurs in a recurring,
recognisable form. It could also be said that interaction is influenced by culture. It
depends on shared expectations based on values.
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2.3.8 Journalism and Popular Culture
I have outlined some significant social influences on journalism, and have pointed
out that more attention needs to be paid to culture. This is, as I have already
mentioned, not easily identifiable, as we are dealing with multiple cultures when
using this term. This brings up another point: the idea of popular culture, and
how journalism relates to it.
In the introduction to ''Journalism and Popular Culture", Peter Dahlgren reminds

us not to be snobs and see popular culture as an oxymoron. During the 18th
century, with the Industrial Revolution and the development of capitalism,
"popular" came to mean "working class", whereas "culture" was an upper-class
collection of interests (theatre, opera, classical music, and anything else that cost
money). This distinction continued in social science - it seemed that "popular"
was a separate class to that of the analyst (Dahlgren 1992:5).
Dahlgren has a point. If we are claiming that journalism is a reflection of society,
we had better define society. We need to look at the "mass" in mass
communication, not just the communication. First of all, what is meant by
"popular"? Perhaps the simplest way of measuring popularity is in numerical
terms: the highest circulation, the highest ratings. But does this really tell us
about the audience or readership? It tells us how many people use media, but not
who or why, or in what way.
Colin Sparks (1992) looks into some interpretations of the term "popular",
beginning with Raymond Williams. Williams traces the usage of the word
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"popular" to the Renaissance, when it was seen as negative. During the French
Revolution, "popular'' was used in a more positive way. At that time, "popular"
encompassed a very large and diverse group - everyone in the "third estate", or
"people", which included the bourgeoisie, the urban poor, and the rural peasants.
This did not continue into the 20th century, Williams notes. "Popular" ceased to be
an idea of the left and became a slogan for right-wing and anti-communist
political parties. The modern left-wing view of "popular", according to Williams,
is critical, since this label assumes unity and classlessness - therefore it must be a
capitalist construction (as cited in Sparks 1992:25-29).
Another approach is taken by Stuart Hall (1978, cited in Sparks I 992), who sees
classes as theoretical, and the reality consisting of "the people" and "the powerbloc". Hall believes that one social group can convince another to accept a
particular ideology by the process of "interpellation". This means that "popular"
can be defined from different perspectives - Thatcherism, for example, could be
seen as "popular" because it transferred the ideologies of the right to the working
class (as cited in Sparks I 992:32-34).
John Fiske (I 992) uses Hall's divisions of power-bloc and people, defining the
former as an "alliance of interest" composed of government, politics, industry,
media, law, the education system, and other white male middle-class institutions.
Fiske divides news into three categories: official news, which is "generally the
news which the power-bloc wants the people to have", like America's Newsweek
or Time; alternative news, which covers different events, chosen by alternative
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criteria, and is radical and politicised; and popular news, disparagingly known as
"tabloid".
Popular news, Fiske surmises, is actually a form of rejection of the official news
media, because it does not accept ''their" truth, or "their" norms. Popular news
does not distinguish between fact and fiction, which is in complete opposition to
the official values of "objectivity" and ''truth". Fiske argues that tabloid scandalstories involving the rich-and-famous are in fact a means of criticising unequal
social divisions, as these people are portrayed negatively for having abused their
power (Fiske 1992:45-48).
This raises an interesting question - is "popular" different to "quality"? Peter
Dahlgren (1992:14) points out that the line between "tabloids" and "serious"
journalism is fluid. Dahlgren also reminds us that our definition of journalism
implies "hard news" or "politics" - but the majority of journalistic output does not
fall into these categories. How do we categorise advice columns, sport reports,
gossip, weather forecasts? How do we distinguish between journalism and nonjournalism?
Dahlgren identifies this as a "boundary maintenance problem" for journalists, in
their attempt to create a sense of professionalism and community. Journalists, says
Dahlgren, see themselves as objective individuals going to report on an event as a
professional for a media organisation. This view obscures the fact that journalists
are part of a social environment, and moreover that journalism contributes to the
construction of social meaning (Dahlgren 1992:10).
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Dahlgren, like McNair, believes that journalism should be analysed as part of
society. However, from a cultural studies perspective, journalists can be seen in a
different way - as part of popular culture. Journalists can be called "story tellers",
because news is like a narrative which creates its own 'world'. "Story telling",
according to Dahlgren, is the link between popular culture and journalism.
Alan Bell (1994), in his study of the language of the news media, found that news
differed little from "stories". Unlike personal narratives, news is rarely presented
in the first person and always relies on precise facts and figures, creating a sense
of objectivity and truth. Otherwise, news and stories share many features, such as
repetition. Recognition of familiar themes is comforting to us, since "community is
in part built upon members sharing the same stories" (Dahlgren 199Z:15).
The cultural studies perspective challenges the divisions of "rational/ serious"
versus "irrational/ frivolous", and suggests that journalism should be understood
as part of popular culture, not separate from it. It reminds us that journalism
draws from the culture it is part of, and is not solely the product of official
institutions, so it is inadequate to take only these into account in an analysis of the
social determinants of journalism.
We can see that journalists, by presenting news to their audiences in a
recognisable format, similar to personal narratives, share the same culture.
Moreover, different types of journalism (such as the categories Fiske has identified)
can be said to correspond to different audiences. However, if journalism is to be
described as popular culture, we need to examine journalists' relationship with
their audiences.
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2.3.9 Mass Media and the Public
Mass communication differs from private communication because "audience
members are separated not just from the communicator, but from each other'' (Bell
1994:86). There is also a time gap, especially with newspapers. Because of this,
journalists' ideas of their audience are likely to be vague. Alan Bell believes that
journalists are also distanced from their audience by their professionalism,
observing that "mass communicators are interested in their peers not their public"
(Bell 1994:90). This view was also held by Jane L.Curry (1990), who studied the
professionalism of journalists in Poland, and Tomasz Goban-Klas (1994), a Polish
media analyst.
Certainly, journalists' contact with their audience is limited. Direct feedback
from audience to a news organisation may be possible, but whether it reaches the
journalist is questionable. Circulation figures or ratings are not much of an
indication. The group "audience" is difficult to measure. Bell points out that the
"audience" can be divided into four categories: the target audience; those who
were expected but not specifically targeted; those who were not expected; and
those expected to be absent (Bell 1994:92).
Bell outlines three different theories of the relationship between journalists and
their audience. The first is the theory of audience design, which comes from
sociolinguistics. According to this theory, the communicator specifically designs
their communication style for the audience, or rather their perceived or target
audience. But this attributes a very passive role to the audience.
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The theory of audience accommodation stems from social psychology and holds
that the communicator modifies, or accommodates, their message to their
audience, according to what kind of feedback they have received. This can be seen
in interpersonal communication, but mass communication is by nature impersonal,
and noted above, it is not so easy for journalists to have direct contact with their
audience.
It could be that the audience accommodates, which means that "if the style does

not shift to suit the audience, the audience will shift to a style that does suit" (Bell
1994:107). According to Bell, audiences influence media. The audience is at an
advantage, because in the mass communication process, they have the power of
choice between paying attention to media messages or ignoring them.
First of all, though, mass communication needs to be put into perspective. It must
be remembered that mass communication is only one aspect of people's lives,
competing with private, or interpersonal communication. In other words, we
should not exaggerate the importance of the media as the sole source of
information. If the mass media do not address issues people are interested in, they
will be rejected, as Bell observes. For example, I have already referred to the

public's disrespect for the Polish Communist media. When they were unable to
trust in official sources of information, Polish people turned to their own
independent sources instead.
Public use of alternative media to compensate for the existing media organisations'
lack of relevant information can also be observed in Thailand. From May 17 to 19,
1992, the Thai army attacked a group of demonstrators in Bangkok, killing 19
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people. The military censored news broadcasts on television, and attempted to
censor the print media as well. These attempts were not entirely successful, as
some newspapers did publish reports on the incident. However, the most extensive
picture of the riots was provided by Thai and foreign television news footage
which had not been allowed to be shown on Thai television. Thousands of video
cassettes showing this footage were copied by Thai "video pirates", and these were
sold throughout the country (11ze Far Ea.stem Economic Review, I I June I992).
This, however, is not necessarily a characteristic of strictly state-controlled media
systems. In any media system, public consumption of media is not automatic, but
depends on what the media have to offer. Perhaps the term consumption is not
quite accurate. Public use of the media is not necessarily a matter of passive
consumption, but can be seen as active participation.
This can certainly be seen in Australia. While there is a chance for people to
phone or write their comments or complaints to television, radio or press, there is
no guarantee that their feedback will actually be made public, or that it will even
be taken into account by the media producers.
However, there are other forums where people can express their views, like
television talk shows with audience participation, talkback radio and internet
discussions. Groups who share a particular interest can create their own websites,
newsletters or "zines", and anyone with a digital video camera can make their own
films. These are only a few examples of how people who are not part of the
"media producer" group can actually be involved in creating alternative media
content.
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What this means is that journalists and other media personnel are not the only
information providers (or creators of reality), and moreover, they are not
necessarily the most trusted. Whether there are many sources of information
available, or only a few, in each case the credibility of the media can be perceived
as questionable.
Moreover, news programmes on television, or newspapers which focus on "hard
news", compete with entertainment programmes and magazines. This can result
in combinations of the two as "infotainmenf' television or tabloid newspapers.
From a cultural studies perspective, this can be seen as a reflection of popular
culture. Journalists are perceived by the public as entertainers, not informers.
Another blurring of the line between journalism and entertainment can be seen
when television news presenters or newspaper columnists become "stars" rather
than journalists. Fact and fantasy are further confused by actors becoming media
personnel in dramatised representations (in series such as Murphy Brown, or Lois
and Clark, or in movies such as "The Paper", and "Broadcast News", not to
mention all of the movies which feature "journalist" characters ) . The effect of all
of this is to reduce news media to the same two-dimensional artificiality as the
drama that represents it. It makes us ask whether the news is "real", or as
manufactured as the rest. If our images of journalists are Tintin or Clark Kent, can
we take them seriously?
There are certainly indications that maybe we do not, since there are many
comedies about on news organisations, like Frontline, and News.Kadio; and satires
of news content, like Good News Week, and The Panel, which take the
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"seriousness" out of the image of news production. It is not surprising that we can
easily become sceptical about the media. We can see through the images it
attempts to create for itself.
Considering the points above, the idea of "control" through the media loses its
validity. This does not mean that manipulation of the media is not possible - not
only in the obvious sense of censorship, but also in more subtle ways. For
example, by making use of a trendy theme, using clever marketing techniques, and
accessing the production process, public relations managers, politicians, or mediawise interest groups can certainly put their message across. But it must be
remembered that in this instance, these groups are dealing with a media-literate
public, who have access to many other sources of information. Total control of the
mass media is simply not possible, particularly with the spread of new technology.
In Thailand, for example, many people have acquired satellite dishes to watch

foreign news broadcasts.
However, this awareness of the media amongst the public does not exist in all
media systems. In some countries, for example Benin, discussed above, only a
small percentage of the population are able to read, and only a few have access to
televisions and radios. The majority are unlikely to come into contact with the
mass media. In this PW,1 the term "mass" media is inaccurate.

2.4

Summary
This chapter has outlined whyftledia systems cannot be adequately described as
either "free" or "repressed", lKlf' a~ "transitional" from one of these categories to
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the other. Instead, the classification of media system types as "open" or "closed"
is proposed, based on an analysis of social, political and cultural factors. These
the6ries will be summarised in the next chapter, which discusses their contribution
towards a theory of journalism's role in the media system.
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3

A THEORY OF JOURNALISM'S ROLE IN THE MEDIA SYSTEM

3. 1

Points to Address in a Theory of Media Systems

Journalism's role in the media system, in the context of the divergent theories
discussed, can be summarised as follows:
Firstly, the idea of "transition", which has been applied in a political and economic
sense to postcommunist countries, is a difficult term which cannot account for
differences between media systems. Each society has cultural characteristics which
are not reducible to its economic and political structure, and these should not be
neglected although they are harder to measure.
Secondly, classifications of media systems as "free" or "authoritarian" are based on
values which obscure the actual situation. Although the description of a media
system as "free" may appear to be based on a subjective definition, this is not
possible. The idea of "freedom of the press" is a historical development which
reflected and continues to reflect a particular political philosophy. Describing a
media system as "free" raises too many questions: Who or what is free from whom
or what? Who is free to do what, to what extent?
Likewise, the use of systems theory to analyse mass media communication needs to
be re-examined. Systems theory can reveal the linkages between structures but fails

to clarify processes. It may be more useful to look at the actors in the media system
themselves to observe how media content is produced, particularly the producers of
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that content. However, the labels "open" and "closed" can be useful in classifying
media systems.
Journalism can be viewed sociologically, that is, in its social context. McNair's
sociological perspective which takes the social determinants of journalism into
account is a useful contribution to a study of the mass media. Besides noting the
structural influences on journalism, McNair also considers the effects of
professional journalistic culture and the practical organisational and technical
constraints. McNair did not intend to classify media systems, but his approach
exposes the limitations of the authoritarian system/ control versus democratic

system/ freedom viewpoint.
Additionally, we need to consider the connection between media and change,
seeing mass communication as an increasingly complex process. However, it is too
simple to reduce this process to one which either reinforces or rejects existing
institutions. Downing's suggestions add another dimension to the previous theories
- the idea of communication as a process of ever-increasing complexity. This idea
also questions the view that the mass media preserve the status quo by reproducing
a dominant ideology. However, this does not mean that the mass media do not
reflect certain common assumptions, as textual analysis has shown. Moreover, it
certainly does not mean that mass communication causes social change. Instead,
mass communication could be seen as a vehicle for change, but also as a stabilizing
process.
It is inadequate to explain mass communicatioit ·ey applying a biological or

mathematical analogy, which sugge&ts that tlllere i$ some sort of natural progression
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in this process. We must consider the involvement of human agency. This means
examining power relations within the media system. However, power should not be
seen simply as the control which one person has over another, and cannot be
understood without analysing the roles of the different groups involved.
The definition of role used here is an expected function. Role should be seen as a
fluid concept since it is defined as having multiple interpretations. Investigating
roles in the media system can provide an insight into how it functions. Because
expectations of behaviour are informed by culture and ideologies, examining roles
enables us to see these significant, but hard to measure, aspects of the media system.
Beliefs are not visible, but behaviour is: what journalists believe translates into what
they aim to do - but in any system, there will always be limits on what journalists
can do.

Journalism should not be defined as the reporting of "hard news" only. The
boundaries between soft and hard news are unclear, and soft news is often
presented as hard news. Journalists present this picture of journalism as serious and
objective, but from a cultural studies perspective they are in fact part of popular
culture. This can be seen in their narrative style of communication. However, we
need to look more closely at the links between journalism and the popular - we
need to know whose culture is being referred to. Therefore, a study of journalism
should not neglect to examine the links between journalists and their audience.
The audience are not necessarily simply passive consumers of media content, but
can use that content for their own purposes. In short, the people using media
should not be seen as helpless and gullible. It should not be assumed that media
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audiences always believe everything they see, read or hear. They are likely to be
familiar with techniques of verbal and technical manipulation, and capable of
producing their own content. Therefore, like the ideal of "freedom", which fails to
describe the reality of media systems, its corresponding opposite, "control", too, is
an exaggeration.

3.1.1

Summary

Considering the above points, we can see that the mass communication process is
complex, with many aspects to be taken into account. It is therefore too simplistic
to reduce this to either a process of exclusive control by one group over another, or
on the other hand a process characterised by "freedom" and equal access.
Correspondingly, the role of the journalist cannot be understood as either lapdog or
watchdog.
What I am suggesting is that to understand journalism as part of a media system,
we first need to look at the overall structural factors and then at the strategies that
journalists take in their day-to-day work. Taking elements from systems theory and
the work of Downing, McNair and others, it is possible to construct a the.cry to
describe how media systems function, which will enable us to examine the role of
journalists.
The the.cry that is proposed here takes its expansive approach from systems the.cry,
making use of the concept of a system of interrelated parts, and the definitions of
"open" and "closed" systems. Systems theory could be criticised for ignoring the
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mechanisms of change, as I have pointed out, as it claims that the system functions
with the aim of maintaining stability. However, this could be viewed differently.
Maintenance of stability could also be understood as a recognition of the need to
adapt. From this perspective, the changes in eastern European nations appear more
reasonable than revolutionary. While theories of collapse or transformation assume
something has gone wrong, I would argue that change is normal and constant; it is
only with sudden change that it becomes particularly obvious, as it did with the socalled "revolutions" in eastern Europe in 1989.
At the centre of this investigation, however, are the producers of media content.
As I have stated, it is insufficient to study the connections between the various parts

of a media system, as systems theory does. This does not provide us with a
description for the process of media content production. It is this process which
should be the focus of our study. As Rodney Tiffen has observed, "understanding
newsmaking is a necessary basis for grasping the opportunities for, and constraints
upon, both the internal and external exercise of power upon news" (Tiffen
1993: I 77). A study of the process of newsmaking will enable us to take all of the
above points into account. Following McNair, we will look at the social influences
on journalism. First of all, though, it is necessary to develop a model to describe
media systems.

3.2

The Definition of a Media System

Reduced to the most basic level, a media system can be described as media
content production and its consumption. This is what all media systems have in
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common. All media systems are characterised by the interaction between media
organisations which produce culturally determined content, and a public who
receive and interpret that content. These media organisations are subject to
mechanisms of regulation which restrict their practices. Media consumption may
also be limited by political restriction of media distribution; also media may not be
equally accessible to all members of the public. This study is interested in the
production process rather than the public use of media.
In order to distinguish between media systems in some way, they could be viewed

as fluctuating between two opposing tendencies. This is represented by two
extremes (although there is no real possibility of either end being reached), which I
have already outlined, namely the open system and the closed system. These two
types of system are not categorised according to their different political or economic
arrangements, but by the different types of interaction within them. The idea of
open and closed systems was also used by Tomasz Goban-Klas (1994) in his analysis
of Polish journalism.
As mentioned above, open systems can be defined as those which allow for

communication to be maximised and diversified. An open system has multiple
channels of communication, that is, it offers access to a variety of sources of
information. The production of media content in an open system does not occur
within a confined organisation, but makes use of feedback from the public.
Closed systems can be described as systems in which communication is limited, its
content is narrowly defined, and few opportunities are given for feedback. In a
closed system, media production operates within very rigid parameters, isolated
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from the public. In contrast to open systems, communication in closed systems is
determined by one group which has the intention of total control of the media.
Authoritarian governments, for example, minimise the flow of information by
imposing strict controls on media production. Sources of information and media
content are limited.
Most importantly, it must be noted that an open media system is not a synonym for
a "free media". For example, as the following analysis of the Polish press will show,
the Polish media system has become more open, but the press is still subject to
certain restrictions and cannot be described as "free".

3.3

Analysis of a Media System: Three Factors

There are three factors that I suggest should be considered in an analysis of a
media system. These three factors are regulation, accessibility, and reciprocity.
Regulation relates to the limits within which the media organisations may function;
accessibility refers to the extent to which the public have access to the media; and
reciprocity describes the amount of interchange between the mass media and the
public.

3.3.1

Forms of Regulation

Regulation can be divided into external (legal or political), internal, or
professional. Legal regulation refers to the extent to which media are restricted or
assisted by legislation. The laws themselves are not as significant as their
implementation. Freedom of information laws, for example, can be hindered by
other regulations which deny access to information, such as laws on state secrets.
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Therefore, when analysing external regulation, we should first look at the laws that
exist, and then question whether these are actually enacted or exist only for show,
and also whether they may be counterbalanced by other laws.
However, the definition of regulation used here is not confined to legally binding
codes. External regulation includes other methods of political containment of the
media, which may be either formal or informal. Formal political regulation could
include the granting or denial of broadcasting licences, or making appointments to
managerial positions in media organisations as part of official practice. Informal
methods of political manipulation may involve the cultivation of personal contacts
between politicians and journalists.
This factor is dependent on the political culture and the political elites - not how
the political system is labelled. We can see the role politicians envisage for
journalists from the methods of regulation they employ. Is there, for example, legal
regulation involving heavily restricted access to information, backed by harsh
punishment? Or does the regulation of the media take a more subtle, informal
form?

The relationship of news organisations to the political institutions can also be seen

in terms of ownership. We need to distinguish between ownership by a political
party and ownership by the state. I am not suggesting that the amount of autonomy
a media organisation has is necessarily less if it is owned by the state than if it is
owned by a private individual. There is also the question of the media proprietor's

65

relationship with politicians. I will return to this issue in the discussion of Poland
below.
Internal regulation takes place within the media organisation. Journalists' work
practices will be affected by the organisation's rules or guidelines, and obviously
also by practical considerations. As in any organisation, certain restrictions are
simply unavoidable, such as hierarchy of decision-making, deadline pressures, and
stylistic constraints depending on medium. Tiris has been summarised above in the
work of McNair, Negrine, and Tiffen. Journalists are, after all, employees, and thus
are allocated a role by their employers.
Journalistic culture is another indirect form of regulation, which provides
journalists with a code of ethics and a sense of duty to the profession. Although
codes of ethics are only guidelines and not laws, journalists are still socialised to
conform to these expectations. This can be described as professional "regulation". It
influences journalistic practice, not only because it shapes the ways journalists
approach their own work, but also because it creates a feeling of shared
responsibility for the profession. Tiris sense of community functions as an ethical
restraint. If the sense of community is strong, journalists may see themselves as
watchdogs over their own profession. The idea of role is useful here, in analysing
journalists' views of their part in the media system.
Another way of analysing the extent of professionalism is by looking at media
associations, which include journalists' voluntary associations, committees
protecting journalists' rights, and organisations monitoring freedom of the press. In
an open system, such associations aim to ensure political recognition of the

66

independent status of journalists, and reinforce professional journalistic culture. In
a closed system, these organisations are limited or subordinated.

3.3.2 Accessibility

Accessibility is the extent to which the mass media are available for use by the
public. This means, firstly, that factors such as literacy, education, financial
resources, technology, and ethnicity are important. Therefore, we should first
inquire into these factors when studying a media system. Obviously, those who do
not speak the communicated language, or those who lack the money or education
for televisions or newspapers, are at a disadvantage.
The distribution of mass media relates to the distribution of these resources.
Education is particularly important, because the more educated people are, the more
sceptical of the media they are likely to be, as described above. They then have the
ability to make more informed choices, and can use media for their own purposes.
Secondly, technological development should also be taken into account, as more
advanced technology allows for more widespread distribution, and also more
sources of information. As McNair (1998) has shown, technology improves
techniques of newsgathering. More sources of information and faster
communication do not equal "better", though - there is also more room for error.
For the public, technology can enable more choice. However, this only becomes
significant when the first factor is considered. The availability of more advanced
technology in itself does not make for an open system. Certainly, it enables an even
greater access to information, if the socio-economic and cultural resources
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mentioned above are more equally distributed. But if on the other hand, these
resources are more unequally distributed, the inequality is compounded. Therefore
we should ask not only what kinds of technology are available but also to whom it is
available.

3.3.3 Reciprocity

Closely related to this is the potential for feedback, which I will refer to as
reciprocity. This factor can indicate the type of relationship that exists between the
public and the media. The question to ask here is, are the media willing to pay
attention to public feedback, and moreover, are they able to respond to it?
First of all, there must be feedback mechanisms in existence, at the very least.
Such feedback mechanisms could be surveys conducted by market research
organisations, or official research centres. Market research organisations provide
indirect contact between the public and media personnel, and between the public
and advertisers, by collecting data on public attitudes to media content. Through
this data, which can only be an estimation of the actual public attitudes, an image of
the public is created which media personnel take into account.
Most important in the feedback category, however, are opportunities for the public
to comment or criticise, which may be provided by the media organisations.
Initiative may also come from the public, in the form of advocacy groups which
attempt to influence either political decisions or media content. In an open system,
we would expect such groups to be influential. In a closed system, they would not
exist, or be suppressed, or ignored.
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Again, the existence of these mechanisms alone is of little value if there is no
subsequent response by the media, which is the condition of reciprocity. If the
relationship between media and public is characterised by reciprocity, we can
describe the media system as open. The media system in which media are not in
touch with the public is bound to encounter difficulty, for reasons I have already
discussed.
The term "audience" is not used here, because this term refers specifically to the
users of media content. As mentioned above, the audience do not necessarily use
the media as the media expect, and they may not pay attention at all. If we use the
term "public" instead, we are referring to the population in general, including those
who do not use media.
This distinction is important, because a study of the "audience" rather than the
"public" assumes that access to the media is equal, and disregards the factors
related to inequality. The extent of public participation relates to the openness of
the media system. If the audience (that is, those using the media) is in fact only a
small percentage of the population, the media system cannot be described as open.
It is, however, difficult to categorise the group "public" as one, as we are divided

by gender, age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, interests, and values. Basically, the
public is a very diverse group with different uses for mass media. For the purposes
of simplifying this model, I have not subdivided this group because, although quite
varied, it still represents one part of the mass media system.

69

I have outlined some of the areas in which we might gain information about media
systems. There is one other area which can also be analysed. Media content forms
the centre of this model and refers to the output of any media: newspaper or
magazine articles, television series or news programmes, radio broadcasts. Content
is created chiefly through media practices, but may also include advertising and
official press releases from political and economic organisations (which are still
processed according to media practices).
The more closed the system, the more media content will be limited - for example,
by government regulations or censorship. Media output can be assessed in content
analysis, which can show what is presented, and in what proportion, and textual
analysis, which attempts to decode this.
In order to show how this model can be used to describe media systems and the
role of the journalist, I will now turn to the example of Poland.
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4

JOURNALISM IN POLAND: AN OVERVIEW

4. 1 WHY POLAND?
Poland has experienced, and continues to experience, wide-ranging economic,
political and cultural changes after the collapse of communism. There are some
distinct features which make Poland particularly interesting for this study. These
will be explained in this chapter.
Throughout the period of communism, Poland was never quite as repressive as
other communist countries. For example, the Communist Party did not succeed in
undermining the influence of the Catholic church, which continued to play an
important part in people's lives. As communism was imposed on Poland by Russia
rather than internally established, it was always resented by most Poles, who felt
that it was a foreign, hostile ideology which conflicted with Polish national identity.
It must be noted that communist Poland was not a state with a completely clear

single-party system. Smaller parties were allowed to exist, although these were
forced into some sort of coalition with the Communist Party. This meant that there
was at least some potential for debate in the Sejm (Parliament).
Secondly, communist authority was undermined by underground resistance.
There was in fact a "dual system" operating under communism - the official and the
underground. For many official institutions there was a parallel underground
institution in operation. These represented an "opposition counter-culture", which
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grew significantly in the 1970s (Garton Ash 1983: 18). The government under
Prime Minister Gierek knew of the existence of these underground elements, but did
not attempt to eliminate them.
There was a second economy, which functioned independently of the state
economy, in which people exchanged goods on the black market. The official press
was countered by the underground press, which rejected the propaganda and lies of
the communist party press. There were underground publishers, notably NOWA,
which published more than 100 banned works, such as Orwell's "Animal Farm".
There was even a "Flying University" established in January 1978, which held
secret seminars. As Timothy Garton Ash observes, Poles "grew up with two codes of
behaviour, two languages - the public and the private - two histories - the official
and the unofficial" (Garton Ash 1983:280).
The extent of resistance to communism was also reflected in the existence of a
strong oppositional movement, which played a significant part in bringing about
change. The Solidarity social movement was so powerful that at its height it
managed to involve more than half of the adult population of Poland. Today,
postcommunist elites continue to be challenged by increasing numbers of political
parties in a political system that is characterised by instability.
Of all the countries in the region, it can be argued that Poland was subject to the
most rapid political and economic reforms. The constitution was almost
immediately completely revised, following the western democratic format, before
the end of 1989. Economic reforms were introduced just as quickly in the
"Balcerowicz Plan", devised by the Finance Minister of that name, which involved
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large-scale privatisation and freeing up of the market. Poland now has a much
higher rate of unemployment than it had under communism, and there is an
increasing distance between socio-economic groups.
In postcommunist Poland, there is now competition between print media in a free
market. The media are no longer wedded to the communist party. Instead, they can
choose their partners amongst the increasing numbers of political parties that now
exist in Poland. Publications try to secure their own particular section of the
reading public. However, this means taking a specific ideological direction in order
to maintain their niche position. Media expert Karol Jakubowicz remarks that "you
have to read between two and five newspapers every day to learn what is
happening in Poland" (Gross 1994).
Although journalists claim to be "objective", their connections with politicians
continue to be close. In this respect little has changed, as Jakubowicz observes:
"Advocacy journalism existed before 1989 and it exists today. The old and new
journalists approach the profession the same way" (quoted in Gross 1994). Teresa
Sasinska-Klas, Director of Krakow's School of Journalism, also feels that the Polish
media are "still highly politicised", and that "Li]ournalistic responsibility along with
the other elements of professionalization are generally lacking" (quoted in Gross
1994).
All of this makes Poland an interesting case study, particularly the current position
of journalists in Poland. Because of the competing ideological backgrounds of
communism and the resistance to it, it is difficult to speak of one "dominant
ideology" for journalists. We could expect Polish journalists to be influenced by
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either one, both, or none of these ideologies. Moreover, the existence of competing
ideologies is also significant for an investigation into the journalist's role.
There are several questions to be answered regarding journalism's role in Poland.
To what extent is there a "journalistic culture" that overrides other interests? Do
Polish journalists experience a definite sense of identity as members of a
professional community? How have the social, political and economic changes in
Poland affected this sense of professional identity?
Before turning to these questions, which I will address in the section on
professional regulation, I will give a brief summary of the historical and
contemporary background of journalism in Poland, providing an overview of the
political, economic, social and cultural conditions. This research is limited to the
press, the oldest medium with a long history in Poland.

4.2

JOURNALISM IN COMMUNIST POLAND

Before the collapse of communism in Poland, two distinct types of journalism
existed: official journalism and underground journalism. Since communism was
imposed on Poland by Russia after the Second World War, Poland was compelled to
follow the Russian social rules, in which information was used as an instrument of
social control. According to Stalinist theory, the function of the media was simply to
legitimise the authoritarian system.
In the 1970s, there was a slight relaxation of the authoritarian-style communist
rule (Garton Ash 1983), and gradual infiltration of trends from the west - the most
obvious followers of these were the hippies, punks, and skinheads who appeared in
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the streets of Warsaw (Goban-Klas 1994:157). The climate was conducive to
criticism of the government. There was certainly an increase in the number of
strikes in the early 1980s, and Prime Minister Gierek was expelled from office in
October 1980 because the Communist Party wished to maintain an appearance of
control. Prime Minister Kania, Gierek's replacement, allowed the "registration" of
Solidarity Trade Union (Alexander 1998). At the same time, an alternative,
underground press representing the views of Solidarity, intellectuals, and the
church, began to develop.
Before the imposition of martial law in December 1981, the bolder of the official
newspapers also began to publish more controversial articles. However, just as the
communist system appeared to be opening up, there was a severe crackdown on the
media. In the late 1980s, Gorbachev's politics of "glasnost" and "perestroika"
found resonance in Poland too, and once again opened up the possibility of political
change. This was expressed in the Round Table talks between Solidarity and the
Communist Party, which involved discussions on how to reduce the powers of the
old system in order for Poland to become a multi-party constitutional republic.

4.3

JOURNALISM IN POLAND TODAY
In the 1990s, Poland is no longer simply divided into those who are for

communism and those against. The divisions are now much more complex,
affecting journalists. However, we should not draw a clear dividing line between
communist Poland and 1990s Poland. Although the communists lost their
monopoly on the press, they did not relinquish all of their power over it. The
process of privatisation, as I will show, did not enable the press to be free from
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political influence. The structures which enabled communist prime ministers to
control the press were passed on to their successors, whether postcommunist or
right-wing. In Poland, as in other countries, politicians continue to restrict media
access to certain information, casting doubt on their claim that the Polish media is
free from political control.
However, political factors are not the only ones to consider when inquiring into the
nature of the media system. Nor are economic factors. Foreign investors are also
blamed for exercising too much influence over the press, but this too is a
simplification. Different companies (or individuals) have different methods of
managing their newspapers, and not all aim to take control. The existence of
foreign ownership is not in itself evidence for self-interested control by the owner.
By looking more closely at media personnel in Poland and the organisations they
work for, we can see that there are significant differences between these
organisations. This questions the determinism of systems theory. If structures
determined the process of mass communication to the extent suggested by systems
theory, we would assume media organisations to be almost identical, as they are
part of the same system and affected by the same patterns of interaction with other
institutions. But this is not the case. Communication is not a unified process. There
are many messages, many media, and many communicators.
There was not, as suggested, a sudden and dramatic transformation from one type
of press to another. Different types of change took place during and after
communism. Commercialisation of media content, for example, was a process that
began during the 1970s with the approval of the Communist Party. Several legal
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changes took place under the first postcommunist governments, but political
regulation of the media continued. Because of these differences, and because of the
influence of the past on the present, I have not divided this research into communist
and postcommunist Poland.
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5

Legal Regulation of the Media in Poland
This study of the Polish print media will begin with the most obvious form of
regulation - that is, regulatory laws which determine the limits within which the
media can operate. As this chapter will show, the media during the communist era
were subject to strict laws deliberately designed to subordinate it to the Communist
Party. However, while many media laws have changed completely, and censorship
has been abolished, the media in postcommunist Poland are also subject to
restrictive legal regulation.

5.1

Legal Regulation under Communism

The Communist Party employed a variety of methods to control the press. The first
of these was to bring the press, and the system of distribution, under state
ownership. From the outset, the Communist Party had a virtual monopoly over the
print media. The Workers' Publishing Co-operative "Press-Book Movement" (RSW),
established in 194 7, owned 22 publishing houses, 17 printing houses, 2 press photo
agencies, and 34 496 kiosks. This gave the Communist Party a monopoly on
distribution, and meant that numbers and types of publications available in kiosks
could also be limited as the Party wished. Although RSW did not own the majority
of publications available, it did have the largest overall circulation - 86.5% of the
daily press and 71.5% of the weekly press in 1989 (Giorgi 1995:74). However,
state ownership of the media does not in itself guarantee a malleable press.
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Journalists in communist Poland found themselves in a difficult situation.
Certainly, some journalists were loyal members of the Communist Party, but many
journalists were not. They were expected to serve the Communist Party, yet the
Party was suspicious of them. Moreover, there was no respect for journalists from
the public, whose opinion was simply "prasa klamie -the press lies". This opinion
went back a long way; in 1961, S.J. Lee, a well-known aphorist, put it bluntly: "It
is simply too hard to believe that the lie was in existence before the invention of
printing." Journalists themselves had little control over their own work. The main
problems facing journalists during the last two decades of communism were
restricted access to information and the system of censorship. All information came
from the same source, the Polish Press Agency.
Censorship was carried out by the Main Administration for Control of Press,
Publications, and Public Performances, through the Communist Party's Central
Committee Press Department. Censors worked according to a strict and
continuously changing book of guidelines, known as the Book of Instructions and
Directions. The extent of censorship varied, but was most restrictive during the
period of martial law. Some publications were more heavily censored than others;
the higher a paper's circulation, the more cautiously it was scrutinised. The most
censored publications included Polityka weekly and Zycie Warszauy (Albright
1983: 13-14).
Not every registered newspaper was under the control of the Communist Party;
there were a few independent, legal publications, most of them representing the
Catholic church. These played a significant role in uniting different voices in
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opposition. Contributors to the Krakow weekly Tygodnik Powszechny (Weekly
Review) and the Warsaw monthly JViez (Link) included Karol Wojtyla, before
becoming Pope John Paul II, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who became Poland's first prime
minister, and both Catholic and non-Catholic intellectuals (Garton Ash 1983: 19).
Such publications were allowed a certain amount of freedom because of their status
as church publications.
Adam Szostkiewicz, political editor of Tygodnik Powszechny, believes that the
privileged situation of the paper was due to both its accumulated prestige and the
fact that the Communist Party needed a "proof of how pluralist, and how tolerant,
this specific Polish communist regime was". 4 Still, there was no freedom from the
censors, who could ultimately decide "what was to be a taboo subject, not to be
negotiated in any way".
A new censorship law was enacted in October 1981, after a year of debate.
Although portrayed as a liberalization, it was still forbidden to criticise communism
or communist countries, or to mention Solidarity, which was an illegal organisation
(Goban-Klas 1994: 171). According to the October 1981 censorship law, the
following were forbidden:
Art. 2. A call for overthrowing, insulting, ridiculing, or demeaning the

constitutional system of the PRL
Art. 3. An attack on the constitutional principles of the foreign policy and alliances

of the PRL

4

Interview, Krakow, 30th October 1998
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Art. 6. A call for criminal activities or praise of them.

This means that any kind of criticism of communism or communist countries was
banned, as was mention of Solidarity as it was considered an illegal organisation
(Goban-Klas 1994:171). In July 1983, further restrictive laws were passed
forbidding the publication of anything considered "a threat to state security or
defence" or any kind of 'criminal' content (Goban -Klas 1994: 19 3).
The Communist Party's control of the press involved more than just a set of rules
which were simply applied to journalists' articles. In practice, the system of
censorship was "very vague," Adam Szostkiewicz explained, "on the principle that
once you've got clear guidelines it's more difficult for you to manipulate, because a
journalist or editor might use these guidelines to disagree with you." 5 Keeping the
guidelines unclear was one way for the Communist Party to pre-empt criticism from
journalists.
The changes to the media laws in Poland reflected changes to the political system,
and to the economic order. In Poland, changes relating to the mass media occurred
more rapidly and dramatically than changes in many other spheres, as the concept
of "free press" was seen as central to democracy (Borkowska 1999:271). The
process of democratisation in Poland did not involve the establishment of entirely
new institutions, like in the neighbouring Czech Republic, but rather the
modification of existing institutions (Sasinska-Klas 1999:20).

5
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This means, significantly, that the old system of political control of the press was
not replaced with a completely different one, although censorship was formally
abolished in law in 1990. The old communist elite could easily retain important
positions, both in politics and business. Some conservative politicians criticised the
process of privatising the press for failing to "de-communise", pointing out that too
many publications were still run by the former staff (Goban-Klas 1994:223). In
fact the process was highly politicised.
The transformation of the media began with a series of legal changes. The
constitution was changed on 29 December 1989, declaring Poland a multi-party
republic. Changes to press law, and the abolition of state control and censorship
came into effect on I I April I 990. The privatisation of the RSW co-operative was
made a law on 22 March. It was to be transferred to private ownership under the
supervision of a Liquidation Committee, which supposedly represented a spectrum
of interests in the print sector (Giorgi 1995:19).
However, the committee was appointed by Prime Minister Mazowiecki, as were the
heads of state radio and television and the head of the Polish Press Agency. Thus the
process of change in the media was politicised from the beginning. The guidelines
given to the Liquidation Committee were provided by the Parliamentary Committee
of Culture and the Media, and stated that the tasks of the Liquidation Committee
were to:
•

regulate privatisation allowing for both national and foreign investments,

•

protect financially weak titles judged significant for Polish culture,
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•

protect the rights of employees of existing publications,

•

prevent strong political party influence on the press,

•

prevent former nomenklatura from dominating (Giorgi 1995: 20).
The Committee was also to divide up and redistribute RSW titles, allocating some

to journalists' co-operatives, some to be sold to political parties, and some to be sold
on the free market (Goban-Klas 1999:60). This gave the Committee considerable
power. However, the guidelines have not been adequately met. The change in
ownership structure resulting from these legal changes means that there were also
some significant organisational changes as a result. These will be examined later.
The liquidation process supposedly gave journalists' co-operatives priority, but this
was difficult to realise. At the time of liquidation, the local journalists' co-operative
in Poznan, where Wprost weekly was published, applied for and received
ownership rights to the weekly. During that time, the weekly was beginning to
become more prestigious.
However, a company by the name of Agencja Reklamowo-Wydawnicza (The
Advertising and Publishing Agency) bought the rights from the co-operative and
began publishing Wprost. This company was co-owned by Marek Krol, who is

Wprosfs editor-in-chief. Interestingly, Krol had become the Communist Party's
chief of propaganda in I 989, as communism was beginning to end.
Therefore, this takeover was viewed by some critics as "crony capitalism",
meaning that the influential positions which were formerly held by the Communist
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Party were simply transferred to the old boys. 6 Even more interestingly, though,

Wprostis seen as ideologically to the right of the political spectrum. Some readers
of the magazine specifically chose it over its main competitor Polityka weekly,
because "Polityka is associated with the postcommunists", and " Wprost is not
communist".
In September 1998, the Liquidation Commission argued in court that it still had
the rights to Wprost The Commission claims that no co-operative had actually
been established at Wprost, and therefore the magazine could not be taken over or
sold. However, Wprosfs lawyer put forward the counter-argument that the
Commission had no rights to Wprost as it had neither published it nor registered it,
unlike the current owner. 7

5.2

Current Polish Media Laws and Their Implications for Journalists
One of the biggest problems for contemporary Polish journalists is the press law.

Despite numerous revisions, it continues to be vague. Moreover, these unclear laws,
which will be discussed below, can easily become restrictive, as they are open to
interpretation. The ambiguous legal framework has a lot in common with the
Communist Party's principle that guidelines should not be too clear, in case they
could be used against their designers.
Current Polish press laws, although they are presented as liberal, can in fact
restrict journalists' ability to report on anything they choose, by denying them
access to certain information, and preventing them from exercising criticism. This
6

(The Warsaw Voice, September 20, 1998, no.38 (517))
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can be seen as a remnant of communist political culture - or typical of politicians in
an unstable political system. Polish politicians' hesitancy involved in finalising
media laws is also a reflection of Poland's political instability.
Censorship may have been immediately banned from the new system with great
idealistic zeal, but once the floodgates of democracy were opened, it began to
appear less like an evil practice and more like an efficient mechanism for coping
with the mass media. According to a 1992 survey of Polish parliamentarians'
opinions of the media, 5 5% of the politicians were in favour of bringing back
censorship. The survey also found that politicians felt that the journalist's role was
firstly to promote correct values amongst citizens, and secondarily to provide
information (Goban-Klas 1999:66-7).
The new Polish constitution adopted in 1997 prohibits censorship and supposedly
allows "freedom to express opinions, to acquire and disseminate information" - but
it also makes exceptions, in rather vague terms, "to protect the freedoms and rights
of other persons and economic subjects, public order, security or important
economic interests of the state"(CPJ 1998).
The perspective on the mass media which is expressed in the Polish constitution is
that it is vital for the media to be seen as free, yet at the same time, the media need
to recognise that there are limits. The constitutional statement of "freedom of the
press", also found in other constitutions in eastern Europe, does not guarantee that
this freedom will be implemented in practice.

7

The Warsaw Voice, September fl/)

J 998, no.38 (51 7)
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As Jeremy Druker of the Institute for Journalism in Transition has observed,

"[a]lmost everywhere in the region, constitutions guarantee a right to information
but leave it up to an envisioned law to define both that right and the way access
should actually work" (Druker 1998). These laws, however, often never come into
being. Druker cites Berti! Cottier, of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, who
explains that governments are not enthusiastic about preparing laws that will
enable others to act as watchdogs (Dmker 1998).
From a journalist's point of view, the formal existence of freedoms in a constitution
does not reflect the reality, as politicians are well placed to avoid the formalities in
practice. "It doesn't matter that the new constitution and the European convention
on human rights and freedom guarantee the right to be informed in Poland; the
less experienced the government is, the more it keeps secrets from the press," notes
one journalist (Podemski 199 7).
The law on state secrets is one of the major hindrances that stands in the way of
the constitution. Politicians, who often mistrust the media, protect themselves from
journalistic investigations by classifying potentially damaging information as
inaccessible "state secrets". The 1982 law on classified and confidential
information prevents those who possess such information from passing it on.
Politicians continued to be attracted to this law, which originated in the period of
martial law. In 1993, Prime Minister Suchocka's government approved a draft
which was almost identical, and a similar bill was accepted by the next government
under Prime Minister Pawlak.
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Now the Ministry of Internal Affairs has sent another similarly restrictive bill to the
Prime Minister's Office (Rutkiewicz 1999). If the bill becomes law, and does not
clearly define what kind of information "classified" and "confidential" information
is, this will deny journalists access to anything politicians want to hide. Even if no
changes are made, the current laws dating from 1982 are still restrictive.
So-called "state and security service secrets", even if uncovered independently
without informants, cannot be published. "State secrets" are currently protected
from publication by a 1983 law which was introduced during the period of martial
law. In 1996, the Warsaw Provincial Court accused Jerzy Urban, editor-in-chief of
the satirical weekly ME, of publishing "news constituting a state secret". MEhad
published documents from 1958 which revealed that the director of Prime Minister
Olszewski's advisory team had collaborated with the communist Security Service,
SB. Urban was sentenced to one year in prison and ordered to pay a fine of 10,000

Zlotys (about $AUS5000). Moreover he was banned from working as a journalist
and editor for a year (Swiecka 1996).
Articles in Poland's penal code referring to libel could also be used against
journalists. Although President Aleksander Kwasniewski promised to remove the
provisions on libel in 1996, Prime Minister Buzek's government has made no effort
to do so (Committee for the Protection of Journalists: Annual Report 1998). Now
that Kwasniewski is being hit with harsh criticism from Zycie daily, he is not likely
to argue so strongly against the punishment for libel. Article 236 of the penal code
states that insulting a public official is punishable by up to two years in prison.
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President Kwasniewski is currently suing Zycie for libel. 8 Zycie published an
article in August 1997 claiming that Kwasniewski held a secret meeting with a
Russian intelligence agent, Victor Alganov, in the spa town Cetniewo three years
ago. Alganov was also friends with Prime Minister Oleksy, who was discredited in
I 995 for allegedly working as an agent of the Soviet, and then the Russian secret
service. After the "Oleksy affair", the right-wing press began to investigate the past
activities of SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) and SdRP (Social Democracy of the
Republic of Poland) leaders. Wprost weekly even suggested that there were Russian
secret service agents amongst the SLD and that the secret service had assisted in the
creation of the party.
The Kwasniewski-Zycie libel case is being debated in court, bringing Zycie a lot of
publicity. Kwasniewski's defence team are trying to prove that the president was
not even in Poland at the time of the supposed meeting; Zycie responded with
several witnesses who said that they had seen the president in Cetniewo.
Kwasniewski is demanding a front-page apology and a payment of 2.5 million
zlotys. The extremely high large sum that Kwasniewski has demanded has led
right-wing politicians to speculate that the president is trying to bankrupt Zycie,
which is Poland's largest right-wing daily newspaper (Golik I 998).
The laws against libel are easy 4Nl'pply, and not pnlyconvenient for politicians. A
regional daily, Dziennik Baltycla~ pu1'lished an arti!;JW s~sting that there were
'

certain "irregularities" in contracts &awn up betw~:µ the Polish Postal Service and
the privat~~ompany Banpol. Banpol accused the ne\¥spaper of giving it a bad

8

At the time of the interviews with Zycie journalists, December 199' tJi.e case was still continuing.
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name and took it to court. The regional court in Gdansk then ordered Dziennik
Baltycld to pay Banpol a large sum in compensation, and to stop publishing further

information about the company. 9 This is a form of censorship.
Besides the law on state secrets and the laws against libel, there are several other
restrictions in the Polish press law which could limit journalists, which Izabela
Dobosz, a judge at the High Administrative Court points out. Although there is no
censorship, there is a legal requirement to publish certain information. Articles 345 of the press law state that official notices must be published on demand, unedited.
In line with international standards, those involved in court cases are protected by
article 13 of the press law, and the right to privacy is protected by article 14.6,
which states that no private information is to be given without permission of the
individual involved (Dobosz 1999:77). In any case, Poland as a member of the
European Union will be forced to change its laws to conform to European standards
- although many European countries still have their own laws.
A further problem for journalists is that they can be made to reveal their sources.
Two editors from Zycie Warszauywere charged with refusal to reveal the source of
a published document in January 1997. The document in question revealed the
official reason behind the discontinuation of the investigation into the Oleksy affair
(the name given to the scandal involving Prime Minister Oleksy, accused of
collaborating with the Russian Secret Service). Mfirek ,Zielenewski, an editor of

Wprost, called the indictment "an extremely dangerous prece4ent, dangerous for
the entire journalistic community, and for freedom of speech and publication....

9

Rzeczpospolita, 8 December 1998, no.28 7
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The indictment comes into conflict with the principle of absolute protection of a
newspaper [sic] sources, one of journalism's most holy rules."

5.3

10

Summary
Legal regulation in communist Poland clearly reflects efforts to keep the media

system closed. Through communist laws, the role of the journalist was defined as a
representative of authority, and a guardian of the security of the state. The strict
laws of censorship that were made during the period of martial law determined
what Polish journalists could and could not discuss. Although this law does not
apply today, Poland's media laws do not guarantee a completely open system.
Current laws suggest that the journalist's role is to respect the nation's leaders and
to refrain from undermining the legitimacy of their rule.
Firstly, the laws on state secrets are still used to prevent journalists from accessing
information that politicians see as damaging to their interests. Secondly, journalists
who publicise such information, even if gained through legitimate sources, can be
confronted with charges of libel. Moreover, journalists can be made to reveal their
sources, which contradicts journalistic ethics. The Constitution may guarantee
freedom of speech, but in fact with the current media laws, journalists can actually
be punished for criticism of politicians or commercial organisations.

10
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6

Political Regulation
Although politicians make laws, political regulation differs from legal regulation,
as it refers to opportunities for political manipulation of the media which are not set
out in a legal code. Politicians are in a privileged position which enables them to
use a variety of methods to influence the media. These methods, described here as
political regulation, will be examined in this chapter. In Poland, interaction
between journalists and politicians was common during the communist era and
continues today, as this chapter will show.

6. 1

Informal Political Regulation in Communist Poland

The Communist Party was able to exert influence on journalists through informal
means. Because many journalists, especially those at the higher levels, were
members of the Party, there was frequent interaction between the Party elite and
journalists at Party meetings (Curry 1990:83). Party membership was beneficial for
journalists as it enabled them to make contacts who were useful sources of
information. Also, it was a means of obtaining a promotion to an editorial or
management position (Curry 1990:84).
Politicians could not afford to be too obvious in their control of the media, as this
might have had the effect of alienating too many journalists. In fact, many
journalists were suspicious of government officials and did not trust their
information, doing their best to find non-government sources. Therefore
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government officials used their personal connections to the editors to prevent the
publication of potentially damaging information. I I
Alternatively, they could try being friendly to the journalist who was writing about
them, in order to get a good write-up (Curry 1990:88). The nice-guy strategy was
also employed at press conferences. Politicians appeared to help journalists by
giving editors answers to their questions and also suggestions on how to write about
the issue (Curry 1990:82).
Another point that is important to note when considering the nature of political
regulation during the last decade of communism is that it was not consistent. The
extent of political restriction varied from region to region; it often depended on
individual decisions. The local Party Secretary made decisions on what kind of
information was permitted. One Party journalist commented, "What I can write in
Krakow I can't write in Warsaw, what I can write today I can't write tomorrow"
(Garton Ash 1983:138). This was both an advantage and a disadvantage for
journalists, as it sometimes broadened, sometimes narrowed, their opportunities.

6.2

Postcommunist Political Regulation

The rapid pace of the political changes of 1989 may have been too much for some,
who found themselves at the receiving end of a flood of journalistic criticism
unleashed with the abolition of censorship. The Church, for one, became concerned
for the need for Christian values in television and radio, and politicians Pawlak and
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Walesa also had their reservations about the new idea of press freedom
(Weidemann 1999:48).
Not surprisingly, the first postcommunist governments made various attempts to
regulate the media in order to minimise its potential for criticism. Again, we must
note that political regulation of the press cannot be simplified to either freedom or
control. There are two aspects of political regulation of the media which need to be
taken into account here - the legislative aims of the political actor, not only the final
outcome, which is discussed in the category of legal regulation; and the public
relations aspect.
Firstly, prime ministers or ruling political parties can attempt to make legislative
changes which will increase their ability to restrict information. These attempts
may fail, if the legislation is not passed. In Poland, where politics is characterised by
a spectrum of diverse ideologies, and ever-changing alliances, one side's attempts to
pass a law are likely to end in insoluble debate. Even if a political party were to
succeed in getting their bill passed, the resulting law could be perceived negatively
by the media, who could then damage the party's reputation. Secondly, political
actors can try to use the media to promote themselves and their policies. This
depends on the public relations mastery of the politician or party involved. Like
legal change, it does not guarantee popularity, and could result in unpopularity.

6.2.1

Prime Ministers and the Media

Tomasz Goban-Klas (I 999) has summarised the relationships between the
different political actors and the media. Those who were most involved with the
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media were the prime ministers. The new political situation meant that prime
ministers now had greater cause for concern about their image in the media. Of the
many prime ministers that governed Poland after communism, only some were able
to deal with the new problem of public relations.
Among the successful communicators was the first freely elected prime minister,
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Mazowiecki was a journalist himself, and therefore had no
problems dealing with the press. Hanna Suchocka, prime minister in 199 Z and
again in 1995, was fortunately charismatic enough to receive favourable
representation in the media. Wlodzimierz Cimosiewicz, prime minister for only a
short term in 1996, had already achieved popularity as justice minister, for
instigating Operation "Clean Hands" (stopping public officials' business rorts).
Most importantly, he knew how to use media, especially television, by making short
and precise comments (Goban-Klas 1999:61).
Considering the circumstances, it is not surprising that a few prime ministers were
unable to win the public relations game. Mazowiecki's successor Jan Krzysztof
Bielecki, like many other politicians, was simply inexperienced in public relations
and did not know how to interact with the media or fend off its attacks (Goban-Klas
1999:61). Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, who was in office in 1992 and from
1993 to 1995, tried to use Miss Polonia as his media speaker. Nice try, but it failed
to convince the public of the Prime Minister's ability to govern the country.
Pawlak's statement that "directing a state also means directing information in the
interests of the state" (cited in Goban-Klas 1999:62) reveals his attitude towards the
press: obviously influenced by the previous regime's ideology.

94

Prime Minister Jan Olszewski tried to gain more control of the media, and sacked
the head of the PAP, the Polish Press Agency, who had been nominated by
Mazowiecki, and changed the structure of the agency to suit his own needs.
Olszewski tried to gain control of Kzeczpospolita, but failed. He gave interviews to
journalists from the conservative Nouy Swiat, but never to the more critical Ga.zeta
Wyborcza. When Pawlak succeeded Olszewski, he too sacked the head of the PAP,
as he believed that the agency had spread information which damaged stability
(Goban-Klas 1999:61).
Perhaps the biggest media failure was Prime Minister Josef Oleksy, who was
accused by the media of collaborating with the Russian secret service. This provided
endless amounts of sensational material, particularly for the popular press, and
became known as "the Oleksy affair". It has become an enduring topic in the
media, and is still referred to in the press today. In 1996, Kzeczpospolita daily
called for his dismissal, and the shamed prime minister resigned (Goban-Klas
1999:62).
The current prime minister of Poland, Jerzy Buzek, is aware of the necessity of
maintaining a favourable presentation in the media and tries to avoid conflict. So
far, Buzek has been relatively successful. This can be seen in the media's treatment
of Prime Minister Buzek as he currently faces accusations of collaboration with the
secret services in the communist past. The Prime Minister's accuser is Tomasz
Karwowski, of the Confederation for an Independent Poland - Homeland (KPNOjczyzna), who has filed a motion with Warsaw's Vetting Court for the second time.
Karwowski claims that the previous negative verdict of the Public Interest

95

Commissioner, Bagu.slaw Nizienski, was politically biased and ignored significant
evidence against the Prime Minister. 12
Allegations that politicians were involved in spying has been a popular theme in
the media since the process of lustration, or vetting, of senior officials began after
communism. The Oleksy affair, described above, is still of interest to the media, and
the current president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, is also under investigation for
spying. Therefore one would expect the Buzek case to be just as sensationalised.
However, many media organisations stated their support for the Prime Minister
and refused to continue publicising Karwowski's accusations. Gazeta Wyborcza
published a statement signed by about 30 newspapers, radio stations and 1V
stations. The media statement said that Karwowski was trying to draw attention to
himself in the media, and that the case had been given enough publicity already.

13

6.2.2 Presidents and the Media

The president is another political actor who needs to maintain a good relationship
with the media. Lech Walesa, as the leader of the Solidarity movement, had always
argued for press freedom, but this soon changed once he was elected president.
Walesa felt it was important for the media to support him without criticism. He
awarded himself the ability to nominate one third of the members of the Television
and Radio Council (Goban-Klas 1999:64). Walesa even called in a general to be a
member of that Council, as he found it too hard to control (Weidemann 1999:48).
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However, Walesa did not receive the kind of coverage from the media that he had
demanded. Gazeta Wyborcza, which started out as a Solidarity paper, did not
support Walesa in his re-election campaign. The Solidarity logo was taken off the
paper's title as punishment for its disobedience, but this did not have any adverse
effects. The right-wing press also turned against Walesa, accusing him of
collaborating with the communists. 14
Walesa's successor, President Aleksander Kwasniewski, was able to use the media
to widely publicise his election campaign in 1995, proclaiming his interest in
entering Poland into the European Union and NATO. Polls showed great popular
support for Kwaniewski (Goban-Klas 1999:64). However, this popularity did not
last. Even Super Express, a paper with little interest in politics, criticised
Kwasniewski on his visit to the United Nations headquarters, noting that the
president arrived late, and was drunk during his speech. On returning to Poland,
students threw eggs at the president. 15 Now Kwasniewski is being cast as an enemy
in the right-wing press.

16

6.2.3 Disputes Between Media Organisations and Political Parties
Each of the major political parties has a different perspective on the media, which,
as I mentioned above, hinders effective changes to media laws. What all political
parties seem to share, though, is a readiness to spot bias against them in the media.

Tomasz Sakiewicz - Interview 6, Warsaw, 11 1h December 1998
The Warsaw Voice, October 16, 1996, no 41 (416)
16 Lukasz Warzecha and Andrzej Potocki - Interview 7, Warsaw, 11t11 December 1998
14
15
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The SdRP (Social Democratic Party, consisting of former communists) do not have
a defined media policy, but its members feel discriminated against by the media,
which they see as biased to the right, particularly television (Goban-Klas 1999:65).
In March 1998, the SdRP accused Wprostweekly of slander. Wprosfs deputy
editor-in-chief, Marek Zieleniewski, replied that the SdRP's "absurd complaint" to
the prosecutor "is nothing more than an attempt to carry out a coup against
freedom of the press." The Wprost articles that the SdRP found offensive revealed
that the party had managed to obtain and conceal the extensive assets of the former
Communist Party.

17

The SdRP's perspective on the media contrasts strongly with the view held by
Andrzej Potocki, journalist for the right-wing Zycie daily. Potocki feels that
television is biased against the right because it is owned by the postcommunists.
Potocki says that getting a job in television was very difficult because "for a
journalist who is generally associated with the right wing, it's not that easy to get a
job in media which are generally owned or directed by left-wing politicians." 18
The PSL (Farmers' Party), which is in coalition with the SdRP, is even more
suspicious of the media. The PSL has proposed that PAP, the Polish Press Agency, be
turned into a state-controlled organisation, and would like its own newspaper as a
propaganda tool (Goban-Klas 1999:65).
The right wing parties are even more suspicious of the media than the left. The
Centre Alliance (PC), which in spite of its name is a rather divided party of the
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right, demanded control of the media, and criticised the media as "against the
government" in I 992. The Christian Democrats (ZCD) see the media as
irresponsible and argue that Christian values are lacking. The strongest
anticommunists, the KPN, agree with media freedom, but exercise strict control over
their own publications (Goban-Klas I 999:66).
Senator Adam Glapinski, who represents the Movement for the Reconstruction of
Poland (MOP) party, expressed the feelings of many right-wing politicians who
think that there is a media conspiracy against the right. Whenever rightist politics
are discussed in the media, Glapinski said, "the interviewers most often invite
politicians who present right-wing values in a caricatured way, those who are the
most demagogic, noisy and extreme".19
The Freedom Union (UW) is probably the least hostile or suspicious towards the
media. The UW is one of the largest parties in parliament, and is described as a
party of the centre. It covers a variety of ideologies, its members ranging from
Christian-democratic to liberal in orientation. Generally the party is interested in
political pluralism, free trade, and a market economy. Members of the UW have
commented on the need for an ethical media, but no clear policy on the media has
been proposed by the party. The UW has suggested turning the Polish Press Agency
(PAP) into an independent commercial agency (Goban-Klas 1999:66).
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6.2.4 Connections Between Political Parties and Newspapers
The connections between political parties and various media organisations are
obvious in Poland. Many of these connections in the print media can be traced to
the liquidation of RSW in 1990. As noted above, the Liquidation Committee had
recommended that this process should not allow political interests to dominate.
During liquidation, many newspapers were given to political parties, so the
recommendation of restricting political influence was not completely upheld.
Solidarity were clearly the winners, gaining control of many major regional and
local dailies.
PC, the Centre Alliance, acquired the popular Warsaw tabloid Express ITTeczorny
(Evening Express). Express ITTeczomywas established in 1946. During the 1980s,
it was one of the highest-circulated papers in Poland, a popular apolitical
alternative to Communist Party newspapers. However, its circulation is now a
quarter of what it was in 1980, and it has been overtaken in sales by Super Express,
started by a breakaway group in 1991.
The Communist Party's Trybuna Ludu was renamed Trybuna, and given to the
Social Democratic Party (SdRP), which was established in 1990 by former
communists (Giorgi 1995:77). Trybuna is still partly owned by the Social
Democratic Party (SdRP).
It is not necessary for a political party to own a publication for it to exert influence

over it. Many newspapers are associated with a particular political party through
"connections" between journalists and politicians.
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Tygodnik Powszechny, like Mez, the Catholic cultural monthly, was established as
a form of political opposition. Mez was established at the same time as the Catholic
Intelligentsia Club (KIK), in 1958, and together with Tygodnik Powszechny, formed
the "Znak" (Symbol) movement. This was a significant independent opposition
which had, according to Mez, a "symbolic representation in the Sejm
(parliament)". In the 1980s, the Znak movement supported Solidarity. One of the
founders of Wiez was Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister of the first noncommunist government in 1990. Mez has now cut its ties to politics, but Tygodnik

Powszechny has not.
Links between the media and politics are commonplace, and usually obvious.
Adam Szostkiewicz comments that "[a]lmost each of those major publications or
radio stations are linked to some kind of political interest, not necessarily a formal
political party. And everybody could tell you which is which. In terms of political
interests, Tygodnik Powszechnyis linked to liberals, with a slight leaning to the
social democrats or left wing, as is Gazeta Wyfurcza. Then there is Zycie, which is
more or less right wing."zo
Lukasz Warzecha thinks that the press is dominated by left-wing interests, saying
that Zycieis "the only conservative newspaper, the only one. We have Gazeta

Wyfurcza, which is much more to the left; we have Trybuna, which is definitely to
the left; perhaps Kzeczpospolita, but Kzeczpospolita is very boring and very
different in character - it's official in character and we are not. As for weeklies, we
have only two big weeklies, Polityka and Wprost, and both of them are rather to the
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left. Wprost is more liberal, and Polityka is rather more orthodox as far as political
views are concemed."2 1
At the other end of the spectrum are the right-wing publications Glos (Voice)
weekly, since 1996, Gazeta Polska (Newspaper for Poland) weekly, and Nasz
Dziennik (Our Daily). Nasz Dziennik and Gazeta Polska are both strongly

anticommunist. Nasz Dziennik, launched in 1998, describes itself as right-wing
Catholic, claiming to present a "different world, better than in the other media"
(Golik 1998). Its influences are the Catholic radio station Radio Maryja, and the
Catholic daily Slowo -Dziennik Ka.tolicki, which was printed until 1997.
The publishers of Nasz Dziennikwere hoping to draw their readers from the 5.5
million Radio Maryja listeners. Radio Maryja is not only Catholic, but extremely
xenophobic, nationalistic and racist. According to Adam Szostkiewicz, "what they
preach on Radio Maryja is clearly in opposition to basic Christian principles. It's for
hatred, aggression, suspicion."22
Gazeta Polska advertises itself on stickers which are half red and half white, like

the Polish flag, with the slogan ''the truly independent newspaper". The definition
of "independent" as understood by the newspaper seems to be "anti-communist".
The weekly began as a monthly in 1992, started by a breakaway group of
journalists from the right-wing daily, Nouy Swiat (New World), which supported
Lech Walesa. One of the members of that group, Tomasz Sakiewicz, explained the
reasons for the split:
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" ... [T]here was a conflict between us and Walesa, because Walesa started
collaborating with the communist secret service. We decided that we couldn't help
him with this political change. Lech Walesa's people, who were also owners of
Nouy Swiat, stopped the money. They wanted us to stop criticising Lech Walesa.

We were anti-communist and independent journalists, so we decided to leave. Half
a year later that paper went bankrupt because people believed us, not the new head
of the newspaper. A few of us - it was my idea - decided to make a new
newspaper ."23
Yet another way in which the media and political parties are connected is through
funding. Political parties in Poland are required by law to reveal their largest
donors, and their statements released for the 1998 budget named some interesting
donors. The largest donor was a company called Agora-Druk, part of Agora, the
publisher of Gazeta Wyborcza. Agora-Druk gave a large sum to the Freedom Union
(Unia Wolnosci or UW), which "came as no surprise, as [Gazeta Wyborcza's]
predilection for the liberals has long been known", Tomasz Oljasz commented in the
Warsaw Voice (January 11, 1998, No.2 (481)). Gazeta Wyborcza's editors felt that

UW had acted in accordance with the law by revealing their company as a source
and did not see the harm in this donation.
However, Oljasz points out that it is not the donation itself but the public
perception of the press that it encourages that is a problem - by making large
donations to a political party that it already favours, a newspaper could gain a
reputation as politically biased. This opinion was also expressed by Ilija Marinkovic,
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of BETA Independent Agency in Belgrade, who wrote that "Gazeta Wyborcza has
risked losing its image as an independent daily newspaper that is not formally or
ideologically subordinate to any political party. . . . In giving money exclusively to
the UW's campaign, Gazeta Wyborcza has demonstrated the bias lately evident in
the newspaper's columns.24
Another very obvious demonstration of political favouritism by the press was made
by Wprostmagazine, which awarded the title Man of the Year 1997 to Marian
Krzaklewski, leader of Solidarity Election Action (AWS). The title came with a
luxurious prize, namely a Mercedes C class. The car was provided by Sobieslaw
Zasada, one of Poland's richest people, who is the Polish partner for Mercedes Benz
Poland. Marek Krol, Wprosts editor-in-chief, stated that "Marian Krzaklewski's
achievements are in proportion with this brand of car''. 25 It is interesting to note
that Mercedes has a prominent full-page colour advertisement in Wprost- but so
do Fiat, Peugeot, Volkswagen and Audi.
Besides giving politicians financial rewards, journalists have also shown support
for them in other ways. Tomasz Wolek, the editor-in-chief of Zycie daily, clearly
demonstrated where the paper's political sympathies lie, when he accompanied a
group of politicians from AWS (Solidarity Election Action) and ZChN (Christian
National Union) on a visit to the ex-dictator of Chile, General Pinochet, held under
arrest in London. The group demonstrated their support for Pinochet and
demanded that he be released. Youth federations of the PPS (Socialist Party) and the
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UP (Labour Union) protested as the delegation prepared to leave Warsaw, calling
the leaders "fascists".
Michal Kaminski, of AWS, later demanded an apology from the leaders of the PPS
and UP, accusing the youth protestors of violence. In Zycie daily, Kaminski was
quoted as saying, "We will end up like a third world country if physical violence is
accepted as the norm". 26 This is an ironic statement coming from an admirer of
Pinochet. Zycie benefited from the whole episode, as the paper could take the
opportunity to support its friends and criticise its enemies.

6.2.5 Personal Connections Between Politicians and Journalists
Adam Szostkiewicz affirmed that along with the more general political orientation
of the major publications, " ... of course, there are some personal links. With us, it
is Unia Wolnosci [Freedom Union]." Szostkiewicz believes that connections with
politics are hard to avoid. "It is a tradition. Many people who worked for this
paper did happen to become politicians after the 80s. there is this grey zone of
personal and official relations. It's a knot - you don't know what to do with it."27
Tomasz Sakiewicz, as mentioned above, says that Gazeta Polska has political links
which make it "powerful in [changing] opinion". Sakiewicz felt that the newspaper
had strengthened its position because of these connections, whereas in the previous
government there had been threatening political enemies. "A lot of ministers are
our readers, and a few of them also write in this newspaper. Most of them are right
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and anti-communist ministers. We have a lot of co-operators or friends in this
government."28
Gazeta Wyborcza's Maria Kruczkowska pointed out that "Adam [Michnik, the

editor-in-chief] is very friendly with our president Kwasniewski, but it's not the line
of the paper, but a personal connection. But we have other connections from when
we were underground in the 80s". 29
The connection between politicians and journalists should not be viewed as a oneway relationship, from which only politicians stand to gain. In fact, politicians can
be just as useful to journalists as journalists can be to politicians. Tomasz Sakiewicz
suggests that politicians can be key sources of insider information, remarking that
"[t]he most beneficial information ... is from our secret informants. All journalists
have their secret informants - in the police, in government, in the banks. The best
articles are based on this kind of information."30
Lukasz Warzecha of Zycie also felt that informants were important sources of
information, saying that "all of us [at the newspaper] have connections in politics
and in government" and that his colleague, Andrzej Potocki, "is after larger and
more elaborate stories, so he uses deep throat sources - some connections of his own
abroad and here in the world of politics."31 Maria Kruczkowska also said that
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Gazeta Wyfurcza's political connections were useful: "we know some politicians

and have the possibility to get some information and some hints from them". 32

6.2.6 Unfriendly Relations Between Politicians and Journalists
Besides trying to use the media to promote themselves through public relations
strategies, or befriending individual journalists, Polish politicians make use of a
variety of avoidance tactics. These are used when they would rather avoid the
media and limit journalists' access to less favourable political information. Polityka
journalist Stanislaw Podemski (1997) complained about this: "Journalists - the
middlemen between the government and the electorate - must wait long hours in
corridors to hear a general statement from a politician, they are chased away by
politicians and guards, and they generally receive unfair treatment. All of these
examples cause rather skeptical [sic] reflections about one of the main rights of
citizens: the right to be informed."
Gazeta Polska's Tomasz Sakiewicz asserted that under the previous government,

his newspaper had been threatened by political opponents due to its strongly anticommunist views. "[W]e had a lot of enemies in government. Unknown people
broke into our office, we had telephone bugs, and we had a lot of legal problems
because they didn't want us to write our articles," Sakiewicz said, adding that this
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had changed since then because the paper had acquired more connections in
government. 33
Artur Gorski of Polityka said that there was a lot of interaction between politicians
and journalists. However he interpreted "interaction" as having unfriendly
connotations, as he also said, "I don't want to say that this interaction exists between

Polityka weekly and politicians. We're not aggressive, and basically they are happy
if they have their name mentioned in Polityka, or they have interviews in our
paper."

34

Therefore, Gorski equates political reporting with doing a favour for

politicians by associating them with the prestige of Polityka.

6.3

Summary
As this chapter has shown, links between journalists and politicians were common

under communism and still are. Obviously, the interaction is now much more
complex as the number of political parties has grown from one (discounting
uninfluential satellite parties) to hundreds. Politicians in the communist era
manipulated the media through personal connections with loyal Communist Party
journalists. The role of the journalist, according to Communist Party leaders, was
not only to pass on selected messages to the public, but to promote favourable
information in a credible way. In other words, journalists were seen as
propagandists for the Communist Party.
In postcommunist Poland, individual connections still exist, although the political
spectrum represented is now broader. Political leaders can no longer rely on the
33
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obedience of the media and instead attempt to gain favourable coverage with public
relations techniques. They may favour only selected media and refuse to cooperate with others. This is possible because newspapers are politicised, reflecting
clearly identifiable political ideologies. In some instances newspapers have
supported political parties or leaders financially.
As this chapter has shown, the relationship between the media and politics

continues to be beneficial for journalists as well as for politicians. Therefore these
connections are likely to persist. As before, politicians see the journalist's role as a
propagandist, either for their own side or for the opposition. The high level of
political involvement prevents the Polish media system from becoming more open.
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7

Organisational Regulation
Organisational regulation refers to the news organisation's internal limitations and
rules, but many of these are subject to external influences. In communist Poland,
political and legal regulation determined, to a large extent, the nature of
organisational regulation, as this chapter will explain. After communism, the
dominance of one political power was replaced with competing political and
commercial interests. The impact of these will be discussed below.

7.1

Organisational Regulation in Communist Poland

During the communist era, the restrictive nature of the media laws made the selfregulation of news organisations very difficult. Decisions were made outside, rather
than inside media organisations. The Communist Party, not the newspaper,
determined what to publish and what to censor, and also who to hire and who to
fire. The chief editors and managing editors of newspapers were often appointed by
the Communist Party, which means that they had usually obtained their positions by
being loyal members of the Party. In this way, communist ideology infiltrated the
newspapers and influenced how they operated.
Chief editors were in direct contact with their staff and were the ones responsible
for hiring and firing. The managing editor's position was administrative and
managerial, involving tasks such as approving and selecting suitable articles for
publication, co-ordinating with the publishing house, organising the publication's
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finances, and trying to prevent censorship problems before they occurred (Curry
1990: 106). With these key positions under communist control, the newspaper was
bound to function as the Party intended - as a propaganda tool.
Although political appointments were criticised in the 1980s, their replacements
were usually no less political. When Solidarity became more prominent, a few
journals began to choose their own editors, but journalists with 'connections' were
still preferable (Curry 1990:101). Tiris is because it was useful to have an editor
who had links to the Party, who could try to negotiate with the censors over the
telephone. Adam Szostkiewicz of Tygodnik Powszechnyobserved that this was a
frequent occurrence before publication:
"All the negotiations, all the manoeuvres, before going to print each week, were on
the telephone. All materials should have been submitted to the censors before
selection. They would read it, censor it, and send it back to you with remarks or
instructions, like "we don't want this to be published." After we looked through
this, we would have a discussion, and some of our senior colleagues would call
them back. They didn't even know the censors' names - they were coded. They
would argue with the censors over the telephone: "we can't possibly accept your
suggestions." There was some space for manoeuvres; sometimes there were
concessions. But in times of crisis they had the political guidelines, which we did
not know, from the headquarters of the Communist Party." 35
Szostkiewicz also points out that "[u]nder the communist system of course there
was no private sector, no printing business. You are not able to run a paper
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without newsprint, and newsprint was in the hands of the system." Newsprint was
granted as a reward for obedient journalism; it was the carrot where censorship
was the stick. Thus one of the basic requirements of a newspaper was not freely
available, but had to be negotiated for. Journalists realised this, and learnt to avoid
excessive conflict which might cost them their jobs, even if it meant censoring
themselves (Albright 1983: 14).
Staff of newspapers were always divided into departments, with each department
specialising in a particular area. Corresponding to this, the government news
agency provided stories categorised by subject, audience, and level of secrecy.
Regional journals lacking in resources were fed with national and specialised
stories. The role of the journalist, according to the Communist Party, was not to
seek news or information, but simply to pass it on (Curry 1990:113).
"All of this makes it clear to journalists that, at any level, news is not their business
and that, as professionals, they are divorced from reporting actual events and facts divorced in reality and in responsibility" (Curry 1990:111). This type of work
organisation resembled any other communist bureaucracy: tightly organised and
highly specialised. This meant that each person was given a very narrow focus and
had less involvement with 'the larger picture'.
A typical organisational restriction which was spared Polish journalists in the
1980s was the pressure of dealing with unexpected subject matter which had to be
presented as quickly as possible. Unlike journalists today, they did not work under
strict time pressure. Journalism was much more planned. Editorial boards would
35
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draw up a list of topics which were to be covered in the next few months and these
would be allocated to the various departments. In a small journal, like 'J)rgodnik
Powszechnyor ITTez, the entire staff made these decisions together. 36 Larger

journals were more hierarchically organised.
The lack of deadlines gave journalists the opportunity to analyse their topic in
depth, and pay more attention to how the article was written than what was written
about. 37 There was no need for a "scoop", and therefore less competition between
journalists. It did not matter if other journalists had already covered a topic, as this
only proved it to be a "safe" topic. This contributed to greater journalistic solidarity.
According to Curry, "what is important is how they can best present the idea, be it
in a narrative style, an essay, an interview, a straight presentation of information, or
an argumentative analysis" (Curry 1990:114).
Because of the in-depth nature of much of the media content during the
communist era38, and because of the rigidly divided structure of the news
organisation, journalists were inclined to specialise. Another reason for
specialisation is proposed by Jane L. Curry, who observed that journalists did not
trust information given to them by communist bureaucrats, and therefore went out
of their way to acquire other sources - workers, specialists, personal contacts which they then accumulated into a personal "library" of information (Curry
1990:88).

36

These two journals stiU operate in this manner (interviews I and 2). Both are concerned with providing
detailed analyses rather than up-to-the-minute information.
37
Interview with Anna Sadurska, Australian correspondent for Gazeta Wyborcza, April 1998.
38
An overview of detailed reports and themes is in Albright 1983 :55-72

113

According to the pre-communist tradition, journalists were not specialists but
generalists, educated in the humanities, with some literary aptitude (Goban-Klas
1994:242). However, belief in this tradition was not helpful in a strictly controlled
environment. Journalists' tendency to specialise did not mean that they only wrote
narrow-minded reports about the same "safe" topic. Specialisation was in fact a
journalistic strategy that enabled journalists some control of their work within
tightly ordered organisational limits.
It is easy to assume that the communist press was not driven by the need to make a

profit, and that the media organisations would not be restricted by commercial
considerations. However, this is not entirely true. The July 1984 press law stated
that the role of the journalist was not entertainment but "strengthening the
country's political system" (Goban-Klas 1994:194). In spite of this, new
publications appeared on the market in the late 1980s in the areas of sport, hobbies
and television. These simply aimed to make a profit, and did so by addressing
interests amongst the public (Pisarek 1999: 134).
The profit motive also prompted existing general interest publications to start to
focus on sex, violent crime, and human interest stories. According to Tomasz
Goban-Klas, director of the Press Research Centre in Krakow, the press "began to
cater more to popular taste" (Goban-Klas 1994: 197). Communist Party newspapers
began to resemble non-party newspapers in this respect - it made no difference who
the owner was, the product was very similar.
The Communist Party realised that the press was not only useful as a propaganda
machine, but as a source of income. Advertising had been increasing since the
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19 70s (Pisarek 1999: 134), and one publication established in 198 7, TOP, consisted
only of advertising. To increase readership, TOPbegan publishing nudes. By this
time, there was not only variety, but also more criticism, in the press. This was
allowed, provided that the paper had strong Party connections, like the critical
weekly Polityka. It was joked that one was allowed to see the world in different
shades-provided that the colour was red (Pisarek 1999:135).

7.2 Organisational Changes During the Liquidation Process
The liquidation of the RSW- Kuch which took place in the early 90s had a
profound impact on the journalists working for existing publications. The decisions
of the Liquidation Committee affected the fundamental bases of their existence,
causing major changes in their workplace (Borkowska 1999:272). There was no
protection that guaranteed them a stable position, as the guidelines had
recommended. Nor was there protection for ''titles judged significant for Polish
culture". Although in theory anyone could establish their own newspaper, or buy
an existing one, in practice it was a matter of surviving the market.
Few publications survived liquidation in their original format, as their new owners
were often seeking a vehicle for their views. To do this, they preferred to buy an
existing title and alter it, rather than start a whole new one, because this ensured a
readership. For example, the Catholic church, which felt that it needed a daily
newspaper to promote its views, took over the Catholic daily Slowo Powszechne and
changed its title to Slowo- Dziennik Ka.tolicld (The Word- the Catholic Daily) and
appointed a new editor-in-chief (Goban-Klas 1994:240).
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Another problem brought about by liquidation was unemployment. In 1991, more
than 2000 journalists lost their jobs for economic reasons, and some also for
political reasons, which also had an unfortunate effect on those journalists who
were still employed. "The fear of losing a job pushes journalists to accept any
working conditions and, perhaps worse, to follow orders from their managing
editors," wrote Goban-Klas ( 1999:241). Many publications were in financial
difficulties after liquidation - without sufficient funding, and with the loss of many
of their best journalists to bigger publications, they were forced to close down - this
applied particularly to Catholic publications (Kowol 1999:236).
The financial problem was heightened by a decline in the number of readers. The
same could be said of cultural publications, which had always had small
readerships. So "publications judged significant for Polish culture" could not be
protected according to the guidelines. Tomasz Wiscicki, of the Catholic and
cultural monthly Mez, sees the lowered circulation in publications like his as a
result of increased choice, saying that "during the communist times, people who
didn't want to read what was the voice of the Communist Party didn't have much
choice. Now they do. Before, we were also read by people who were not Catholic,
but wanted to read something independent. It was part of the opposition. Now this
is no longer the reason to read lt'iez."39
Like Wiscicki, Adam Szostkiewicz says that the newspaper he works for has also
faced the difficulty of dealing with a loss of readers. According to Szostkiewicz,

T)rgodnik Powszechnywas once "the only major voice for independent-minded
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people [in Poland] that was allowed by the Communist Party. That was not a
normal situation. That was a privilege." The paper once had a high status due to
this privileged situation, which now no longer exists. 40 Yet the staff of Tygodnik
Powszechny have preserved its serious approach to politics and culture, and
although the readership has declined, the paper is still published every week.
There is another reason why the process of privatisation was not a smooth one.
Just as the level of political involvement could not be kept minimal, which was
contrary to recommendations, foreign investment was also not kept within strict
limits. Although attempts to stop cartel building and limit the amount of foreign
investors were made 41 , the rough competition ruled out those without large
amounts of capital (Giorgi 1995:22) .
The most successful foreign investor was Robert Hersant, from France, who gained
control of seven regional dailies and the large national daily Rzeczpospolita
(Republic). Some publications which were not seen as valuable were given to
journalists' co-operatives, most eventually acquiring foreign partners, because these
did not have sufficient funds (Bajka 1999:85). Alternatively, the publications that
were seen as profitable were bought by Polish or foreign companies.
While liquidation of RSW titles continued, successful European companies were
trying to establish how well popular western publications would fare in Poland.
These publishµtg companies, which were mainly German and also Scandinavian,
conducted some trial runs before entering the market directly, ensuring their
40
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success. Foreign capital was also used in the establishment of Polish publishing
companies, and to save existing publications that were experiencing financial
difficulties (Bajka 1999:85-6).

7.3

The Impact of Foreign Ownership on the Polish Press
As the graph (Figure 1) shows, foreign investment in the press is dominated by

Passauer Neue Presse, which has invested US$98 million in the press, according to
estimates of the Polish Agency for Foreign Investment (PAIZ). This makes it the top
investor in the Polish press, with almost twice as much invested as its nearest
competitor, Orkla Media of Norway. There is a significant amount of German
capital invested in the Polish press, other major investors being H. Bauer and
Gruener +Jahr. The USA has invested the largest amount in the mass media
overall, but more of this has gone to broadcast media.
German companies also dominate in the field of special interest publications. I
have already noted the extent of German ownership of women's magazines. In fact,
German publishing companies together share most of the Polish market, as the
publications they own are those with the highest circulation. Ilza Kowol's survey in
1994 found that 13% of the daily press, 75% of the programme guides, and 70% of
the women's magazines were published by German companies, and this has grown
since then (cited in Kopper 1999:41).

41

The liquidation committee was initially cautious to respond to bids by foreign companies, particularly
Germans and Austrians- but by 1994 the most shares had been sold to German companies (Giorgi
1995:78-9)
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The foreign publishers are not only in a better financial position than Polish
investors, but they are also at the advantage of having an existing product which
they know to be successful in their own country. Now that satellite television,
international travel, and tourism are linking Poland to the once forbidden west,
foreign trends are easily passed on. This characterises Poland as an open system.
Due to this increased communication with the rest of Europe and America, Poles
can easily identify with the foreign products. This has caused some media analysts
to wonder whether Polish national culture will be lost with the influx of so many
new European and American influences (for example, Goban-Klas 1991, Kopper
1999, Weidemann 1999). And many conservative groups in Poland think that this
has already happened (for example, Nasz Dziennik, Gazeta Polska, and especially
Radio Maryja).

We need to ask, firstly, whether the foreign companies really have made such a
distinctive contribution to the Polish press market. The most prominent press
presence, Passauer Neue Presse, certainly has. Passauer's domination of the local
press is not restricted to the ownership of the papers themselves, but also extends to
their printing houses - the company has six of these, covering the major regions of
Poland. Also, Passauer is trying to establish a distribution network for its
publications, which is not unlike the old communist system run by Ruch RSW.
One striking example of the influence of Passauer Neue Presse on the local press
can be seen in the recent incident involving two newspapers, Zycie and Dziennik
Baltycki (Baltic Daily). As I have already mentioned, Zycie is involved in a oourt
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case with President Aleksander Kwasniewski. Initially, when connections between
the President and the Russian secret service were suggested in August 1997, the
story was not only published in Zycie, but also in Dziennik Baltycki, a local
newspaper owned by Passauer Neue Presse.
President Kwasniewski accused both newspapers of libel shortly after the
publication of these newspaper articles. Dziennik Baltyclds editor-in-chief, Andrzej
Liberadzki, immediately published a front-page apology which stated that some of
the journalists' claims were based on dubious evidence and therefore should be
disregarded, as "it would be lamentable if the president's authority were to be
jeopardized because of our articles".42 Liberadzki then "resigned" from his position.
The newspaper's apology obviously echoed a letter written by F.X. Hirtreiter,
owner of Passauer Neue Presse, to President Kwasniewski. As Anna Hejman points
out, Hirtreiter's comment in an interview (prior to the Kwasniewski case) that he
was not interested in the content of his newspapers needed the postscript, "as long
as there is no trouble" (Hejman 199 7).
Kwasniewski withdrew the suit against Dziennik Baltycki, and took out a new one,
against Zycie only. Zycie actually gained a lot of publicity from the affair, and
Hirtreiter's treatment of Dziennik Baltycki was portrayed in the media as an attack
on press freedom. As this example shows, attempts at control of the press are in
danger of creating a backlash.

42
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F.X. Hirtreiter made himself more unpopular when he bought Gazeta Olsztynska
in September 1998. This newspaper from the region of Olsztyn has acquired a
symbolic significance, representing Polish resistance to foreign invasion. The paper
gained this reputation a century ago for defending the Polish minority when the
region belonged to Prussia. It was banned under the Nazis but was re-established
after the Second World War.
Not surprisingly, the fact that a foreigner, especially a German, has bought the
paper, is offensive to some - or more accurately, is a good excuse for some political
point-scoring. Postcommunist senator Janusz Lorenz, who represents Olsztyn,
criticised Hirtreiter's purchase of the paper as a provocation which would stand in
the way of Polish-German relations. He was supported by a member of the political
opposition, parliamentarian Halina Nowina-Konopczyna, of the ultra-conservative,
Catholic party "Polish Family" (Frankfurter Kundschau, August 13, 1998, no.186).
A newspaper that has definitely been affected by its ownership, but in a different
sense, is Zycie Warsauy(Warsaw Life), which had been a major daily since its
establishment in 1944. During the liquidation process, the paper was acquired by
Nicholas Grauso, an Italian linked to Berlusconi, and could be described as a rightwing daily. For several years, Grauso considered selling Zycie Warszau.y, which
was experiencing financial difficulties and a declining circulation. In 1995, Grauso
sacked the chief editor, Tomasz Wolek, and in 1996 Zycie Warszauywas sold to
the Polish company Multico (Bajka 1999:88).
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Wolek believed that Multico's owner Zbigniew Jakubas, a mineral water producer,
would not guarantee the paper political independence.43 Wolek and forty other
journalists from Zycie Warszauythen founded Zycie, which as I have noted now
has a much higher circulation than their original paper. Zycie Warszauyhas
changed under its new owner and is no longer a right-wing newspaper, whereas

Zycie definitely is (Pisarek 1999: 141).
The examples of Hirtreiter and Grauso seem to suggest that ownership can be
equated with control. The owner of a title does have considerable potential power
to determine what form that publication should take, but we should note that this
may or may not be exercised. There is no doubt that owners can control or
influence their publications, for example by appointing editors and chief executives,
and making decisions on the form and content of the publication.
However, even if they attempt this, they cannot always succeed, as the example of

Zycie Warszauy demonstrates. In Poland as in other countries, "it is unlikely that
such proprietorial power will be exercised without reference to commercial
considerations or marketing considerations" (Negrine 1994:64). This opinion was
also expressed by Juliusz Braun, a member of the Sejm's cultural committee, who
thinks that foreign investors have been a benefit to the Polish media, as they
preserve the independence of the press by pursuing profits rather than politics
(Styczek 1998).
This statement certainly applies to F.X. Hirtreiter and his 13 local dailies, as it does
to the Swedish company Bonnier which owns the majority of Super Express, a paper
43
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which is not interested in politics, and definitely is interested in profits. However,
we should question the use of the word "independent", since the fact that a paper
claims to be independent of politics does not mean that it is independent of its
owner. Bonnier does in fact exert some influence over the newspaper's layout and
content, Super Express journalist Tomasz Sommer said, "because they show us how
they publish their magazines in Sweden. They give us some ideas."44
Some owners, however, are reluctant to interfere in the running of their
newspaper. Orkla Media, the Norwegian company that owns several titles in
Poland, prefers to leave the task of organising the style and content of its
newspapers to the editorial and managerial staff. Orkla bought many of its shares
from Hersant, the French company that gained the most in the first wave of
privatisation, and did not attempt to modify the newspapers in any way, enabling
them to preserve their original character. This is different to the Passauer Neue
Presse publications, which are similar in content and form (Styczek 1998).
Orkla owns 51 percent of Presspublica, which publishes Rzeczpospolita daily. This
was acquired from Hersant. Grzegorz Gauden, recently made the new chairman of
Presspublica, said that he would be hesitant to make any changes: "I feel a sense of
stage fright and reponsibility, because Rzeczpospolita is an important element of
Polish public life. I have my own observations about the paper, but I won't
introduce any changes without first consulting with the team". 4 s
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The Wydawnictwo Lubpress publishing house in Zielona Gora, Lubuskie province,
is another of Orkla's recent acquisitions. Lubpress is the publisher of one of the
largest local dailies, Gazeta Lubuska.. Before taking over, Orkla was obliged to sign
contracts guaranteeing the staff minimum four-year terms of employment and
journalistic independence. 46
Even if foreign companies, such as Orkla, cannot be unfairly accused of
interference in their publications in Poland, there is still the question of the
infiltration of foreign culture. Gerd G. Kopper, a German media researcher, has
observed that the Polish media is becoming more like the western media. This has
both positive and negative aspects.
On the positive side, Kopper believes that the influx of international capital has
opened up more opportunities in the Polish media, as it can finance "new ventures"
which would otherwise have failed. Moreover, internationalisation can offer Poland
new concepts in media management (Kopper 1999:36).
On the other hand, Kopper points out that the development has not been even
throughout the different sectors of the media. There are notable differences
between those sectors of the media which are internationally controlled, and others
which are nationally controlled, so the overall development of the media industry
has not been specifically "Polish" in character - in other words, the changes in the
media have been largely out of Polish control.

46
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There are also great differences in the kinds of qualifications, training, and
professional orientation of media personnel in Poland. The disunity amongst media
personnel is also a result of a lack of professional exchange infrastructures,
especially in the print media (Kopper 1999:37). This will later be discussed in more
detail.
Joachim Weidemann, who has also studied recent developments in the Polish
media, agrees that media organisations have aimed to copy the west and become
"free, fast, colourful", which has had mixed results. As for freedom, this exists in
an official sense, Weidemann believes, but there is some doubt as to whether it
exists for journalists to question their own organisations (Weidemann 1999:48-50).
The media can be seen as "colourful", in the sense of variety, as there are certainly
many types of publications to choose from in Poland. In the print media, there
literally are more colours than before, as newspapers as well as magazines try to
attract readers with bright pictures and less information. Artur Gorski said that
Polityka became a "full colour magazine, destined rather more for young people",47

and Tomasz Sommer describes Super Express as "rather more comics than paper".48
Mo:rieover, this "colour" is not coincidental; Polish publications aim to copy
successful western titles. Tomasz Sommer says that Super Express is modelled on
other tabloids, "[m]aybe the Sun, or the Mirror, from England."49 Sommer said that
he often took his stories from these two papers. Polityka, says Artur Gorski, is "a
combination of different models. I think it's like Newsweekmagazine, and some
47
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German papers like Spiegel ... and also Stem. I think Newsweek is a better
comparison because it's a smaller paper, and as for size ... German papers are
extremely fatI" 50 Maria Kruczkowska does not think that Gazeta Wyborcza actively
follows a western model, but the paper did have "ambitions to be the Polish Le

Monde'. 51

7.4

The Impact of New Technology

One plus point of internationalisation of the Polish media that Kopper observed
was the introduction of new technology, which can bring Poland up to western
European standards (Kopper 1999:37). Like Kopper, Weidemann sees new
technology as a benefit which can speed up the flow of information. One example
is the spread of mobile phones and notebook computers which have enabled
politicians to report straight from the Sejm (Parliament). However, this has led to
misreporting, as information has been publicised too quickly without being properly
checked for accuracy (Weidemann 1999:50).
The technological modernisation of the Polish Press Agency (PAP) started during
the process of democratising the media along western lines. The PAP began its
modernisation process in 1990, aiming to "achieve organizational and legal status
as well as technical standard fully meeting contemporary requirements of
democratic states." The list of "Major dates in the PAP history"
(http://www.pap.com.pl) explains this development. On 1st March 1993, the PAP
introduced satellite transmission of its news services, using its own satellite station.
49
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From 1994 to 1996, the agency introduced the Typlan internal editing system. In
January 1995, PAP started its online databases, and in July, it began using new
digital technology for photographic news services.
Online access to PAP, but also to the international news agencies, especially
Reuters, has definitely changed the ways in which Polish newspapers acquire their
information. Again, this has both advantages and disadvantages. One of the main
advantages of the internet has been its speed and the vast amount of information it
has made available. However, for some newspapers, the internet has replaced
correspondents and become the most important source of information. Moreover it
is very simple for journalists to simply copy information from the internet.
This has affected the way some journalists view their role. Tomasz Sommer, of
Super Express, described a typical day at work: "I go to my computer, then I check

the agencies - Reuters and others. Then it depends what happens. Usually I just
write what happened in the past 24 hours. Sometimes I write about a special topic.
For example, now I'm writing about the man who injected AIDS into his son."
Sommer was not enthusiastic about his work, and admitted, "I don't feel very
attached to this job. I just write." Asked to describe his role at the newspaper, he
responded, "I'm just a translator. What more can I do?" 52
Almost all of the journalists interviewed mentioned the internet, and the press
agencies Reuters and Associated Press as some of their main sources of information.

Zycies weekend feature writer Andrzej Potocki said agency archives were "a very,
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very deep well of information". 53 Gazeta Polska journalist Tomasz Sakiewicz said, "I
take about thirty percent of my information from the internet". 54 Judging by the
amount of articles in the press that show agencies as their sources, Sakiewicz is not
an exception.

7.5

NEWSPAPERS IN POLAND: Survivors and Newcomers

The privatisation of RSW brought many new problems for existing publications,
and not all were able to continue publication. Those that did continue were forced
to change in some way. Several newspapers (Nouy Swiat, Express ITTeczorny, and

Zycie Warszauy- described in more detail below) experienced internal divisions,
causing some of their journalists to leave their jobs there and start their own
newspapers. The phrase "survival of the fittest" describes the postcommunist press
market. Survival depends on adaptation and/or finding a convenient niche.
Among the national general-interest dailies, not a single newspaper remained
unchanged. The old communist paper Trybuna is one example of a publication that
has had difficulties adapting. Although Trybuna changed its size and title in an
attempt to modernise, its circulation continued to decrease; in I 983 its circulation
was over a million copies, but by 1997 this had dropped to 100, 000.
As mentioned, a dispute occurred in the fifty-year-old Zycie Warszauy(Warsaw
Life) leading to the publication of Zycie in I 996. The situation that Zycie
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Warszauyis now in is exactly the same as that of Express Meczomy, which lost
readers to the breakaway Super Express, but the former has a much lower
circulation. Express Meczorny advertises itself with the slogan "the whole paper
for half the price". While it is indeed half the price of other dailies such as Gazeta

Wyfurcza and Rzeczpospolita, it also has less than half their amount of pages.
Rzeczpospolita, the largest-sized and most serious-looking national daily, managed
to become independent from the government in 1990. Prime Minister Tadeusz
Mazowiecki offered the position of editor-in-chief to Dariusz Fikus, secretarygeneral of the Polish Journalists' Association when it was banned under martial law.
Fikus had been involved in underground publishing and represented the media in
the 1989 Round Table Talks, and has been credited with turning Rzeczpospolita into
"an objective and independent newspaper that quickly won respect from both
readers and government" (Swiecka 1996). The paper now has a higher circulation
than in communist times. It is one of the highest selling dailies along with Super

Express.
Special interest dailies which had a place in the communist era have not
automatically kept that place in the postcommunist press market. The communist
youth paper Sztandar Mlodych survived, and was still selling well in the early
1990s. However, now its sales have decreased, which is due to the competition from
new magazines for young people. These are mainly Polish versions of German
publications, which are aimed not just at "youth" as a group, but at more specific
audiences. The magazines cater for audiences such as young rock and pop music
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fans, young sports fans, girls in their early teens and older teenage girls who are not
yet interested in women's magazines.
The newspaper for soldiers, Zolnierz Womosci (Soldiers of Freedom) changed its
title to Polska Zbrojna, and underwent many changes. Gromada-Rolnik Polski, the
newspaper for villagers, also faced changes due to internal and external conflict,
and some staff left to establish Gazeta Rolnicza - unfortunately, neither of these
publications are selling well.
Amongst weeklies, few have been able to maintain the level of popularity they once
had. Polityka, started in 1957, is one weekly that has succeeded. It has been
circulating steadily for the past two decades. It has managed to hold on to its "old
faithful" generation of readers who started reading it twenty years ago, and
according to the magazine's own polls, is gaining younger readers. The magazine
went through a facelift, becoming more colourful, glossier, and smaller. Wprost
weekly, established in 1982, is Polityka's main competitor, and sells roughly the
same number of copies. Wprost has a similar format and layout, but its content
favours business and economics.
Several weeklies that were once very popular amongst intellectuals are now selling
very few copies. Przekroj, which in the 1980s had a print run of several hundred
thousands, is now down to 75,000 - about a quarter of which is not selling. The
magazine used to be owned in part by Orkla Media of Norway, but this company
sold its share at the beginning of the year, preferring to focus on more profitable
publications such as Rzeczpospolita.
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One of the leading opposition papers, fygodnik Powszechny, has also seen its
circulation reduced drastically. fygodnik Powszechny has not modernised its
layout; its large page size and title font are exactly the same as they were in the first
edition. It has a very serious appearance compared to other papers - it has longer
articles which are not interspersed with colour photographs, advertisements or text
boxes. The articles often have headings in the form of questions, which underlines
the paper's analytical approach to news.
The newspapers mentioned above are all distributed nationally, and are only a
small sample of the many publications in Poland. Among the "survivors" we should
also include many of the local and regional titles that began under communism.
There are too many local and regional papers to describe in this sample, but for
comparison I will mention two local dailies from Krakow, Dziennik Polski and
Gazeta Krakowska. These two papers have a very similar format. Dziennik Polski

translates as Polish Daily, but it is a regional paper. Stories are short, with short
sentences. Local news takes priority, although the paper also covers national events.
Throughout the paper, "advertorials" are placed together with copious advertising.
Most of the paper consists of advertising and classifieds, not news.
The other major daily newspaper for Krakow, Gazeta Krakowska, was once very
critical of the communist system, but now is more interested in advertising the local
companies that finance it. The front page and the following page contain brief
news summaries of major national and international events, taken from press
agency reports. The rest of the paper, like Dziennik Polski, is dominated by
advertising, or advertising thinly disguised as local news.
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Many new titles appeared after communism, but most disappeared again. The
losers will not be dealt with here. The most successful newcomer is Gazeta

Wyfurcza, which is Poland's best selling national daily. In fact, it is debatable
whether the paper should fall into this category or not - which shows the
difficulties of attempting to categorise in this way. Gazeta Wyfurcza is interesting
as a case study, because it reveals how a newspaper can be established at a crucial
time of dramatic change, and then continue to succeed by keeping up with social
change.

Gazeta Wyfurcza was established in 1989, before the first free elections, as an
election campaign paper for the opposition, at the request of Solidarity leader Lech
Walesa. Its editor was (and still is) Adam Michnik, one of the intellectual leaders of
the opposition movement, and its main organiser, Helena Luczywo, and the staff
were from underground newspapers, mainly fygodnik Mazowsze (Mazowsze
(region) Weekly).
When Gazeta Wyfurcza was established, no-one, including the staff, thought that
it was anything but a temporary campaign update, printed on donated computers in
a kindergarten classroom. However, the daily became not only permanent, but "the
opinion-maker of the nation". The paper was able to survive because it adapted to
changing conditions, by changing its size and layout.
During the 1990s, editorial staff observed that the newspaper's sales were falling,
while sales of tabloids were on the increase. Gazeta Wyfurcza's editorials gave
strong support to Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his campaign for the presidency in 1995,
and at this time the paper's sales were dropping sharply. Piotr Pacewicz, one of the
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editors, felt that this obvious political side-taking was too "arrogant" (Oljasz 1999).
It seemed to the staff that the paper needed to change, and they decided to give the

paper a less serious look (Schmidt 199 5).
In 1996, a special team was created to rejuvenate the paper (Oljasz 1999). Gazeta

Wyfurcza is now a tabloid-sized newspaper, but with many supplements adding up
to make it quite thick, from 100 to ZOO pages. Each edition of the paper also has a
local supplement, depending on the region (there are 18 regional variations in
total), and then a daily supplement, depending on which day of the week it is.
On Monday, there is a large employment section (including different supplements
depending on the region); on Tuesday, a section on office and computers; on
Wednesday, advertisements for real estate, and a section on home decoration; -on
Thursday, a motoring section, and a weekly colour magazine; on Friday, there is a
weekly entertainment guide, and weekly television guide; on Saturday, a new
weekly magazine for women has been introduced.
What is it about Gazeta Wyfurcza that makes it so successful? These supplements
are certainly one of the special features of the newspaper, but it is also unique in
other ways. Maria Kruczkowska, a journalist for Gazeta Wyfurcza, who has been
with the paper from the beginning, believes that "the weaknesses of [Gazeta

Wyfurcza's ] adversaries" may contribute to its success. Most importantly though,
says Kruczkowska, was the fact that the paper was the first of its kind:
"[W]e started first, and we got the most [out] of the experience of the new
[situation]. It's very difficult to make a new title out of an old title, if you observe
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what's happening with Polityka, for instance. It's difficult to give a new dynamic to
a paper from the old system. They had their staff, they had to throw out everybody.
But we didn't have this problem. In this new time, it's rather good that we started
nine years ago . .. we started at the right time for a political paper, when there was
a lot of political interest. Today it would be almost impossible to start a political
paper."

55

Gazeta Wyborcza's success can be attributed to the following factors, according to

a Polish media analyst. To begin with, it was the first independent daily in
postcommunist Poland. Secondly, because it started out as a Solidarity paper, it
represented opposition to the communists and support for democracy, which made
it very popular. Thirdly, it was printed in different towns, with large local

advertising sections. Moreover, due to the large amount of advertising, the paper
has a large income and is able to offer readers better quality for their money. Also,
it has various specialty supplements and a television guide. Overall, Gazeta
Wyborcza is a very clever combination of local and national, sensational and serious

(Pisarek 1999:143).
The tone of Gazeta Wyborcza is similar to that of Polityka, serious but witty. The
newspaper publishes long analytical essays by experts in various fields, and its
commentators are well-known. A characteristic feature of the paper are the eyecatching, dramatic photographs. It is also known for its clever headlines. Puns and
ironic statements are commonly used to grab the reader's attention. The paper
employs professional headline writers for this task (Oljasz 1999). By using this
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tone, Gazeta Wyborcza's staff have identified the cynical attitude towards the media
that exists amongst the public - they are not treated as if they will believe anything.
Gazeta Wyborcza is undoubtedly the best-selling general-interest daily newspaper.

However, its success needs to be put into perspective. Its circulation may be close to
half a million copies, on average, each day. But by far the most sucoessful
publications in terms of circulation are those which fall into one of two categories:
women's magazines and television guides. These weekly magazines regularly have
circulations of over a million. Out of the top ten highest circulation weeklies, eight
are women's, and the remaining two are television. The weekly magazine market is
dominated by German companies: Bauer, Springer, and Gruner+ Jahr. All of the
top 10 best selling magazines were established after 1990.
Nie, one of the best-selling publications that is not a women's weekly or television

guide, is a satirical tabloid, expressing the extreme views of its owner,Jerzy Urban.
Urban, called "the most hated person in Poland" and likened to Goebbels, wrote for
the Communist Party's Propaganda Department and was appointed spokesperson for
the Jaruzelski government during martial law. He was in favour of state control of
the media, and against everyone and everything else - particularly Solidarity and
the church. These views are reflected bluntly in Nie. The paper's circulation has
declined in the past few years, because the initial shock value has worn off.
The daily newspaper market has been difficult to break into, with several
newcomers attempting and failing. Nowa Europa (New Europe) and Nouy Swiat
{New World) fall into the latter category. In Poland, the percentage of the
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population interested in newspapers is relatively small. Therefore, a new newspaper
has to target a group that is not already served by existing papers.
Super Express and Zycie are the two breakaway newspapers that have actually

fared better than their parent papers. Super Express was started by some journalists
from the old tabloid Express Hi'ieczornywho disagreed with the "structure of
ownership ... they decided that 'if we can write for somebody, we can do it even
better for ourselves"', said Tomasz Sommer, of Super Express. It is a "classical
tabloid", according to Sommer, which claims to have no interest in politics. The
daily prefers human interest stories, about both famous and ordinary people.
Super Express is more interested in scandal than Express Hi'ieczorny, often taking

stories from the front page of England's Sun or Mirror. Its success may be due to its
eye-catching layout, sensational but simple content and clever marketing. The ideas
for this paper are clearly copied from overseas, says Tomasz Sommer: "[If] the
manager thinks that if in England or America it sells better in this shape - red and
big titles - why not try in Poland." The paper's sales have increased steadily since
its debut.
In 1996, Zycie Warszauy's ex-chief editor Tomasz Wolek, sacked by the previous

owner (or as part of a communist conspiracy as some of its journalists believe), and
some of his followers amongst the staff decided to produce their own paper, Zycie.
They got into legal trouble for using an almost identical name, but were not
punished. Zycie has now become the major national centre-right daily, aiming to
rival Gazeta Wyfurcza daily, but with a completely different political perspective.
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In fact, Zycie has taken on the role of balancing, or countering Gazeta Wyborcza,
by operating in a similar format with an opposing ideological slant. In the words of
one of its journalists, Lukasz Warzecha, "I think just to balance them [Gazeta

Wyborcza], we have to be on the other side. That is my view. We have to realise
what this paper that we work for is, and what our views are."

7. 6

Ownership and Control of the Local and Regional Press

As I have already noted in the brief descriptions of major newspapers above, those
that were able to succeed were those that were able to adapt. However, in the case
of many of the smaller newspapers, adaptation has meant compromising their
original principles, and survival the loss of their editorial independence.

Gazeta Krakowska, the Krakow daily, is an example of a newspaper that has
changed its tone considerably in the past two decades. It was one of the more
critical dailies during the period of criticism in the early 1980s, publishing, for
instance, a story on the problems of pollution caused by the nearby Skarwina
aluminium factory. Journalist Jerzy Sadecki visited the factory, which did not use
filters, and interviewed the factory workers. Doctors testified to the health problems
the factory was causing, and the newspaper organised discussions with officials.
The story was taken up by Poh"tyka, and became so well publicised that the plant felt
compelled to close down some sections (Albright 1983:61).
Possibly, Gazeta Krakowska was able to be more critical because Krakow was one
of the more liberally administered areas, where censorship was not as excessive.
Also, the editor, Maciej Szumowski, was on good terms with the local authorities
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(Albright 1983:76). These days, the paper is more interested in advertising local
companies than in criticising them for polluting the environment.
Another feature of the paper that made it stand out in the early 1980s, introduced
by Szumowski, was its reliance on its own reporters rather than the official news
agency, PAP, for information. As with many other regional and local papers, this
has changed. News reporting is now limited by financial considerations.
Particularly for many of the smaller papers, it is cheaper to take pre-prepared
information from a central source than to pay for permanent correspondents or
even freelance journalists.
Financial constraints are especially obvious in the local press, as Anna Hejman
( 1998) observed. According to Hejman, many independent local publications were
started by local intellectuals during the period of the first democratic elections and
changes to press laws. Like the underground press in the 1980s, these newspapers
began as primitively produced newsletters which aimed to act as the local
community's watchdog, but with time adopted more sophisticated printing and
production techniques.
Hejman defines only those publications that are completely self-financing as
independent. There are fewer of these than might be expected (she estimates 100 at
most), because many titles that are classified as independent are in fact dependent
on local government inserts as their source of income. This makes them a
mouthpiece for local governments rather than their monitor.
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Other local titles, owned by foreign companies such as the German publishing
house Passauer Neue Presse, are not interested in editorial involvement in local
politics. Hejman observes that for Passauer and other foreign companies, "emphasis
is placed on avoiding conflict. The newspaper, therefore, ceases to fulfil its control
function, it becomes indifferent to the local authorities." The same applies to local
newspapers owned by Agora-Gazeta, Gazeta Wyborcza's publishing company,
which due to its size is able to win control of the local advertising market from any
competitors (Hejman 1998).

These newspaper profiles give us a picture of a press that is quite diverse.
Competition has not produced monotony, but variety. Like Negrine, we could
conclude that "as soon as a news organisation is established within a competitive
economic system, it has to exercise choices about what sort of medium it is, what it
does and for whom it does it" (Negrine 1994:24). In Poland, these choices are not
based on the question of which competitor to copy, but of which group of target
readers to aim for.
"The Polish market has no room for publications addressed to a wide audience, to
the average Joe", observed Ryszard Pienkowski, who built up a publishing house
specialising in law and economic publications (Styczek 1997). However, at the
same time, the major national newspapers are beginning to extend their target
group of readers to include those with more specialised interests. One example of
this is Gazeta Wyborcza's new supplement for women, Wysokie Obcasy (High
Heels). Kzeczpospolita has several special supplements, coloured pink and yellow,
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which address legal and economic issues. According to surveys, 62% of the
managers polled said that their preferred source of information was RzeczpospoHta,
and 19% favoured Gazeta Wyborcza (Styczek 1997).

7. 7

The lnfluenc·e of Advertising

Newspapers in Poland must choose their target readers carefully. This decision is
based not only on how to sell as many copies as possible, as we have seen, but also
on how to generate the most profit from other sources. Advertising is a major
source of revenue for many publishing companies in Poland. As the chart below
shows (Figure 2), advertising is a large percentage of the total income for most
successful publishing companies in Poland.
Agora-Gazeta, the publisher of Gazeta Wyborcza and several regional dailies, is
one of the most profitable press companies in Poland and the biggest advertiser. In
1997, Agora made 71 % of its profits through advertising. Presspublica,
Rzeczpospolita's publishing company, also receives the majority of its revenue (54%

in 1997) through advertisements.
For the newsmagazines Wprost and Polityka advertising is between one third and
one half of their income (estimated by Businessman Magazine) . Because many
publications are dependent on advertising, which in most cases also makes up a
large portion of their content, they have developed specific ways of targeting
advertisers.
Agora's strategy is to attract as many advertisers as possible: Gazeta Wyborcza,
especially the local supplement, contains more advertisements than Zycie, a national

140

daily of similar layout and writing style. The local supplement includes articles that
are advertising, such as a guide to supermarkets in the area and where to get the
best prices, or a travel section where local agents present their best deals.
Gazeta Wyborcza has cleverly expanded its target audience to include specialised

interests. Apart from the travel, motoring, computers and office, home decorating,
and entertainment sections, the newspaper now has a new women's supplement.
Advertisers are attracted to these special areas, where the target reader is easier to
define.
Super Express has taken a slightly different tactic - the one taken by cheap

scandal-and-gossip magazines and women's weeklies - which is to attract the
largest possible audience of general consumers. This means papers can profit from
their high circulation, and again attract advertisers because of this.
Rzeczpospolita daily looks for quality advertisements that are profitable, rather

than a large quantity of advertisements. RzecsposJXJlifa's staff intend its main
source of income to be advertising. The price of the paper covers printing costs. A
large advertising department is attached to the paper, with about 50 staff involved
in selling advertising space. "As far as advertisements are concerned, we have the
so-called 'high-rank' advertisements - for example, Volvo rather than Fiat. I think
that these advertisements are directed at our mixture of readers," managing editor
Robert Lutomski said. 56 This suggests, however, that rather than displaying
advertisements that happen to reflect the tastes of its readers, the paper is trying, as
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are many of the other papers, to attract a group with expensive tastes - to attract the
best-paying advertisers.
Not all publications are devoted to advertising. fygodnik Powszechny and ITTez
are almost entirely devoid of advertisements, and are therefore dependent on sales
for their income. These publications benefit from a lack of advertising, as it gives
them a more serious and non-commercial appearance, which appeals to their
narrow group of readers. It is possible for fygodnik Powszechny and ITTez to avoid
advertising because of their small staff and low production costs.
There are a variety of publications, in all ideological directions, which also have
very few advertisements, for different reasons. Gazeta Polska, which also keeps
costs down by having a small staff (16 people) is able to make profits without
advertising. Its ideological opposite, the satirical magazine NIE, prefers to advertise
itself, and advertisements would only distract from this - except for a small section
on the back page, reserved for advertisements for pornography and telephone sex,
to make a statement about its irreverence. Catholic publications are shocked and
offended by NIE, but both have one thing in common - few advertisements. One
example is the Catholic-nationalistic daily Nasz Dziennik, which is against
consumerism, commercialism and any such western nonsense.
Wprost weekly seems to be devoted to advertising. The magazine is not only filled

with advertisements, but also with advertisements that are made to look like articles,
and articles that are really advertisements in disguise. In one issue (20 December
1998), there were three full-page advertisements that closely resembled articles,

142

with very similar layout, headlines, and typefont; one of these used a question and
answer format that is resembled the style of the magazine's interviews.
In the same issue, the magazine published several articles that could be described

as advertisements. One page, titled "Supermarkef', reviewed four luxury products
that are hardly likely to be found in any polish supermarket (Yves Saint Laurent
makeup, Sony pocket video, Motorola mobile phones, and a high-tech colour
printer) and gave them one to three "stars" for value for money. Besides a very
advantageous review, each product got two or three stars and a colour picture.
A three page article titled "The Oven that Talks" discussed "the successes on the
market in 1998". This praised a variety of expensive consumer products, from cars
to cosmetics, that had apparently been best-sellers. Another article described the
benefits of treatment at various beauty farms in Poland. Wprosf s "books of the
month" list is brought to you by Empik bookshops, and the article on the 1998
journalism awards (containing plenty of self-advertisement) was sponsored by the
companies Era GSM and Agros Holding, whose logos were also printed under this
acknowledgment.
Express ITTeczomy, the tabloid that Super Express originated from, consists mainly

of advertorials. Besides promoting exhibitions, concerts, and events, Express
ITTeczornyhas a section called "Cheaper and easier (with us)". This includes a

series on "Shops unlike any others", which recommends unusual shops in the
Warsaw area. This is typical of local newspapers, like Gazeta Krakowska and
Dziennik Polski, which I have already mentioned.
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One explanation for the popularity of advertorials is the inexperience of Polish
journalists. From the Communist party's point of view, the role of journalism was
to promote the interests of the Party, although cloaked in professional talk that
described it as "reporting". It is not surprising that this practice continued after
communism, with advertisements replacing propaganda (Zakowski 1999:262).

7.8

The Growth of Public Relations Agencies

Public relations was unknown in the communist era. There is a story that
illustrates this. At a business conference not long after the first democratic
elections, a Polish manager asked a western businessman what this thing called
"PR'' was. After it was explained to him, the Pole's face lit up in understanding.
"Ah yes, I know what you mean," he said. "We had the same practice in our
country, but we called it propaganda."
Public relations is now a growing field in Poland. Since 1990, the number of
public relations agencies has increased. By July 1996, when the Polish Public
Relations Association held its second congress, there were 50 PR agencies registered.
At the conference, PR companies and journalists discussed their respective roles,
debating whether PR agencies aim to manipulate the media. Agata Miedlar, PR
consultant for The Rowland Company obviously thought they did not.
"Manipulation can only occur if PR firms give false information, and that clashes
with our professional ethics."

57
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(The Warsaw Voice,July 7, 1996, no.27 (402))
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Rzeczpospolita deputy editor-in-chief Bozena Wawrzewska said that PR was about
manipulation, and "journalists are susceptible to this kind of pressure." However,
she agreed that "it's not really harmful, as long as the media, with a modicum of
self-respect, sift through the information they receive."
However, most of the PR agencies' clients are foreign companies. The idea of
public relations is still new, and many Polish companies are not yet familiar with
the services PR agencies can provide. Neither are journalists. Because of their lack
of experience in dealing with it, and the tradition of passing on information rather
than looking for it, PR material that is given to the media is likely to be used
unquestioningly.

7.9

Organisational Guidelines

I have discussed some of the ways in which several publications have targeted
groups of readers and planned their advertising strategies. Naturally, these
decisions will affect the journalists who work for the publications, whether or not
they themselves have been involved in the decision-making process. While not
every organisation has a clear set of guidelines, each does have a distinctive
ideology or style which its journalists are expected to follow.

Tygodnik Powszechnys editorial policy is shaped by its Catholic background.
Adam Szostkiewicz said that "as it is a Catholic paper, or Catholic-oriented, because
we are a mixture of all sorts of people here, not all of them practising Catholics, we

try to avoid brutal criticism or very biased journalism. This is not to say that we are
afraid of ''tougher'' texts. Not really. But the policy is not to use very strong
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language, not to attack the people -perhaps it's rather the problems, the issues, we
would raise as the topic of our analysis, rather than persons." 58
He added that this does not necessarily pay financially. But not to follow this
policy could alienate existing readers, who may not continue to buy the paper if it
changes.

Tygodnik Powszechnyis in a difficult situation: "It's 40 000 [in

circulation], the risk is very high, we are not very well organised as a business,
there are many problems, financial and with the staff, because we are understaffed
- but there are so many problems with new people coming in, we can't accept any
new journalist coming to us."

59

This also means that journalists at Tygodnik Powszechny have to be careful not to
lose any readers who might choose the paper because it is Catholic. One
particularly noteworthy example is the paper's depiction of Pope John Paul II.
Szostkiewicz commented that many of the weekly's journalists disagree with some of
the Pope's ideas, but could not afford to publish these views. This could cost them
readers, as the journal is described as Catholic.
Moreover, the Pope reads Tygodnik Powszechny, and acts as a kind of prominent
advertisement for the weekly. 60 Tygodnik Powszechnyhas been linked with the
Pope for the past twenty years. In fact, the weekly had a special status under the
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communists and was the only publication in Poland that was allowed to show a
photograph of the Pope on his official visit to Poland in 1978.61

Mez, which is also a Catholic journal, consists of people who "all knew more or
less what this monthly is about", said Tomasz Wiscicki. The staff is small, and "there
are no people who are here by accident ... there is some way of thinking that is
common to us." This means that the staff agree on key issues, such as how to write
about the church and politics. As for the latter, the guideline which they follow is
"to abstain from the call of politics." Asked whether it would be possible to criticise
the Pope, Wiscicki replied, "we do not feel the need to criticise, because we agree
with him."62
In a large newspaper like Zycie, the staff are not always in agreement and conflicts
can occur. Lukasz Warzecha questioned the amount of freedom he had writing
articles. "If I were given a scale of ten points to evaluate it I would say seven.
There are some topics which you could give ten points to on that scale, but with
others you have to negotiate. Andrzej [Potocki] can accept the scale of liberty but
given one point less he will quit. But given ten topics he can write what he wants
about nine of them ... but the case is about that one remaining topic."
Examples of topics to avoid are "the truth about the Polish People's Republic [the
name of communist Poland] and the connections between today's politicians and the
PRL, or the connections between people who create public opinion today and the
former system. Revealing those connections can always cause very serious
61

Twenty years later, that has changed dramatically: on the anniversary of his pontificate, Pope John
Paul II's photograph was on the cover of every publication in Poland.
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problems. Also showing some mechanisms of the current politics, particularly
within the right-wing parties. For example, the very famous case of Deputy Prime
Minister Tomazewski,63 which we had in our newspaper, and journalists were not
allowed to write about it as much as they wanted to."64
Artur Gorski feels that he has complete freedom in choosing his topics as Politylais
culture editor. He is not aware of any political guidelines. "It should be written
well, that's all. Ideologically, our paper has been associated with the political left.
Actually the people who work here have different political outlooks. ... No,
ideologically, there are no rules that I have to keep."65 However, Gorski works in
the culture section, so it would be unlikely for him to encounter any problems of
contradicting the paper's political orientation.
Maria Kruczkowska describes Gazeta Wyborcza's guidelines as "our own system of
values, which originated in our political engagement in the 80s, and it doesn't
determine all our preferences, but some of them. For instance, we don't vote for
something that is nationalist." As Kruczkowska points out, the paper's policy is to
support those political and economic values that benefit it: " I think there are some
parallels between our political and economic [views]. In economics, we are very
liberal, we are rather for liberalism, which is also a reflection of our group [Agora,
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the company which owns Gazeta, has shares on the market], which is flourishing as
a result of capitalism - we are one of the beneficiaries of the system." 66
Rzeczpospolita takes a similar approach. "We are following the guidelines of the

free market. Liberal economy. These are our main guidelines," Robert Lutomski
explained. It would be possible to criticise liberal economy, as the paper has "the
page of opinions, and there are many people criticising."
However, Rzeczpospolita's openness to different opinions does not apply to
journalists, but to politicians. "Politicians write their opinions, and we publish
them. We publish the opinions of the politicians from the left, from the right, and
from the centre of the political spectrum. This is an open page, where they can say
what they are thinking."67
For Lutomski, who has the advantage of being in a managerial position, there are
few restrictions. He is involved in major decisions, such as the content of the
newspaper and what will make the front page. Lutomski is attached to his job and
says he couldn't imagine working for another paper. 68
The journalists' comments show that experiences of restriction differ, depending
on the extent to which they are able to conform to their organisation's guidelines.
For those journalists who work for papers that are associated with a political or
religious orientation, there is no perceived restriction, provided they themselves
agree with that orientation. Gorski, Wiscicki, Sakiewicz, Lutomski and
Kruczkowska are in this situation. Also, the journalists with more decision-making
66
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power, Gorski, Lutomski, and Wiscicki, did not feel restricted as they are to a large
extent responsible for the guidelines. However, for the more critical journalists, like
Szostkiewicz, Warzecha and Potocki, organisational guidelines are restrictive.

7.10 Summary

This chapter has examined the factors that are involved in organisational
regulation. Under the communists, these were largely political. Through political
appointments and monitoring, the Communist Party was able to exert influence
over newspapers. Newspapers' internal structures were shaped by their Communist
managements, which shows them to be part of a closed system.
Today, each newspaper is in a unique organisational situation (although we can
identify similarities between them). As described above, each publication has been
managed differently depending on the extent of involvement of the owners and the
decisions of its head staff. In an open media system, media organisations have
sufficient independence to make their own decisions - such as who their target
readers will be and how to attract them.
New Polish newspapers faced a choice of target audiences, but for existing
publications the matter was not as simple. They had to determine whether it would
be more profitable to stay as they were or to change their appearance and content.
As noted, only those that changed succeeded in gaining readers. However,
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newspaper management is now influenced by considerations of how to attract
advertisers, shown to be a convenient source of income.
As for the individual journalists working within the organisation, they may

contribute to staff discussions, but ultimately they must conform to the
organisation's rules. From the organisational perspective, the role of the journalist
is an employee who is responsible for carrying out the tasks set out in their contract.
There are, however, some informal constraints for journalists within news
organisations, such as individual editorial preferences and pressure from other
journalists to conform. At the same time, another set of values also have an
influence on journalists - the ethics of the journalistic profession. The impact of
these ideas will be dealt with in the next chapter.
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8

Professional Regulation
The previous chapters have dealt with external and internal forms of regulation
that have affected journalists in Poland. Now I will turn to a less obvious form of
regulation, which involves the influence of the profession of journalism itself. The
impact of professional regulation in contemporary Poland is difficult to measure.
Journalists in communist Poland were subject to distinctive socialisation, making
them feel part of a professional community. However, journalists in Poland today
are not such a united group with a common sense of identity. In this chapter I will
show this by looking into journalists' perceptions of their role and their differing
interpretations of professional ethics.

8. 1

Defining Professionalism

Jane L. Curry, in her book "Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Politics"
described journalists as a distinct group, united by their professionalism. Curry
argues that to understand Polish journalists' behaviour, the theory of
"professionalisation" is the most useful. This applies to professions "who control
unique bodies of knowledge not shared by the rest of society" (Curry 1990:3). This
is controlled both within a group and according to society's regulations.
Professionals are defined as those who establish professional organisations, go
through similar training and socialisation, have full-time work commitments, and
want the right to control their own work.
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Professional groups have more formal and informal interaction than other groups,
due to their controlled membership, common values and interests, and their shared
"special role". According to Curry, "[i]n any society these groups are able to claim
some autonomy and self-control - as journalists in Poland have". Not only can they
achieve autonomy, but they can also influence political policy-making.
Curry believes that journalists are in a privileged position because of their links
with politicians, enabling them to "enter into the early stages of policy-making and
play 'gate-keeper' roles in later stages" (Curry 1990:21). Journalists also act as
"channels to modify the impact of policies on individual citizens and to alert policymakers to problems in how their policies work" (Curry 1990:22).
Curry's theory of professionalisation may apply to journalists in Poland in the
1970s and 80s. However, journalists in Poland today are in a different position.
Taking the definition of professionalism used by Curry, we could say that journalists
in Poland today are no longer united by professionalism, and this should not be seen
as the leading influence on journalistic practice.
However, professional regulation is an important factor to consider, as journalists
are still to some extent influenced by professional values. These values are partly
traditional in origin, but now are beginning to incorporate the Anglo-American
ideal of professional journalism: "objectivity". The process of "westernisation" of
the Polish media, which I have mentioned above, has affected the profession of
journalism as well as media organisations, with the introduction of western
journalistic values.
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It is difficult to analyse professional values, for the journalists' use of terms such as

"objectivity" or ''truth" may be based on a belief that these are necessary values, as
they are common in professional discourse, but the journalists' understanding of
their meaning may be quite different.

8.2 Historical Background of Professional Values in Journalism
Journalism in Poland has a long history, which can be traced back to the 17th
century. As Jane L. Curry has observed, Polish journalists come from a tradition of
representing national and political interests. This means that many journalists felt
that their role was not to criticise, but to promote particular political ideas.
Poland may have been ruled by one party, but that party was very divided.
Factionalisation gave journalists the opportunity to choose their connections
amongst the political elite (Curry 1990:32). Thus journalists were given the feeling
that they were presenting 'their' political viewpoint.
The practice of journalism is also influenced by the literary tradition. According to
Tomasz Goban-Klas, head of the Press Research Institute in Krakow, a journalist in
I 9th century Poland was "a person who had received some literary education but
was not talented enough to become a novel writer'' (Goban-Klas 1994:241). Curry
believes that they were "champions of national culture and language" (Curry
1990:36).

In the 20th century, and particularly in a period of political instability, journalists
continued to see themselves in a literary role. Writing style was important, as was
an analytical approach to the subject, rather than simple information. This notion
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provided journalists with a professional goal - the achievement of an elegant
writing style - which did not conflict with political control.
Another historical aspect of journalism that has had a significant effect on
journalistic practice in Poland is not specifically Polish, but common to European
societies. The journalistic profession according to European tradition was never as
concerned as the English and Americans with the ideals of "objectivity", and nonpartisan journalism, which I have discussed above. This applies particularly to print
media, which have adopted new technologies, but have continued to reflect their
heritage.
As a recent study of the Hungarian mass media pointed out, "traditionally in
Europe, the print media are often affiliated with a political party, or an ideological
agenda unlike the system of "objective" newspapers in the United States....
Though nominally independent, nearly all publications can be associated with
political groups or political agendas, regardless of the degree of foreign ownership
of the newspaper" (Csapo-Sweet and Kaposi 1999:4). The same could be said of
Poland.

8.3 Newspapers and Political Partisanship
Most of the Polish journalists I interviewed upheld this tradition of political
journalism, and not all saw this as contradictory to the ideals of neutrality and
objectivity. "It's natural that some papers should have one opinion, and other
papers a different one. It's justified. I don't like those papers that try to balance all
the opinions, because it's without any nerve, meaningless," Tomasz Sommer, of
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Super Express, replied, when asked whether newspapers should represent political

viewpoints or be "neutral".69
Sommer also works for another publication, Najwyszy Czas (It's High Time
(literally, Highest Time)). This is a small self-financing weekly newspaper with a
circulation of only 10,000, run by a staff of four. Sommer describes it as a "liberalconservative" paper that looks at political issues in Poland. While Sommer does not
feel enthusiastic about his job with Super Express, he does express enthusiasm for
working on Najwyszy Czas, since as an editor he is part of the decision-making, and
is able to write his opinion on political subjects. 70
Polityka journalist Artur Gorski said, "there are some party papers which I take

because I know when I read the articles, there is some ideological direction. Being
objective is important, but sometimes I like to read papers which I know won't ever
be objective." 71
Maria Kruczkowska explained that people in Poland were unable to trust the press
because they could see that it was politically engaged. "We have no tradition of
Anglo-Saxon objective journalism," Kruczkowska said. "This way is that the press
wants to manipulate public opinion."
However, although she herself disapproved of this method, she also expressed
understanding for those journalists who had a background in the underground
press. "I think that the press should be about informing, and not manipulating. But
I understand that if you have been so engaged in changing realities, and such a
69
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tradition that intelligentsia have tried to escape the masters by means of media ...
you have to understand this." 72
Adam Szostkiewicz also sees the past as a burden for Polish journalists who have
worked in the underground press. Szostkiewicz, who has worked on BBC
programmes and often co-operates with European, British and American journalists,
indicated the extent of the differences between Polish and western journalists:
"One of the major points of misunderstanding between western journalists and
people like myself used to be the role, or the social function of the journalist. They
would argue, especially in countries like the UK, that what we need is a certain kind
of non-partisan journalism. What we (Polish journalists) would say is 'alright, we
do understand what you mean, but please try to understand the difference in
context."' 73
Szostkiewicz explains that the context of underground journalism in Poland was

necessari..(vpolitical: "[I]t was a totalitarian regime, and there was no other way as
a journalist but to commit yourself to this noble cause of fighting for human rights,
for democracy, for independence, and for that matter for the freedom of expression,
which is quite specific for the journalist's job. Of course, there was this tension,
there was this dilemma of a journalist who is committed to a specific political cause,
on one hand, and on the other hand, trying to do his job, to give a picture of the
truth." In the underground press, Szostkiewicz admitted, "that principle of
accuracy was not always honoured."

70
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It was not always simple, or even practical, to be accurate in the underground

press. Reporting on the two sides of an issue was often not possible. Because the
underground press was illegal, reporters faced problems in gathering the necessary
information. "You couldn't imagine, if writing for an underground publication, to
go and ask for an opinion from the authorities," Szostkiewicz said. "First, they
would never [be bothered to] see you. Second, they would call the police."
The problems faced by journalists who were committed to fighting for a cause
continued with the replacement of the communists with a democratically elected
government. Szostkiewicz describes it as "the same kind of problem in a new
version: shall we commit ourselves to promoting the democratic values, and in
what specific way?" Although the answer seemed to be an obvious "yes" to the
journalists who had opposed communism, the situation soon became hazy.
"Of course there were mistakes by the first democratic governments. Shall we, or
shall we not, discuss it? Shall we attack? Shall we criticise? Shall we raise our
accusing fingers at the government who, for the very first time after five decades of
repression and unfreedom, were democratically elected? Another problem was that
they were composed, to some degree, of our friends from that heroic time of
opposition. It is just not easy to criticise a person in such a situation."
Adam Szostkiewicz sees a need for non-partisan journalism, saying of the principle
of neutrality, "I thihk it's an absolute necessity, a must, for the Polish press to adopt
it". However, he also believes that sometimes bias is necessary. "The
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transformation process is not finished. There are moments, I think, when journalists
should support, in their own way, the main cause, which is democracy. In
situations like these, I would say forget about being non-partisan and promote
democratic values. For example, at this paper, because we write about the church
and religion, and social conflicts, one of the big issues is Polish-Jewish relations and
the burden of the past. This is not a very friendly society towards Jews .... We
published ... a story by a priest, who told how anti-Semitism is still alive in some
circles of the church.... This is one example of an occasion where I would not be
in favour of typical unbiased journalism which shows both sides." 74

8.4

Promoting Traditional Values
It is not only journalists with a background in the underground press who are

affected by the past. Szostkiewicz says that the combination of isolation from
foreign countries and the extensive brainwashing under communism caused some
"mental habits" to form which still remain:
"There is still this tendency to wish for a unity, for a consolidation. Because of that,
there is still a tendency to search for enemies, for foreign influences as something
dangerous, undermining one's identity. It's in the genes. And that still happens to
journalists. Some of them are writing that we don't want European Union, we don't
want western culture, we'll make it on our own. There are so many journalists who
would l\ave no problem with answering your question, 'is there an agenda?' with
'yes, of course."' 75

74
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The conservative national daily Nasz Dziennik is extreme in its views concerning
the European Union, and any non-Christian foreigners. One of its headlines was
"The Nazi Freeway to the European Union". The editor-in-chief of Nasz Dziennik,
Artur Gorski76 , discussing his editorial philosophy, said, "First of all, I could lead a
crusade against the European Union, where socialism runs rampant" (The Warsaw

Voice, July 5, 1998, no.27 (506)).
The paper also condemned women's magazines from the west because "the
woman is presented as a person oriented towards her own pleasures, who devotes a
lot of time and attention to her appearance. Such magazines contribute to readers'
frustration" (cited in The Warsaw Voice, November 22, 1998, no.47 (526)).
The nationalistic influence is also connected with religion, as the Catholic Church
was actively involved in the association of communism with evil (Kula 1993: 192).
Poland is, as I have noted, extremely Catholic. To say that the majority of Poles are
Catholic is an understatement - estimates of the percentage of the population who
are Catholic have varied between 91 and 97%. Therefore, it is not surprising that
there are many religious publications.
Committed Catholic journalists have their own press agencies and journalists'
associations. This introduces yet another set of what we could see as professional
values, since they are presented as such. However, those who identify themselves as
Catholic journalists see the role of the journalist in a specific way, which is quite
distinct from the first definition of professionalism.

76

Not to be confused with Artur Gorski of Polityka weekly, who was interviewed for this research.
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Tomasz Wiscicki, of Mez, says that he and his colleagues "try to see the different
fields of human activity as those which should be governed by moral rules." This
includes politics, but Mez is not political. Wiscicki feels that his publication's
decision not to get involved in politics after communism was a wise one. However,
although Mez cannot be said to have a political agenda, it does have a moral
agenda. Wiscick:i sees this as important, saying that "for me, the [profession ofl
journalist is a special kind of vocation. For a Christian, every work is a vocation.
"From that point of view, it was very difficult for me to work for a journal that I do
not want to read - I have to be convinced that my journal does the right thing.
What do I mean? That it tells the truth as far as this is possible and it does not lie.
The role of the journalist is to help people understand. . . . He cannot let this side
say something, and then that side say something, and then say, "I'm impartial, I'm
okay." It's not okay. He has an obligation to let people understand what is going
on."
Wiscicki explains that Mezdoes this by examining issues thoroughly. "We
comment, but not like in the daily papers, which say something is right or wrong,
wise or stupid; we try to see everything which goes around it, in a broader
perspective and a Christian perspective. Not all of us are Catholic, but this is a
Catholic journal, and it means something to us. We feel responsible for the
Church." 77
The above observations highlight one of the main problems of contemporary Polish
journalism - how can journalism be a united profession, when there is not even
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agreement on what professionalism is? The agenda-following approach to
journalism could be seen as unprofessional, if professionalism is judged by western
standards.
However, for many journalists in Poland, particularly those with work experience
in the communist era, the role of the journalist is to present a point of view. To
understand this definition of professional journalism, we need to be aware of the
historical background and the influence of the Catholic culture. The development
of professional journalism education may counter these influences. We need to
examine the type of education that journalists are receiving.

8.5 Journalism Education

Journalism education in Poland appears to be increasingly popular judging by the
numbers of courses becoming available. Particularly private schools of journalism
and journalism courses at private universities have opened in the past few years.
According to the universities and colleges that offer courses in journalism, these
courses are in great demand, as are journalism graduates.
However, according to the journalists I interviewed, most journalists do not have a
diploma or degree in journalism, but a university degree in the humanities or social
sciences. Moreover, many newspapers do not want to employ journalists with socalled professional training. Also, the journalists themselves expressed criticism
towards journalism qualifications, for various reasons which I will discuss below.
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A journalism diploma is not required for employment with Poland's most popular
daily, Gazeta Wyborcza. On the contrary, graduates of the Journalism School of
Warsaw are seen as "not good as journalists," according to Maria Kruczkowska.
When it was established at the end of the communist era, Gazeta Wyborcza did not
hire journalists who had gone through journalism training. This education was
seen as politically biased, unsuitable for the new publication which was a forum for
the opponents of communism.
Kruczkowska said that the requirements for employment at the paper have changed
since its establishment, but "there are still no requirements of having a diploma
from a school of journalism. Rather they ( Gazeta Wyborcza) take people from
Linguistics, Political Science, anything from Humanities." 78
Tomasz Wiscicki, editor of the Catholic cultural monthly ITTez, does not believe in
hiring job applicants with a journalism education. Wiscicki spoke critically of it: "I
have an opinion, and it's not just my own, that it is not very suitable, especially for
this kind of journal." Wiscicki says that preferred applicants have a humanities
degree and a "certain way of thinking". 79
Polityka's Artur Gorski got his position at the weekly with experience gained at the

Polish Press Agency (PAP), the official source of all information under the
communists, which he believed was the best way to get a job in the press.
According to Gorski, "[t]here are two schools of journalism; one is university,
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which zives you nothing, and then there is the Polish Press Agency. Even though it
is connected with the government it is the best school for journalism." 80
"There are very few journalists in Poland who have completed journalism studies",
Zycie daily journalist Lukasz Warzecha said. "Journalists would be very willing to
have some foreign scholarship, to see how it works in Australia, United States,
western Europe." Warzecha was studying International Relations at the time of the
interview, and had acquired his position at the paper through "five or six years" of
experience as a journalist with a regional political and Catholic monthly. 81
Andrzej Potocki, also from Zycie, studied Law and worked in different fields
including television and business before becoming a journalist. Potocki did not
think that journalism education was necessary, saying that "journalism is something
you can learn just by walking down the street."82
The opposite opinion was held by Tomasz Sakiewicz, an editor of the right-wing
weekly Gazeta Polska. He does not have any qualifications, but many years of
experience. Sakiewicz believed that a diploma in journalism was no guarantee that
a journalist would be able to write well, because "there are people whom any
studies couldn't help. It's [a] free and very creative job."83
It would not be true to claim that all newspapers are dismissive of schools of

journalism. The tabloid Super Express is one newspaper that does look for
journalism qualifications and takes on young graduates for further training - but
80
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seeing as even one of its own journalists, Tomasz Sommer, describes it as "rather
more comics than paper"84 , this is hardly a compliment to journalism education.
What is wrong with journalism education? Andrzej Krajewski, editor-in-chief of
Przeglad Reader's Digest and deputy chairman of the Polish Journalists' Association,
complained, "journalism schools that don't distinguish between a journalist, an
advertising agent and a detective are mushrooming" (Krajewski 1998b). Adam
Szostkiewicz believes that "it is something new and will take a long time for it to
really start to work." 85
For the older generation of journalists there were only very few places which
provided formal training, which were all "under the political control of one party,
the Communist Party," Szostkiewicz said. "People like myself tended to avoid this
sort of training; they were anxious not to be brainwashed. This can explain why
there are so many untrained people working in the Polish press."86
However, it is not only the lack of tradition that is a problem, but the many doubts
that have been expressed regarding the quality of the education. Journalism
education has certainly changed its curriculum since communist times. Marek
Grzelewski, principal of the Higher School of Journalism in Warsaw, observed that
the changes to the journalism education curriculum reflect political, social, and
economic change:
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•

the values of democracy and pluralism have led to an emphasis on objectivity
and neutrality

•

aiming for civil society means choosing and presenting information for public
participation

•

the replacement of a totalitarian state with a constitutional state allows for a
critical assessment of politics and society without disobeying the law

•

the existence of a market economy means that competition must be taken into
account

•

the introduction of new technology has enabled the use of modern techniques in
information-gathering and disseminating

•

the growing importance of unity with Europe means standardisation with
European practice. (Grzelewski 1999:282)
The new principles summarised by Grzelewski sound very promising, but in

practice there were several problems. The first relates to journalism education at
state institutions. At the time of writing, journalism education was available at
universities in Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, Katowice and Lublin. Warsaw's Institute
of Journalism is the largest, co-operating with the Ecole Superieure de Journalisme
in Lille. Students choose courses in general knowledge, foreign languages and
practical methods. The Krakow, Katowice and Poznan programmes are very similar.
At these universities, the political science departments offer journalism as a
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specialisation after one year of political science. Krakow can accommodate 120
students, Katowice 70 and Poznan only 60.
In all of these courses, little practical work is available. They lack the facilities and
equipment, especially for television and radio; there are only very few computers. I
have already referred to the influence of the traditional view of journalism, even
predating communism, as "a product of a traditionally well-educated mind'' - in the
19th century "a journalist was a person who had received some literary education

but was not talented enough to become a novel writer" (Goban-Klas 1994:242).
This notion has continued in journalism education also, and along with the more
practical problem of a lack of funds, has led to largely theoretical courses (Freedom
Forum 1994).
Quite varied programmes are now offered by the increasingly numerous private
institutions in Poland. Among the most well-known are the Higher School of
Journalism, the Higher School of Communication and Media in Society, the School
of Business and Administration and the Warsaw Journalism Center. All of these are
based in Warsaw and offer shorter programmes which usually take three years to
complete.
The Higher School of Communications and Media was founded in 1994 and given
the status of a state institution. It provides a general humanities education and gives
students the chance to specialise after the third semester. The School of Business
and Administration, established in 1993, offers a course in journalism, but after one
year students have to go to Warsaw University for their studies. The Higher School
of Journalism, which was established in 199 5 and is funded by an organisation
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established by the Association of Polish Journalists (SDP) in co-operation with
UNESCO, offers three-year courses with specialisations in journalism and
diplomacy.
The Warsaw Journalism Center is financed by the U.S. International Media Fund
and was set up in 1991. The Warsaw Journalism Center distinguishes itself from
other institutions by having both Polish and American media professionals
conducting courses. It is said to have a "pragmatic, hands-on approach to teaching
journalism" (Freedom Forum 1994).
Several smaller and less well-known private institutions now offer three-year
journalism programmes which are typically much more practical in orientation,
differing from the five-year theoretical university courses. They offer specialisations
in radio, television, or press journalism. However, the problem with such
institutions -apart from the limited availability of places and the high cost of the
course - is that their concentration on practical work is so great that the amount of
theory is reduced, including basic and valuable theory such as ethical work practice
(Grzelewski 1999:284).
As Szostkiewicz observed, the new style of journalism education has not been in
operation for very long. This means that the academics taking these courses are not
yet familiar with teaching the new concepts outlined above by Grzelewski. A survey
of journalism education in Poland by Freedom Forum found that "few full-time
academics have practical journalism experience and higher academic degrees in
journalism/mass media. Nor are they apt to devote a large amount of time to
reshaping curricula, revising courses or taking on additional laboratory
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assignments, because most hold outside jobs to supplement their income ....
Journalists employed to assist these programs are largely untested teachers who also
take such jobs for additional income" (Freedom Forum 1994).
Journalists in communist Poland went through a socialisation process, during
which they acquired professional values. This included their education. However,
journalists today do not go through the same processes. Their values are, as we
have seen, different depending on the publication they work for. Unlike in
communist times, these publications are largely in competition with each other, and
journalists have little contact with other members of their profession. Another
factor to consider here is the lack of a unifying journalists' association, which was
important for journalists in the 1980s.

8.6

Journalists' Associations

Journalists in communist Poland were represented by one professional
organisation, the Polish Journalists' Association (Syndykat Dziennikarsky Polskich,
or SDP), until 1982. It consisted mainly of journalists who were members of the
Communist Party. During 1980, when the Solidarity movement was strengthening
and developing its own media, the Polish Journalists' Association began to become
more actively involved in representing the real interests of Polish journalists.
The SDP replaced its old leaders at the October 1980 congress, and the new
leaders discussed a new role for the media (Albright 1983:43). The newly elected
president of the SDP, Stefan Bratkowski, was an influential and respected journalist
who managed to speak out against current legal restrictions on the media.
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Bratkowski and the SDP argued for the abolition of censorship and increased access
to information. Bratkowski was expelled from the Party several months later for his
outspoken views (Goban-Klas 1994:170). However, his views were not entirely
disregarded by politicians. AB changes to press law were deliberated in parliament,
censorship began to weaken (Albright 1983:52).
Polityka began publishing articles on the need for new media laws. Other new

themes which had previously been forbidden appeared in some of the more daring
official publications: accidents, alcoholism and drug abuse, shortcomings of the
health services, environmental problems and corruption (Albright 1983:42-69).
However, this experimental daring was not permitted to continue very long.
In December 1981, martial law was declared, and lectures, conferences, or
gatherings of any kind forbidden, as was travel to other towns. The press was
regarded with the utmost suspicion, and many publications were banned. Many
journalists lost their jobs. Only the most loyal Party papers, like Trybuna Ludu
(People's Tribune), continued regularly.
In 1982, the SDP was declared dissolved by the mayor of Warsaw. According to
the Communist Party, the ABsociation had failed its task. A new organisation, the
SDPRL (ABsociation of Journalists of the Polish People's Republic) was established,
whose members supported Prime Minister Jaruzelski.
Jane Curry sees the period of martial law as a test of journalists' loyalty to their
profession - journalists could either stay in their current position, but with limited
autonomy, or they could leave. After martial law, journalists were still members of
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a professional community, even when not working in their previous positions. The
journalists who were surveyed by Curry said that during this time, professional
methods took priority over keeping their jobs or collaborating with the communists
(Curry 1990:241).
Yet many journalists were communists - over 70% of regional journalists in 1983
were members of the Communist Party. Also, as I have noted, since the Party
controlled the right to approve major appointments (nomenklatura), editors or
managing editors were likely to be Party members. It is not surprising that
journalists during this time could not be independent from politics. However,
according to Curry, there is a code of unspoken ethics amongst journalists which
holds that the journalistic profession comes first (Curry 1990: 164).
This could apply to the SDP Association of Polish Journalists, which dared to speak
up, until it got too vocal for the communists. In the case of the replacement
association, the SDPRL (Association of Journalists of the Polish People's Republic),
loyalty was not to the profession but to the Party. According to journalists who
were not members, the SDPRL was more interested in preserving Communist Party
power than representing journalists' interests (Curry 1990:240).
Today, there is not a single nationwide association of any significance which
represents journalists in Poland. There are two main associations, the SDP
(Association of Polish Journalists), which was the only one until banned under
martial law, and the SDRP {Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland),
formerly the SDPRL, which was the ~al-eommutti.st ·l'~acement association.
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The SDP and SDRP are still rivals, continuing on the opposition of each other
which began in the communist past. When the SDP was banned under martial law,
its funds were confiscated and given to its replacement, the SDPRL. The SDP reemerged after martial law, but as it did not re-register, it was not permitted to keep
its funds (Borkowska 1999:273). Now the activities of the two organisations are
practically identical, yet they are unable to unite.
The SDP organised television discussions on the role of the media after the new
democratic political system was established. Now the SDP gives yearly prizes for
journalism, sponsored by "The German Marshall Fund of the United States". The
SDP is a member of the International Federation of Journalists, based in Brussels.
The SDRP also gives prizes for journalism, and holds workshops for journalists, with
counselling on legal and ethical problems. It is a member of the International
Journalists' Organisation based in Prague. Only on the big issue of press freedom
will the two organisations make a common stand (Borkowska 1999:274-5).
Few journalists join journalists' associations. Artur Gorski dismisses them as a relic
from the past, which enabled journalists to "feel stronger, or supported by people
who feel the same way as you". He is "convinced that younger journalists do not
join these organisations" - unless they "want to make some kind of political career".
Gorski had not even heard of the Polish Media Conference, which is supposed to
represent journalists' views. 87
Andrzej Krajewski, chairman of the Association of Polish Journalists, agrees that
journalists' associations are no longer representative of Polish journalists. Krajewski
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was critical of "the permanent helplessness and antagonism between journalists'
organisations, in which ever older people fight over disintegrating assets and ideals"
(Krajewski l 998a).
The communist origins of journalists' associations may discourage some journalists
from joining them. Tomasz Sakiewicz is also not a member, as he feels that
journalists' organisations were established in communist times, which means that
"they accepted lies and wrote what the totalitarian government wanted. Of course
there was a group of honest and brave journalists but not a very big group."88

8. 7

Protection of Journalists' Rights
It seems that journalists' associations cannot really do much for journalists. They

cannot secure jobs, as they have no legal possibility of liaising with employers.
Because of this powerlessness, the SDP called for a united trade union organisation
in 1991. In 1993 Syndykat Dziennikarsky Polsldch (Syndicate of Polish Journalists)

was established. The role of the Syndicate is now often discussed - should it remain
a union, or should it change its function so that it becomes more focussed on
improving journalistic standards? (Borkowska 1999:278) In any case, the Syndicate
does little. The situation is summarised by Andrzej Krajewski:
"In the tenth year of freedom, Polish journalists are represented by three authors'

associations, six local press associations, a trade syndicate and a media conference
which is supposed to unite this representation. Ethical charters have been prepared,
journalistic codes are binding in several editorial offices, and work is underway on
87
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several drafts of a new press law. Nonetheless, employers still disregard the hardwon privileges of journalists' collective labor [sic] agreements (longer holidays,
earlier retirement) and access to the profession is not governed by any regulations"
(Krajewski 1999b).
Is there any protection for journalists' rights? There is the Press Freedom
Monitoring Centre, established in 1996 by the Polish Journalists' Association. Its
aim is to protect the right of freedom of expression as laid down by the European
Convention on Human Rights, Article 10, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Article 19, "especially to protect journalists' freedom of access
to information and to disseminate information, to consolidate the system of
independent mass media in Poland, and to popularize the proper use of the
principle of free speech" (Goszcynski 1998). The Centre outlines its tasks as the
following:

•

participating in press trials as a friend of the court

•

drafting a Journalists' Professional Code of Ethics

•

reporting on the state of laws regulating public media

•

addressing legislative authorities to amend media regulations

•

recording court conflicts involving the media and journalists since 1989

•

exerting influence on public administration practice, especially to make
information available, and reacting to criticism of the press
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•

stimulating public interest in the freedom of the press (Goszcynski 1996)
The Centre was able to help Ga.zeta Wyrorcza journalist Marek Kozubal soon after
its establishment. Kozubal was writing an article on discipline among the law
enforcement services and was unable to receive information from the State
Protection Office (UOP) which quoted a secret resolution by an interior minister in
1985. The Centre found that all former Security Service regulations, including the
one mentioned, are no longer valid under the current constitution, which
guaranteed the journalist the right of access to the information (Goszcynski 1996).
However, the Press Freedom Monitoring Centre has not always been able to help
journalists. A definite limitation of the centre is that it can only work within the
boundaries of the existing press law, which as I have noted contains considerable
restrictions.

8.8

Journalists Divided

8.8.1

Competition Between Newspapers

Without the guaranteed support or protection of a nationwide journalists'
association or trade syndicate, and without a need for belonging to a journalistic
community, it seems that journalists no longer have such a strong sense of "loyalty
to the profession". The disappearance of the common enemy and the common
cause has changed the journalistic profession into a much more diverse and divided
one. Perhaps this is because in a market economy journalists are competing with
each other, and are not forced to support each other for strength in the face of
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hardship. Whereas under communism, journalists needed solidarity with other
members of the profession, journalists today are more likely to experience a sense of
competition.
Robert Lutomski, Managing Editor of Rzeczpospolita, pointed out that "[a]s in
every market, we compete with all the newspapers in the market."89 Gazeta
Wyrorcza is also very competitive, even though it is "running first", as Maria
Kruczkowska put it. "From time to time, someone tries to catch us, which makes us
run even quicker; but until now we have succeeded in losing our eventual [sic]
competitor." Gazeta Wyrorcza is influenced by U.S. management style, and is set
on making profits through gaining the largest share of the advertising market. It
has succeeded, and Kruczkowska observes, "it's one of the things in which no other
paper can beat us."90
Competition, as I mentioned above, does not need to result in a narrowing of
differences. In Poland, we can see how competition can bring out the differences
between rival publications, rather than the similarities. There is obvious rivalry
between the two popular newsmagazines Wprost and Polityka. Artur Gorski of
Polityka said, "our most significant serious competitor is Wprost weekly. I think
that thanks to the existing market for Wprostweekly, we changed our image
actually. We became a full colour magazine, destined rather more for young
people."91
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As for the dailies, the rival for both Zycie and Super Express is Gazeta Wyborcza.

Zycie journalist Lukasz Warzecha observed that "[w]e compare each edition of ours

with it, although we are completely different as far as character of the newspaper is
concerned." Warzecha said that this difference was important to maintain. His
colleague, Andrzej Potocki, thinks that Zycie is competing for the same group of
readers. The newspaper's target audience is the intelligentsia, and its aim is to
influence them. "Elites usually read both Zycie and Gazeta Wyborcza to have what
they say is a full view of the affair," Warzecha said. 92

8.8.2 Competition Within Newspapers

Another form of competition that can be observed in the Polish print media takes
place within various newspapers, as well as between them. Of the journalists I
interviewed, four said that there was no rivalry between the staff of the newspapers
they worked for. However, three journalists said that there definitely was a
competitive atmosphere at their organisations. Asked whether there was
competition within Polityka, Artur Gorski replied, "Sure - I can feel the sense of
competition. " 93
Gazeta Wyborcza and .Rzeczpospolita encourage competition between staff. In

both of these newspapers, this does not disturb the notion that everyone is part of a
team, but promotes it. "We have a special award each week, so journalists are
competing, as far as news is concerned. As in any other work, people are
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competing and trying to be better than others," Kzeczpospolittis managing editor
Robert Lutomski affirmed. 9 4
In Gazeta Wyrorcza, the atmosphere is also very competitive. "There are some
parallel systems of journalism and pushing the [competitors]," Maria Kruczkowska
explained. "You get prizes every week for the best article and it's officially
announced. Also you receive points for a period of time, which are counted in
[shares] ... we will have stocks on the market, so the better journalist you are, the
more shares you will have."9 5
The Zycie journalists felt that collaboration predominated at their newspaper,
although Andrzej Potocki had heard that there was some competition. 96 Super
Express does not promote internal competition. 97 None of the smaller publications I

surveyed ( T)rgodnik Powszechny, ITTez, and Gazeta Polska) were particularly
competitive. All of the competitive publications are in fact successful and known
for their high standards (Gazeta Wyrorcza, Rzeczpospolita, and Polityka).
Moreover, these three publications are both internally and externally competitive.

8.8.3 Competition or Solidarity?
However, in spite of the fierce competition between newspapers, there is some
evidence to suggest that the sense of journalistic solidarity has not completely
vanished. I have already referred to the case of Jerzy Urban, who was punished for
breaking the state secrets law. Even though many journalists do not agree with
94
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Urban's views, and often criticise his newspaper, NIE, they expressed their solidarity
with him in his 1996 court case. Gazeta Wyborcza-S deputy editor-in-chief Helena
Luczywo wrote that although N!Es content was "frequently repulsive", she believed
that "press freedom also means freedom for authors to write such articles."
Urban was also supported by Jorge Ruiz Lardizabal, of the Polish section of the
Association of European Journalists, who said, "Being unable to write for a year sets
a dangerous precedent. Backed by the authority of an independent court, it restored
a mechanism well known in the past, when political censorship also stopped people
writing, 'in the interests of the state."' A resolution passed by the Polish Journalists'
Association agreed, "depriving a journalist of the right to carry out their profession
is an echo of the times when the press found itself under tight political control."
(Swiecka 1996)
This journalistic communal perspective on press freedom is also held by Adam
Szostkiewicz, who disapproves of the anti-foreigner radio station, Radio Maryja, yet
does not wish to stop them:
"This is a very difficult situation. . . . The worst situation would be if the bishops
managed to disband them. I don't think this is likely to happen, but if it does, what
should I do as a journalist, fighting so many years for freedom of speech? And my
answer is, for the time being, I would defend them. Much as I hate what they are
preaching, which is extremely damaging to our national interests, I would defend
them. For freedom .... And that's what we use in this paper, to criticise them.
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That's what we hoped for so long under the communists, that we could quarrel and
exchange ideas in an open way."98
However, we need to ask whether these journalists are actually showing
journalistic solidarity, or whether they are defending the principle of freedom of
speech. There have been many more cases where journalists are critical of their
media rivals when they get into trouble. The "Karwowski case", for example, has
not united all journalists. Although many journalists signed the document banning
any further reports of the Prime Minister's accusers, Sejm deputies Karwowski and
Slomka, there are also many journalists who do not agree with the idea, as Wprosfs
Marek Zieleniewski commented. 99

8.9 Professional Values in the Journalists' Code of Ethics
Concluding his evaluation of Polish journalism, Professor Goban-Klas commented
that "[t]he most serious obstacle to the independence of the Polish media is the lack
of a professional code among journalists" (Goban-Klas 1994 :241). At the time
Goban-Klas wrote, there were in fact several codes of ethics. The problem was
rather that these codes were not used by all journalists. To begin with, each
association of journalists had its own code of ethics. Now there is the Media Ethic
Charter, which has been accepted by most associations.
Most major publications, too, have their own guidelines, some of which I have
discussed above. However, these remain largely separate, due to the different values
that each paper represents. Because not all journalists are members of journalists'
98
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associations, it is more likely that they will refer to their publication's guidelines
than to an association's charter, as I have suggested in the previous chapter, when I
addressed the effects of organisational guidelines on journalists and showed how
they differed.
Another problem is that some of the guidelines in the codes may be understood in
different ways; concepts such as "truth" and "objectivity" have multiple
interpretations. These ideas sound familiar to journalists as they are part of
journalistic professional discourse. They are found in codes of ethics, journalists'
conferences, editorials and articles: journalists keep sending and receiving the
messages that reinforce these professional values.
The Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland first devised its Code of
Ethics at the third annual congress in 1991. No other associations were involved.
This document began with the statement that "the basic obligation of a journalist is
to seek after the truth and to publish it." The journalist is also asked to keep fact
and opinion separate. The second obligation is to respect an informant's wish to
remain anonymous. The document prohibits slander, blackmail, contempt of court,
inciting hatred or violence, pornography, crypto-advertising, and causing harm to a
colleague or to the profession.
The Code of Ethics can be seen as a precursor to the Media Ethic Charter, which
was adopted in March 1995 by nearly all of the journalists' associations in Poland:
the SDP, SDRP, Catholic Journalists' Association, Syndicate of Polish Journalists,
Journalists' Trade Union, Press Publishers' Union, Polish TVS.A., Polsat TV,
99

The Warsaw Voice, May 30, 1999, no.22 (553)

181

Association of Independent Film and TV Producers, Public Radio Association in
Poland, Polish Private Broadcasting Association, and Trade Union of Radio and TV
Journalists. The Charter uses very grandiose language, stating that journalists and
other media personnel "bearing in mind the principle of common good, conscious
of the role of media in man's life and in civic society, accept this charter and declare
that they will perform their jobs in accordance with the following principles:
•

The principle of the truth .. .

•

The principle of objectivity .. .

•

The principle of division of the information and the commentary ...

•

The principle of honesty ...

•

The principle of respect and tolerance ...

•

The principle of superiority of recipient's good ...

•

The principle of freedom and responsibility ... "

The latter two principles indicate a slight change since the 1991 code of ethics.
The 199 5 charter seems to indicate that social responsibility theory has had a
greater influence on journalistic professional values than in the previous charter.
This is because the focus is not only on the producers of media content, but also
considers media consumers.
The sixth principle is explained as meaning "that the basic rights of readers,
viewers and listeners are superior to the interests of the editorial staff, journalists,
editors, producers and broadcasters." However, the charter does not describe in
more detail how journalists should respect their readers' rights.
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The seventh principle is also vague, meaning "that freedom of the media imposes
on journalists, editors, producers and broadcasters responsibility for the form and
content of the message and the consequences which result from it." This statement
assumes that the media are free. It further suggests that the media have control of
their content. This is difficult in practice, as we have seen.
The Media Ethic Charter is an illustration of journalistic professional values in
Poland. While many journalists are familiar with these "principles", which are part
of their professional discourse, there is not necessarily agreement on what they
actually mean. These differences in interpretation emerged in the interviews I
conducted.
One of the most enduring journalistic beliefs is the conviction that there is such a
thing as press freedom. At the International Communications Forum in Kazimierz
Dolny, Poland, held in December 1995, a group of Polish and international
journalists discussed the aims and practices of the journalistic profession (ICF
1995). The enthusiastically named session on "Free Society, Free Media, Free
JournalistsT" demonstrated the predominance of the belief in press freedom. The
print journalists I interviewed also felt that the Polish media could now be described
as free.
There were three main approaches to press freedom that can be observed in these
responses - the first is that it is limited by journalists, the second is that it is a
product of capitalism, and the third is that organisational factors limit it.
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The idea that press freedom exists, but journalists abuse it, is reflected in John
Henningham's views, summarised earlier. 100 Bernard Margueritte, a Foreign
Correspondent in Poland for the French Press, expressed ideas corresponding to the
sixth and seventh principles of the media charter. Margueritte believes that the
media in Poland are now free, but this alone is not good enough. It is up to media
personnel to determine the standards of the media.
"If we have free journalists do we have responsible journalists, who have a sense of

mission, a sense of serving the public? The media is as responsible as the people
who work in it," Margueritte asserted. "We have to rebuild ourselves first and then
rebuild our society in a way that moral and spiritual value will be respected. So, let
us do it!" Margueritte's understanding of free media is a media that is not run by
the state.
Michal Komar, editor-in-chief of the Warsaw daily Sztandar (a paper bought up
by Marquard which was taken out of circulation in I 997) also believes this. Komar
said that after communism, "it soon transpired that freedom did not necessarily go
hand in hand with ethical values. Newspapers found themselves to be players in an
economic game and became debased by it. Journalists were subjected to bribery and
corruption by advertisers, banks and commercial interests. This situation, made
worse by a shortage of capital, also enabled political corruption to return" (ICF
1995).
Like Margueritte, Komar sees press freedom as a condition that exists in Poland
today, which needs to be kept under journalistic control. If there are problems,
100
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these are not a result of the system but of unethical practices. This view is similar to
that expressed by Henningham described earlier. Komar described the growth of
technology and asked, "we have all these means of transferring information but
shall we be able to use them in an honest way? And may we not find old habits
coming back to haunt us?" Apart from the journalists' own misuse of freedom,
there is still the (presumably political) threat that "there could be efforts to take
away the freedom that we have won" (ICF 1995).

Wprostweekly's deputy editor-in-chief Marek Zieleniewski also expressed the
view that press freedom is under threat from journalists. Referring to the
Karwowski case, involving a group of journalists signing a document stating that
they would not publish any further accusations against the Prime Minister by two
Sejm deputies, Zieleniewski commented that
"an unprecedented thing in the short history of Poland's free press happened.
Part of the community has announced the introduction of self-censorship. And if we
have any kind of censorship, irrespective of its cause, we are not dealing with truly
free press any more."10 1
Another journalistic approach to the idea of press freedom associates it with
democracy and capitalism. Komar, for example, links press freedom and free
society by saying that "[f]reedom begins in the press room. A free society cannot
function without a free press." As democracy and freedom have replaced
communism in Poland, it seems logical that press freedom has also replaced the
communist press. This view of press freedom is optimistic.
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Adam Szostkiewicz of 1jrgodnik Powszechny sees press freedom as an import from
the west that comes with democracy - but these conditions are still in the making.
He is convinced that "after ten years of democratic experience, not only in politics
and economy, but also in culture, there is a growing interest in something more
serious. After the first shock of having been open to anything coming from the
west: the colour, the excitement, the decadence (which is quite nice sometimes of
course), it's gone, finished."
1jrgodnik Powszechnyis the "more serious" publication that is needed as

democracy matures, or so Szostkiewicz believes. He thinks that the exciting,
colourful and decadent publications that appeared on the market were just a phase
in the process of "freedom". Szostkiewicz also said, "The transformation process is
not finished. There are moments, I think, when journalists should support, in their
own way, the main cause, which is democracy." The role of the journalist as
Szostkiewicz sees it is to fight for freedom and democracy, and this is still
necessary. 102
Artur Gorski thinks that the media in Poland have attained western standards,
saying that "journalism now reflects the idea of journalism in the western world. In
the past, it was different. It was journalism only in some areas - culture, for
instance. Even so, you couldn't write what you wanted to, particularly in politics,
but also in culture. There were many books you couldn't write about - you couldn't
have dissident writers. It's apsolutely changed." To the question of whether press
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freedom existed now, Gorski responded, "of course! I can swear that freedom is
basic to this job and I enjoy it."103
Robert Lutomski of Kzeczpospolita also believes that freedom of the press exists in
Poland now. Like Henningham, Lutomski thinks a free press means free choice: "In
each newspaper, you could find the same information. There was just one agency.
There was no creativity, just following the scheme which was created by someone
else. Now readers have a choice - they can choose from left to right, to culture, to
economy. This is a real change." 104
Another journalist who sees press freedom as a result of capitalism is Gazeta

Polska's Tomasz Sakiewicz. He said that when he started work as a journalist in the
underground media "there was no free media. [The] Communists controlled all
legal media. Now we have freedom. Our media are more professional." Sakiewicz
sees freedom of the press as a condition that exists because the communists are no
longer in power. This also makes professionalism possible, according to
Sakiewicz. 105
The third approach to press freedom is to see it as limited by organisations, rather
than journalists. Maria Kruczkowska is sure that freedom of the press exists in
Poland now, but she expressed some doubts, saying that "the press functions in the
world as it is. Fifty percent of our gains are from [advertising]. ... it's the power of
money. It makes for pressure. I don't work at the economic desk of Gazeta but I
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think that they must be under some kind of pressure ... "106 Kruczkowska's view of
press freedom is therefore less idealistic - freedom exists within boundaries which

'

are determined by money.
Lukasz Warzecha is critical of the idea of a free press, because there are
restrictions within each newspaper. "In a newspaper like this you have selfcensorship, you have all the editors who can influence journalists so that they write
what they want them to. Consider, for example, television, where communists are
most powerful, and you have to watch what they want. ... You always have an
owner of the newspaper, you always have an editor-in-chief, you always have your
own boss who can tell you how to do that and that and that. It depends on how
cunningly you manipulate and zigzag between all those and wherever you can, get
across your message and not theirs." 107
When I commented that this sounded similar to the old communist system,
Warzecha replied, "I think it's the same thing in western media. I would even say
that perhaps in some sense it is more difficult than it was before. Then, you could
write something and people just read between the lines, they knew what you
wanted to say. Now, you must put it more clearly but you have to lever it between
all the people that you have here. It's the same thing in the western media, because
of finance - perhaps it's even worse there." 108
In Warzecha's view, press freedom is limited by the organisation, but it is possible
for journalists to achieve more "freedom", which requires some talent. It is up to
106
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the journalist to manoeuvre around the editors, mangers and owners of the
newspaper.
The journalists' affirmations of the existence of press freedom, although different,
all included the idea that they are contributors to this condition. It seems that the
belief in a free press is helpful to Polish journalists, as it gives them a sense of
purpose, or at least control over their work.

The belief in press freedom is supplemented by the conviction that the journalist's
role is to tell the "truth". At the 1995 International Communications Forum, Michal
Komar spoke of journalists as if they were freedom fighters who would resist attacks
on press freedom by fighting with the weapons of "truth" and "morality". Komar
gave a stirring speech:
"Are we defenceless? No! Because we have learned what is to tell the truth. That
true information is not only a moral course, but that it helps to make our daily
working lives more effective in public and in private. It will not be so easy for this
sense of truth to be taken away. But the danger obliges us in the media to face our
responsibilities. To tell the truth is a greater moral duty, even more now than
before. We must talk about decency and morality" (ICF 1995).
The ''truth" is very popular with journalists - the idea that the role of the journalist
was to 'seek the truth' was expressed by many of the journalists I interviewed.
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However, as with the ideal of press freedom, the journalists' understandings of
"truth" differed.

Adam Szostkiewicz explains that the Polish journalist's relationship with the truth
is a difficulty inherited from the communist past. During this time concerned
journalists were confronted with a problem of self-definition - "there was this
dilemma of a journalist who is committed to a specific political cause on one hand,
and on the other hand trying to do his job, to give a picture of the truth."
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For Szostkiewicz, the role of the journalist is to convey the truth, but this conflicts
with promoting any kind of political values. Being truthful means showing both
sides of a conflict, not supporting one over the other. This "principle of neutrality"
is what journalists should strive for, Szostkiewicz says. However, he can see
instances where he would not do this. 110
Tomasz Sakiewicz believes that "a journalist can't be neutral. For example, it is
the Second World War. You are in [Auschwitz]. How can you be neutral? How
can you take the side of the Nazis? No, it's impossible. But the fact that you can't
be neutral doesn't mean that you can't write the truth. You can write the truth."

The "truth" can be equated with "facts". "Facts" should be separated from opinion,
but opinion is necessary, according to Sakiewicz. He is convinced that "journalists
should give their own opinion. People must know what is the opinion of the
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journalist and what is the information. This must be very clear. I think that this is
more honest. Journalists shouldn't hide their opinions." 111
Lukasz Warzecha takes a similar view. He answered that "of course, [the
journalist's role] should be seeking the truth, but all the time bearing in mind that
we live in a media society and there are some very complicated ways of getting your
message across to people and making them think as you think. . . . I think that the
role of the journalist is first of all, seeking the truth, but below that it's influencing,
it's being cunning, it's using all those tricky methods ... "
Warzecha believes that influencing people is just as important as telling the
"truth", saying that "as we live in a democracy, everything depends on the people,
how they vote. So if we think that something is right, we should influence them so
that they choose someone who we think will do something right." 112
Andrzej Potocki, like Warzecha, said that "the role of the journalist is to show the
truth. But you gain influence anyway, because of the mechanism of the media. And
that's why the journalist should try to get to the truth, and not manipulate the text."
For Potocki, writing the "truth" means not being a conformist: for example,
although he happens to write for a right-wing newspaper, he likes to criticise rightwing politicians if he disagrees with them. 11 3
Asked whether he believed that objectivity was possible, Tomasz Wiscicki replied,
"I think, for me, the truth exists. Objectivity, for me, means to be as close to the
truth as possible. Objectivity does not mean to make contradictory statements about
111
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the truth but not even trying to show where the truth is. . .. It means to gather as
much information as possible and give it to [the readers], not to judge, not to tell
them who is right and who is wrong, but to say who lies and who tells the truth - if
I know who lies." Wiscicki thinks that the truth needs to be 'interpreted', and this is
the role of the journalist.
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The principle of separating information and commentaries, and the principles of
objectivity and truth, which are all related, are recognised as necessary by
journalists - and yet, they are also seen as the theory rather than the practice.
Szostkiewicz and Wiscicki, for example, agree with the idea of objectivity but admit
that they are not objective. Maria Kruczkowska observes, "In Gazeta we try to be
objective, for instance we put information and commentary separately. Information
is one column, and the commentaries are in dark print. But it's more appearance
than reality, from my point of view, because information is very selective and
[contentious]." 115
The Zycie journalists were also sceptical about the idea of objectivity. Lukasz
Warzecha spoke frankly about this: "What I've noticed being a journalist is that socalled independent and objective media is a myth, because we've been talking about
left-wing, right-wing media, and it's quite obvious that they are not so unbiased,
even when they have to choose topics .... For example, the affair with General
Pinochet - it depends what you write about him, what pictures you publish, ... what
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words you use. I have some views, of course, and I'm not trying to pretend that I'm
objective."
Marek Zieleniewski, in his criticism of the journalists who banned publication of
Karwowski's accusations, also reinforced the ideal of objectivity as a goal that must
always be aspired to above all else. Zieleniewski wrote that "the press is supposed
to be impartial. Its duty is to provide comprehensive and objective information,
even if the news might turn out to be unnerving or depressing". 116

8.10 Summary

The Polish journalists' views of their role can be seen to be influenced by definitions
of professionalism such as those set out in the media ethic charter, and traditional
professional and cultural values. While there is no definite agreement on the role of
the journalist, the sample of journalists interviewed did use the same expressions to
describe their role. The image of the journalist is rather idealised, as is the
assumption that freedom of the press must now exist in Poland.
The idea that the role of the journalist may vary with different media systems is
difficult to assess, because this varies within media systems, and moreover, the same
terms are used to describe roles, but with different meanings. In Poland, there is
clearly some continuity from the communist past which still influences the
profession of journalism. In particular, Polish journalists see their role as an
informed commentator, rather than simply an information provider.
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Yet while Polish journalists share this past, and are aware of a common set of
professional ethics, they are divided by their different approaches to their work.
There is no uniform system of journalism education or training to unite them, nor
are they interested in joining a journalists' association. These two factors brought
together journalists under communism. Moreover, communist journalists worked
in similar environments, and shared the same status. People's mistrust of journalists
also contributed to the journalists' need for solidarity. What do people think of
journalists in Poland today? The public view of the role of journalism will be
addressed in the next chapter.
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9

THE MASS MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC
A study of Polish journalism cannot be complete without examining the social
context in which they work, and their relationship with the public. We need to ask
not only how journalists work, but also whom they are addressing. In this chapter,
the Polish media system will be discussed with a focus on the consumers, rather
than the producers, of media content.
The questions this chapter will focus on is firstly, how accessible the Polish media
are for the public, and secondly, to what extent the media represent and respond to
the people. The first issue, the extent of accessibility, can be assessed by looking at
the distribution of the media, and the range of socio-economic inequalities.
The other issue is whether journalists are able to represent the interests of the
people. Under communism, there were the two distinct kinds of journalism which I
have discussed. The underground press filled the communication gap left by the
official media. In Poland today, it is questionable whether print journalists are in
touch with their readers, as this chapter will show.
Since this essay aims to understand the present by comparing it with the past, the
first point to note is that the overall daily newspaper circulation has definitely
decreased since the I 980s, when the total print run was over 9 million copies. The
total circulation for dailies in Poland today is 3.3 million copies (Ubysz 1999). This
is a considerably lower figure, which can be interpreted in at least three different
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ways. The first explanation is that people have less money to spend on the press;
the second is that people are not interested in what the print media have to offer;
the third is that television has become more popular as a source of news and
entertainment. These suggestions will be dealt with below.

9.1

ACCESSIBILITY
Firstly, the difference in newspaper readership between communist and

postcommunist Poland can be explained in terms of accessibility. Theoretically, the
official media were widely available in communist Poland. Firstly, the distribution
network was well organised. Newspapers and magazines were sold at a countrywide network of tiny kiosks, over which the state had a monopoly. Also, the system
of postal delivery based on subscriptions ensured distribution.
However, in practice, the kiosks' range of titles could be limited by the
Communist Party, which controlled the system of distribution. During the Solidarity
era of 1980-Z, when the growth of the underground press began to affect the
official press, the less propagandistic titles such as Polityka and Gazeta Krakowska
were difficult to acquire; the queues in front of kiosks equalled those before
butchers' shops (Garton Ash 1983:137).
Communist Poland was not isolated from the rest of the world. Its borders were
not impenetrable, and if Poles were sceptical about their official Communist Party
dominated television, radio and newspapers, they could turn to other sources.
People wanted access to information, above all truthful i.J;lformation. The
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availability of television and radio from the west, a benefit of technology, enabled
them to choose these as an alternative. Western media were certainly popular, so
much so that "[e]ven the poor peasant farmer in his shack tuned in nightly to hear
the news from Radio Free Europe and perhaps a BBC commentary" (Garton Ash
1983: 13 7). It is doubtful, however, that all areas of Poland were actually able to

receive foreign broadcasts.
The unavoidable infiltration of alternative media, both non-government,
underground, and foreign, into the public sphere revealed the falsehood of the
official press; it added to the public atmosphere of distrust. News did indeed, as
McNair said, 'get out'. Although the Party tried to maintain total control of the
media, some undesirable comments or information were able to slip through. In
1979, the official Polish media were discredited when a book of censorship

instructions was leaked to the western media. The western media then revealed to
their Polish audience the extent of censorship in Poland (Goban-Klas 1994:161).
Another way of accessing information was available to printers. Employees of
print works were able to read the first uncensored proofs of their local Party paper
(Garton Ash 1983:130). It is estimated that 40 -50 000 print workers in Poland
were members of Solidarity. On 18 August 1981, they organised a protest called
the "Days Without Papers". For two days, printers brought about a strange reversal
of government censorship by refusing to print the official papers from their works
(Garton Ash 1983:203).
As the example of the printers shows, Solidarity supporters were not content with
the existing media system. Solidarity members demanded access to the media, which
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they saw as a form of public control over politics. They also called for "fair
distribution of newsprint", legalisation of underground publications, "legal
liberalization of censorship", and journalists to be protected from dismissal for
political reasons. The end of state control was marked by the Round Table talks
between the government and Solidarity which began on Gth February 1989. (GobanKlas 1994:208).
In April 1989, a document signed by all groups outlined a new political system
based on political pluralism, freedom of speech, and independent courts. Solidarity
was granted some time on television and radio. On 3th May, the first edition of

Gazeta Wyborcza was published, aiming to promote Solidarity candidates for
Poland's first free elections. This independent publication was given permission to
be published during the Round Table Talks. The Communist Party could no longer
claim total control of the media; nor could it claim that this was necessary.
Legalisation could only confirm the existing situation.
In spite of all the discussions about upholding democratic values, the
democratisation of Poland has not provided equal opportunities for everyone. Firstly,
there is a large discrepancy between the highest and lowest incomes, and secondly,
there is an even greater gap in terms of assets. While the "richest I 00" list of 1991
still mentioned the old communist nomenklatura, by 1993 a new elite had come to
replace them - the business elite (Juchler 1994:242).
The differences in income between socio-economic groups have increased
dramatically, as national statistics show. In 1987, managers and professionals had
incomes of 45% above the average, while the incomes of farmers were 12% below
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average. By 1993, managers' incomes had risen to 217% the average. Farmers
had incomes of 43% less than the average, and unskilled labourers' incomes were
37% less (Juchler 1994:246).
These differences show a clear division between those who gained from the new
economic situation in postcommunist Poland and those who did not. The extent of
the latter group's discontent is indicated by the increasing numbers of strikes. In
1989 there were a total of 894 strikes, compared to 5 916 in 199 2. In the first half
of 1993, there were 7 341 strikes. During one of the strikes, in the summer of
1992, a copper miner told television journalists that "we now have democracy, but
no money!" (Juchler 1994:24 7)
A further problem of inequality is that of the difference between regions.
Joachim Weidemann has observed uneven development in the Polish media between
what he calls "Poland A and Poland B". This refers to the obvious differences
between the urban and rural regions of Poland (Weidemann 1999: 51). The rural
communities in some areas of Poland have limited access to the mass media. It is
not only satellite and cable television that they lack, but even the regular broadcasts
are weak in reception in some areas.
Even more basic technology is often denied people in these regions, such as
telephone cables. A recent television advertisement shows a farmer at a public
phone booth in a small and primitive rural village, giving words of encouragement
over the phone to his wife, who is having a baby in a distant hospital. The man
shouts out the joyful news that "it's a boy!", and there is a loud cheer from the
entire peasant community, who have been standing behind him. The commercial is
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praising the Polish telecommunications company Telekomunikacja Polska for
actually bothering to make one telephone available to a whole village in such a
remote area.
Telecommunications networks may be more widespread in the cities, but there is
still a long wait to have individual telephones installed. Due to this deficit, the
mobile phone market has expanded rapidly. As Csapo-Sweet and Kaposi observe in
Hungary, "the competitive prices and services of the mobile phone companies make
this medium of communication attractive to Hungarian customers who in Socialist
times had to wait years for installation of home or business phone lines. Mobile
phones have also rapidly become a symbol of new social status and wealth" (CsapoSweet and Kaposi 1999:7). This growth is reflected in the numbers of
advertisements for mobile phones in the media.
Although it is mainly in the area of television that some rural areas of Poland are
neglected, the print media, which have an important function of providing local
news, are often available but in danger of being bought up or pushed out of the
market by larger national or foreign publishing companies - the Polish AgoraGazeta and the German Passauer Neue Presse. 117
Without these notable social and regional inequalities, Poland's media system
could be described as open in terms of accessibility. Illiteracy is not a problem in
Poland; the national literacy rate is 99% ( 1992 figures) .11 s Ethnic minorities make
up only 1% of the population, and amongst these the largest group are Germans
ll7

see chapter 7.2.1
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(estimated to be 300 000 to 500 000 people) living in the western region of

Opole. They are represented by their own political party and have their own
newspapers.

9.2

RECIPROCITY

Even if the media were accessible to every Polish citizen, there is still the problem
of whether these media actually reflect a broad range of interests, or only selected
viewpoints. Under communism, as mentioned above, people did not trust the
official media. 120 Jacek Kuron, one of the intellectual leaders of the opposition
movement, summed up public opinion of the government and its media by saying
that "if there were to be an announcement that the government had laid a golden
egg, people would say: first of all, not golden, secondly, not an egg, and thirdly, it
didn't lay it but stole it" (Garton Ash 1983:283). This interview was published in

Sztandar Mlodych, the official youth paper, in October 1981. The editor was
sacked for publishing it.
However, although there were not many opportunities for Polish journalists in the
1980s to have any kind of interaction with the public whatsoever, there is some
evidence to suggest that they did. Most of the journalists interviewed by Jane Curry
said that their readers, not the elite, were their source of topics (Curry 1990: 114).
Journalists said that they received many letters from their readers, and some used
readers' letters in intervention cases. That is, the journalist would act as an
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Literacy refers to the number of adults over 15 who are able to read, write and understand short basic
texts. (Fischer World Almanac 1998, Fischer, Frankfurt 1997)
119
Fischer World Almanac 1998
120
see chapter 4
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intermediary in a dispute. The journalists who took on this role carefully chose
institutions and issues which would be likely to respond to intervention, and
avoided insoluble bigger problems (Curry 1990: 196-7).
Some journalists did respond to public requests, although this was difficult, as it
meant resisting the official system. During August 1980, as the Solidarity
movement was gathering strength, workers at the Gdansk shipyards and their
intellectual supporters called for the official mass media to publish their demands.
The Party publications would not, and authorities cut telephone lines and dropped
leaflets of anti-strike propaganda.
Following the blackout, some journalists sent a resolution to the SDP complaining
about the system of false reporting guidelines and censorship. The newspaper for
youth, Sztandar Mlodych, boldly published the strikers' demands. This encouraged
other journalists to become more critical of the Party (Goban-Klas 1994: 16 7). In
spite of this, the majority of official publications were still hesitant to report on
strikes or the activities of the opposition.
Journalists also encouraged their readers to comment on government policy, and
sent these criticisms to the regional or central Party offices, or even state officials
(without revealing the identity of the writer). Sometimes these letters brought about
change; Curry cites the examples of alimony law and regionalisation of schools
which were revised due to journalists' efforts (Curry 1990: 179-80).
Another way in which journalists were actively involved with their readers was by
actually organising projects for the community and motivating the public to
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participate. These usually focussed on regional or local issues, and were carried out
by local or regional newspapers. Journalists' action took the form of meetings with
locals, or organising a campaign or fundraising project. The action was discussed
by the paper's editorial board and the paper staff were all expected to take part
(Curry 1990:200).
Intervention initiated by some journalists in the official press enabled public
participation and made the government aware that the public would not tolerate
every inequality. Official journalists were still viewed as political, out for personal
gain (Curry 1990:94). There was no trust in the media; the evening television
news was so obviously fabricated that it "did not have to be seen to be disbelieved"
(Garton Ash 1983:139).
As noted above, the official newspapers that were more critical, like Polityka and

Gazeta Krakowska, sold out quickly, and people queued at kiosks for them as they

did for food (Garton Ash 1983:137). But most critical of all were the underground
newspapers, which best fulfilled the feedback function.
In the 1970s and 80s, there was a great increase in publications that were not
officially registered, and therefore not censored. These were amateur productions,
often not more than one or two pages, crudely reproduced by typewriter or
mimeograph, and distributed by hand. It was estimate<;! that between August 1980
and December 1981, at the peak of the underground mov~ent, there were about
3200 underground titles in circulation (Giorgi 1995:76).
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Robotnik (The Worker), established in 1976, may have been the first of the
underground publications. It was a two-page bulletin produced by KOR, the
Committee for the Defense of Workers, whose "fundamental task was to convey the
truth, since the official press did not fulfil this role" (Goban-Klas 1994: 156).

Robotnikwas not only a source of information, but also a forum for activists calling
for political change and democratic values. In 1979, it published a Charter of
Workers' Rights signed by 80 people in 22 cities (Albright 1983:19).
Initially, "Solidarity was a movement of the spoken word", communicating to
workers at strikes, Professor Goban-Klas observed. Solidarity leaders tried to reach
larger audiences by using any methods that they were able to access, such as
publicising the negotiations with authorities over a shipyard PA system, attaching
posters to noticeboards at factories, and broadcasting on foreign radio stations
(Goban-Klas 1994:172).
Solidarity repeatedly demanded access to the mass media, which was repeatedly
denied by the government. One of Solidarity's main criticisms was that "the
propaganda language, which damages our desired way of expressing thoughts and
feelings, is a dangerous pack of lies. Solidarity will seek to give back to society the
Polish language that makes it possible for people truly to understand each other"
(Goban-Klas 1994:176). Solidarity rejected the language of the official media as
un-Polish, which is interesting considering that the official media took pride in its
use of language.
Solidarity Press used many letters for the basis of its reports du~ tlre 1980's.Curry claims that this "reinforced the image that they had power and authorlly~
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(Curry 1990: 198); but more likely, I think, is that this showed that journalists were
in touch with the public.

The underground press was concerned with issues that affected its readers, which
were not covered by the official media: food shortages, inflation, strikes, and calls
for unions. In July 1980, for example, there were strikes in several cities as a
reaction against increased food prices. There was no mention of the strikes in the
official media for ten days, but KOR publicised the news and foreign media took it
up (Goban-Klas 166-7).
One of the KOR publications, Solidarnosc (Solidarity) started out as a strike
information bulletin with a circulation of 20 000, and soon became more
argumentative and satirical; Solidarity was later the name for the whole movement.
What Solidarity achieved was opposition on a mass scale. Solidarity publicised and
promoted itself by establishing regional offices and libraries, and its own press and
radio. Although Solidarity publications were critical of the government, their
demands were usually very cautious.
There was some disagreement amongst Solidarity journalists as to whether they
should criticise their own leaders or not, and as to how radical their demands
should be. Paradoxically, although committed to truth and democracy, Solidarity
was forced to "censor its own members" (Garton Ash 1983:88). This meant
preventing Solidarity journalists from becoming too radical in their criticism of both
the communists, with whom its leaders wanted to co-operate, and the Solidarity
leaders themselves.

205

However, the workers were opposed to what they saw as "linguistic compromise",
and wanted freedom to express opinions. The Solidarity Programme condemned the
language of propaganda, and proclaimed that the union would use plain Polish for
communication between people, not brainwashing. A Solidarity satire of
Communist Party propaganda, the "TV Dictionary", was a guide to understanding
official euphemisms: "2 Poles= an illegal gathering; 3 Poles= an illegal
demonstration; 10 million Poles= a handful of extremists" (cited in Garton Ash
1983:270).
Solidarity media, unlike the official media, had a social base. The Solidarity
movement used the language of nationalism to appeal to everyone; as Polish
sociologist Marcin Kula observed, "[n]ational categories were the only common
language for the masses" (Kula 1993: 192). The communist propaganda of "united
workers" had been revealed as false. Instead, Solidarity united people on the basis
of their citizenship of the Polish nation. This nationalistic language also had the
approval of the Church, and in a nation as deeply religious as Poland, allying with
the Church guaranteed support.
As Colin Sparks and Anna Reading (1995:31) point out, Solidarity and other
opponents of communism focused on the rather ambiguous goal of "civil society".
Karol Jakubowicz observed that this meant the development of an independent
media that was representative of the people: "The ideologues of the new
infornfation order in Poland ... see communication as empowerme~!~ aS' the e«ercise
of a right, and satisfaction of a need, to communicate by 'speaking with -one's own
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voice', without the need for spokesmen and intermediaries" (cited in Sparks and
Reading 1995:38).
Solidarity's demands at the Round Table Talks reflected such views, as they called
for one television and one television channel to be made available to social groups.
However, the changes to the mass media did not take the course that opposition
leaders had planned. Instead, the television and radio board continued to consist of
political appointments (Sparks and Reading 1995:41), and the press, as we have
seen, was simply privatised. Therefore, the goal of a more representative, 'socially
responsible' media has been difficult to realise.

9.3

1990s Poland and the Media

To return to the issue of the decline in newspaper readership, we will now
examine social changes in postcommunist Poland. Analysing these changes can
help us to understand the changing patterns of media use.
As Ryszard Filas points out, it is difficult to analyse the readership of the Polish

press. Publishers usually provide statistics that are a little optimistic, to attract
advertising. "Circulation" may be quite a high figure, but this simply refers to the
number of copies produced, and does not account for the copi~& that were not sold
(Filas 1999:215). Therefore, the surveys made by the Press Research Centre (OBP)
in Krakow and the official polling agency, CBOS, are a more reliable source of
information.
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Filas divides readership trends in the 1990s into four phases, possibly five ( 1996,
the year the study was completed, may have marked the beginning of a new phase,
but this could not be assessed at the time).

• The first phase ( 1989-90) was characterised by suspicion of new publications,
but readership of previously established daily newspapers, especially regional
papers, remained stable. The number of people who never read the press at all
almost doubled, going from 9% to 17%.

• During the second phase ( 1990), readership of national dailies increased. There
was a much larger choice of publications available.

• The third press readership phase, lasting until 1993, was one of fewer regular
readers, with people reading more weekly and monthly publications, but not
consistently. Fewer dailies were read regularly. However, more people read
"older" publications (those that had been established in communist times) many of which were being re-styled. There was also an increase in the number
of non-readers.
• This continued into the fourth phase (until 1995), but more people read national
newspapers than local and regional papers. The beginning of what may be a
fifth phase (1996) is characterised by even more non-readers (16.8%) and more
readers of scandal-and-gossip magazines; the gap between the top three
newspapers and the others remains large (Filas 1999:214-31).
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• OBOP polls conducted in July 1997 found that people are tending to stick with
one daily newspaper or weekly journal, and are not interested in trying new ones
(Drab 1998). Titis makes it very hard for new titles to succeed - unless they are
women's weekly or monthly magazines. The numbers of these continue to
increase. Eight of the top ten magazines are women's, the remaining two are
television guides.
As the chart below (Figure 3) illustrates, Gazeta Wyborcza quickly attained a

leading position amongst national dailies, which reached its peak in 1992, when the
paper had 25% of the market share. It has retained its leading position, but its two
distinctive rivals, Super Express and Rzeczpospolita, are gaining. The tabloid
Express ITTeczomyand Przeglad Sportou-y(the oldest sports paper, established in

1921, and now partly owned by Marquard) are also catching up. Other popular
titles are Dziennik Zachodni (Eastern Daily), Trybuna Slaska, Gazeta Pomorska and
Glos ITTelkopolski, which are all regional newspapers.

A distinctive development is the drop in readership of older titles that had very
high circulations under communism, such as Groma.da .Kolnik-Polski (Group of
Polish Farmers), Sztandar Mlodych (Banner of the Youth), and Trybuna (previously
Trybuna Ludu) . Trybuna had a much higher circulation than any other newspaper

in the 1980s (over a million in 1980).
However, any figures from the communist era need to be regarded with suspicion.
Newspapers were purchased almost exclusively through subscriptions, and the
state-run kiosks did not always have all newspapers on offer. Trybuna was the
official mouthpiece of the Communist Party, so it was made widely available and
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printed in large quantities. Therefore Trybuna should not be seen as a "popular"
newspaper, just one that the greatest number of people had access to.
The statistics above require some further interpretation. The first thing to note is,
as mentioned above, that the difference between rich and poor has become more
distinct in Poland since the disintegration of communism. However, these changes
are not confined to small groups at either end of the spectrum. It is significant that
for the majority of people, living standards declined in the 1990s - real wages fell
and perceptions of economic development became more negative Quchler
1994:269-77). With less money to spend overall, people also have less to spend on
daily newspapers, or those who bought more than one magazine buy only one. This
may also account for the growing group of non-readers.
Two other variables that affect newspaper readership are education and age. As
Dorota Ubysz (1999) observes, "The main factor stimulating press readership in
Poland is the education of society. Dailies are especially popular among readers
with a college education. High income and the young and middle-aged sectors of
society also have more contact with the press." The percentage of Poles with
university degrees in 1990- 1 was only 12.9%. By 1997-8, 29.2 percent of Poles
had a degree (Ubysz 1999). According to this analysis, daily readership should
increase.
Along with socio-economic changes, changes in values are also of interest for a
more detailed analysis of media use in Poland. Examining these changes together
with political transformations and media consumer trends provides us with a more
comprehensive picture of Polish society.
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Sociologist Marek Ziolkowski argues that a "new normative order" has emerged in
Poland in the 1990s. This consists of both values and interests, and the accepted
means of their realisation. Ziolkowski describes values as subjective ideals of
morally just behaviour, desirable for a functioning social order at the macro level
and decent life at the micro level. Interests, on the other hand, are strategies which
enable one group or individual to achieve their goals (Ziolkowski 1995:165).
In 1989, a Pole's interests and values depended on his or her experience of the old

system, but with time these changed in response to different social conditions,
Ziolkowski believes. Under what is known as the "transformation honeymoon"
beginning in 1990, the values of independence, democracy, freedom, and
overcoming the old regime, were shared by Polish society. It was a "time of social
mobilization, optimism, hope, and revolutionary enthusiasm" (Ziolkowski
1995:167).
During this time, the government was able to implement more wide-ranging
reforms than were possible later, due to the high level of trust, Ziolkowski points
out. It was in this context that the fastest steps were taken to transform the media,
as the liquidation process began and new media laws were passed. This
corresponds to Filas' second phase, during which newspaper readership increased.
It is likely that people bought newspapers during this time because they were

interested in finding out about the political and economic changes that were taking
place in Poland.
However, once the "honeymoon" was over, "everyday drudgery" set in. Living
standards fell as the cost of living rose. The enthusiasm wore off, and values and
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interests began to divide. This coincides with Juchler's observation that politics had
become more factionalised - minor political parties splintered off from the original
groupings, and new parties (like the Party of Laughter, the Survival Party and the
Beer Party) registered (Juchler 1994:248).
Voter turnout for the second free elections in 1991 was only 43%. After these
elections, 29 parties were represented in parliament. Unlike the communist era,
when the world could be divided into communist and non-communist, the postcommunist world was fragmented, without identifiable "goodies" and "baddies".
From this period, four different systems of values and interests can be identified
according to Ziolkowski.
Ziolkowski's four "systems of normative order" do not characterise society as a
whole, but are competing, coexisting systems which are manifest in a variety of
ways, with different groups exhibiting these interests and values at different times.
We can identify them in electoral choices, consumer trends, and importantly for this
study, in the "social communicative space" (Ziolkowski 1995:169).
1. "Classical" dilemmas, discussions about the socio-cultural and political order are
seen as important; these are regarded in terms of values.
2. There is an economic focus, where material concerns take priority. People
question the shape of the economic system and their place in it. Although their
goals are pragmatic, people lack sufficient pragmatism to realise them.
3. There is concern with the fiscal system, and questions of the extent of state
intervention, with the realisation of the collective economy.
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4. Non-material values are the main concern, such as the protection of the
environment, minority rights, and sexual equality.
The first system, Ziolkowski says, characterised many of the debates held in the
social communicative space. The debate over the political order (before the extreme
fragmentation of politics) was divided into two polarities, authority (law and
order") and democracy. The Catholic church also discussed Christian values in this
style. The position and interests of Poland in the world were debated by politicians,
intellectuals, and the media, whether Poland should take a national or international
focus. This system was dominant in political rhetoric, public debate and mass media
content before the second elections in 1993 (Ziolkowski 1995:172).
The decline in the first system was marked by an increase in the fourth:
representatives of various social movements emerged and the subjects of debate
shifted to these "post-materialist, alternative" concerns. However, this system did
not guide all activities, especially not in the political sphere. In fact, seen from a
statistical point of view, the numbers of people actually participating in these new
social movements were very limited.
At the time Ziolkowski made these observations, in 1995, the second and third
systems predominated in the social consciousness. Most people were interested in
problems of an economic nature, and feel that the construction of a new society has
lost its axiological and ideological dimensions. At first, the development of a
capitalist economy was just one aspect of the democratisation process, with the
values of freedom, pluralism and equality just as important. However, these values
are no longer seen "as values in their own right but merely as instruments" -

213

according to a 1992 survey, 46% of Poles said that democracy was only worthwhile
if it led to prosperity, and only 18% saw it as an important part of the political
system (Ziolkowski 1995: 174).
This theory is supported by another sociologist, Witold Morawski, who found that
democratic values have become less important as political aims. In a 1980 survey
asking people what they thought were the most important political aims, 22% of
Poles replied "to give people more say in the decisions of government, and 17% said
"to protect freedom of speech"; in 1993, these figures were 15.8% and 4.6%, with
most people answering that maintaining order in the city and fighting rising prices
were most important (Morawski 1994:26).
Ziolkowski suggests that economic and welfare goals are often defined in
discussion, but not the means to achieving them; they are often seen in emotional
or irrational terms. He conjectures that people are likely to be receptive to imported
mass culture with its materialistic values (Ziolkowski 1995: 177). This trend can be
seen as corresponding with Filas' fourth phase - people are interested in gossip
about the rich and famous, and envy their material possessions and lifestyle. This
affects teenagers too, who prefer the trendiness of imported magazines to the Polish
equivalents.
Three years later, Ziolkowski observed that consumption had grown in
significance. The greater choice of goods available only gave people a sense of
deprivation and "something lacking" if they could not afford these things. New
divisions in society have emerged as a result of consumerism: the "consumer class",
for whom buying gives a sense of belonging, the "consumer underclass", who
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cannot afford to belong, and the "consumer elite", who can afford luxury goods
(Ziolkowski 1998:36).
As Ziolkowski points out, the mass media have encouraged, even determined
consumer needs, as their content is increasingly dominated by advertisements,
quizzes, competitions, and give-aways. The media are interested either in the
consumer class or the consumer elite - because advertisers are. Advertising has
increased noticeably in the Polish mass media in the past decade. 121
Advertisers, Ralph Negrine noted, are interested in readers with buying power, so
they will favour the 'quality' press even though the space will cost them more.
"One effect of this is to force the quality press 'up-market' so as to serve the wealthy
reader" (Negrine 1994:67). The content becomes biased; moreover advertising
creates some sections such as travel, motoring, and fashion. It suits newspapers to
see their readers as elites because elites have more money. 122
Gazeta Wyborcza is a good example of this. Most of its extra supplements were

created as advertisements, or as a vehicle for them. Like Super Express and Express
ITTeczomy, it aims at the consumer class and those who would like to be in it.

.Kzeczpospolita's supplements focussing on law and money are obviously aimed at

the kind of people its advertising caters for - the consumer elite. It is hard to
separate the growth of consumer trends from the media - it becomes a chicken and
egg question of whether the media are observing and serving an existing consumer
need, or whether they are in fact creating it.

121
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See chapter 7.7 above
Examples of advertorials aimed at the consumer elite are also discussed in chapter 7.7
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An example of the press both responding to and contributing to consumer trends is

its part in the gambling and lottery-playing craze. "Zdrapki", or scratch-cards (of
the silver-covered match-the-symbols-and-win variety), were used by many
newspapers in the early 1990s to attract readers. The Lodz daily Express
Ilustrowany, owned by the French Hersant publishing company, was the initiator of

the newspaper scratch-card competition in 1991. The newspaper's sales went up so
markedly that other papers including Super Express, Zycie Warszau.yand Kurier
Polski thought they would try it too. The idea seemed a certain way of increasing

sales, for not only were new readers attracted to the paper because of the contest
and prizes, but also because many people began buying more copies to have a better
chance of winning (11ze Warsaw Voice, September 27, 1998, no.39 (518)).
Super Express now has regular competitions which involve filling in coupons

inside the paper. The competitions are advertised in large letters on the front page
accompanied by pictures of prizes. Gazeta Wyborcza and Express Meczomy also
offer competitions, in the form of phone-in give-aways.
The competition craze has many forms, with a variety of companies organising
competitions usually based on answering questions about their product. Television
phone-in quizzes are a common part of an evening's viewing on the commercial
stations, as is the traditional lottery draw. Lotteries seem to be very popular,
judging from the amounts that are played for. This appears to support Ziolkowski's
observations about the increasingly materialistic aims of many Poles.
The number of television programme guides that are sold each week compared to
serious newspapers suggests that many people are more interested in watching
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television than reading newspapers, which would support the third hypothesis
proposed above. Filas suggests that television is preferable because people have less
free time, and television is a less demanding way of spending it than reading (Filas
1999:230). Also, in the case of news, television news programmes quickly
summarise the main points in half an hour, whereas reading the details of the same
information in a newspaper may take much longer.
To deal with the challenge of television, many publications have reduced the
amount of information in their articles and substituted it with pictures. Super
Express and Express ITTeczomy are the most obvious examples of this. Also, the

information is sometimes presented in boxes next to the text, bearing some
resemblance to a television screen (Falkowska 1992, cited in Filas 1999:230). The
weekly newsmagazines Wprost and Polityka often use this layout. Serious
newspapers like 1)rgodnik Powszechny and Rzeczpospolita deliberately avoid colour,
information boxes, and short articles, as they target readers who prefer more
detailed information.123
Newspapers may take these strategies with a target group of readers in mind, but
are they responding to this group, or creating it? Are journalists even aware of
what the public think of them? We need to answer the second question in order to
consider the first. Opinion polls might not be accurate, but they still provide a
rough idea of what people think. According to an opinion poll conducted by CBOS
polling centre in mid-1996, public opinion of journalists seems to be quite high on
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Interview 1, Krakow, 30th October 1998, and Interview 4, Warsaw, 9th December 1998
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one hand, but disappointing on the other. On the positive side, 73% of the people
surveyed saw journalists as ''well-educated", and 58% described them as "honest".
When asked the question ''what should a good journalist have?", the most
frequently given response was "impartiality". This again supports the association of
journalism with objectivity. According to the public (or the majority of people), as
well as most journalists, the role of the journalist is to be objective.
However, only 39% think journalists are objective, and 36% think journalists are
biased. Therefore, for many people, bias is not necessarily a sign of dishonesty.
Unfortunately, people have other reasons for not trusting journalists. Only 48%
believed that journalists are actually "familiar with the things they write about"
(The Warsaw Voice, August 11, 1996, no.32 (407)).

It is interesting to compare these results with what journalists themselves imagine

the public think of them. Andrzej Potocki and Lukasz Warzecha, of Zycie daily, felt
that journalism was prestigious. Warzecha added that "the proof of it is, if I want
something and I go to a shop, when I show my press card, it's always much easier to
get it." Potocki maintained that in spite of this, people do not have a high opinion
of journalists. "Above all, simple people don't approve. This is because of the flood
of lies. People think that journalists are liars in general and they don't differentiate
between lying journalists and good journalists." 12 4
Potocki said that in fact, the public opinion of journalists was a paradox, as people
could respect journalists, but did not like them. Potocki illustrated this with a
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hypothetical situation: if he should meet, for example, an old man, the man might
shake his hand in awe and be excited to be meeting a journalist, but as soon as
Potocki turned his back, the man would mutter something insulting about
journalists. 125
Tomasz Sommer thinks that journalists are not regarded as a prestigious group,
but perhaps a few of the more famous are viewed as prestigious. Maria
Kruczkowska believes journalism is one of the more prestigious occupations, "less
than businessman but more than teacher, university professor ... People trust it, as it
is one of the institutions that is most trusted after the church. Radio is trusted more
than the press, but still." But she also said that Polish people were not inclined to
trust the press because of "stories about press manipulation" and could see that the
press was politically biased. 126
Considering that journalists' perceptions of their social status are so vague, we may
well ask if journalists know who their readers are. There is certainly an attempt by
many publications to find out. The Polish market research organisation SMG/KRC
lists as its clients Super Express, Tygodnik Powszechny, Kzeczpospolita, Wprost,
Zycie Warszauy, and the publishers Marquard, Gruener +Jahr, Bauer, Springer
and Orkla. The majority of journalists I interviewed had some kind of target
audience in mind when writing their articles, but none of them were exactly sure
who reads their publication.
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Asked if he knew who read Super Express, Tomasz Sommer replied, "Yes, it's the
regular Pole," but admitted that "none of us knows exactly who reads this paper.
But rather low-income, not very well-educated people, generally not very old, about
30, 40." Sommer said that there were about 10,000 letters from readers a day, but
he does not have any contact with them, as reading letters was not his task. 12 7
Polityka journalists also face the problem of having too many readers to be able to

identify with. Moreover, the information that they have about their readers
suggests that there are two distinct groups, which could be hard to address with the
same topics. "We have, according to polls, about one million readers for each
edition. So it's very hard to imagine one reader," Artur Gorski pointed out.
"Our readers are, firstly, very old people, who remember us from the period when
we were established, and secondly, very young readers. I could say that we are the
most popular youth paper in Poland. It's funny but it's true. There are two
absolutely different audiences," Gorski said. Therefore, he does not write with a
reader in mind. "I write for myself, hoping that if it is good quality, and if it is, it
will sell," he said. 128
Even at the smaller journals, it is not easy for the journalists to know exactly who
their readers are. Journalists themselves do not deal with readers' letters, leaving
this task to secretaries or "letters editors" who make a selection of letters suitable for
publication. Tomasz Wiscicki of Mez said, "I wouldn't say we have much contact,
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but we have some. We have letters of course, and some events which they could
attend." 129
Although the journalists' ideas of their readers often seemed vague, nearly all of
them felt that they were writing for a high-status group of readers - readers they
saw as influential. This supposed high-status group could be the high-income
consumer elite discussed above. However, the journalists' perception of their
readers as an elite also reveals some of their assumptions of journalism's role.
Only Super Express journalist Tomasz Sommer admitted to a humble audience.
The "regular Pole" was described by Sommer as a member of a low socio-economic
group: "rather low-income, not very well-educated people, generally not very old,
about 30, 40." Sommer said that Super Express was competing for readers with
Gazeta Wyborcza, "because they also have quite a high readership of people with a

low education." 130
However, Gazeta Wyborcza's editors do not see their group of readers as those
with a low education - on the contrary. Maria Kruczkowska asserts, "our readers
are rather well-educated, from the intelligentsia, in the eastern European sense of
the word, young and middle-aged, rather men than women ... and rather well-off,
west-oriented, because we have a lot of foreign pages ... " 131
Lukasz Warzecha and Andrzej Potocki of Zycie also have a picture of Gazeta
Wyborcza readers as members of the intelligentsia, the same group of readers they

are targeting. "Both Gazeta Wyborcza and Zycie are very influential in opinion129
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making, so if they both get their message through it's to the intelligentsia." Potocki
said he targeted people who had a different point of view from his own: "It's
useless trying to convince people who have the same views as ours." 132
By contrast, Tomasz Wiscicki of ITTez does not attempt to attract a wider
readership, as he sees that this is no longer possible. "We are read by those people
who more or less agree with us," Wiscicki said. However, he also suggests that this
is an influential audience. "I think that the majority are Catholics, but we try to
retain the others, because what is particularly needed now is to maintain this
dialogue between different groups in the church. Before, there were different
groups, but we were united. Now there is no longer an external reason for us to
unite." 133
Tygodnik Powszechnyis in a similar situation. Adam Szostkiewicz said that there

was a niche for the weekly, but it would be unlikely that it could acquire more
readers. "I think that as far as I can tell, we have between ten and fifteen percent of
the new readers aged between fifteen and twenty-five. It's not a big hope, but there
are new readers coming. These are very specific readers. We are talking about a
society in which not less than ten percent of the people have a tertiary education.
It's a big problem. For that ten percent of educated people, there are so many
publications that compete with each other." 134
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One of these publications is ITTez, according to Tomasz Wiscicki. "Our monthly is
not an easy one, so I am quite sure that our readers are people of high education.
We made a survey - which is not true to sociological methodology - but anyway we
can tell that our readers are different ages, live in different towns and even in the
country, are of high education."135
Szostkiewicz sees T)rgodnik Powszechnyreaders as a small, but significant group:
"The bulk of our readers are 35 to 55, people who are prime targets: very active, in
important positions, established, having an influence in their communities, which is
also important. This is still a very influential paper - of course, within small circles,
but the circles of decision-makers.... this is a paradox: a small paper that's still a
major voice - at least, within the chattering classes." 136
Kzeczpospolita also claims that its readers are the cream of society. "Our readers

are not the average, but rather the elite of society," managing editor Robert
Lutomski believes. "Our main readership consists of highly-ranked specialists in
administration, industry, and so on. Compared with the nationwide education level,
we have the highest average of people with high education." The newspaper targets
this group of readers by bearing in mind that "they are very critical and very well
[educated]. They don't need to have such easy information. The information should
be in-depth, with background, and so on." 137
It is clear that there are some groups who are not served by the mainstream media,

and have responded by establishing titles of their own. These groups reflect what
135
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Ziolkowski has called "the post-materialist system of values". Environmental
interest groups have published newspapers such as Eko u nas, Ekopartner, and
Zielony Sztandar, which examine ecological problems. Zielony Sztandar (Green

flag) looks at political issues from an environmentalist perspective.
Gazeta Wyborcza's Maria Kruczkowska believes that "Poland is a male country in

the public eye; it is also dominated by young males and their interests - spy stories,
military stories.. " Particularly at the foreign desk, Kruczkowska feels that such
stories are preferred, as "it's a question of what policy we have at the desk, and that
policy is to cover mainly political and diplomatic stories - we don't take social
subjects, but military operations or international relations. It's rather a masculine
desk; there are not a lot of cultural, social, or economic issues." 138
Kruczkowska's opinion that Gazeta Wyborcza favours a male readership is
supported by the SMG/KRC market research organisation's surveys of national daily
readership. According to SMG/KRC, Gazeta Wyborcza, Super Express, Zycie,
Trybuna and Gazeta Kolnicza all had notable majorities of male readers.
Kzeczpospolita and Nasz Dziennik had very marginal majorities of female readers

(SMG/KRC 1999).
Gazeta Wyborcza's new women's colour supplement, Wysokie Obcasy (High

heels), launched in April 1999, claims to bring women's interests into the
newspaper. This is, however, a space for advertisements rather than a feminist
discursive space - it resembles a women's magazine, featuring fashion, culture,
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health and beauty, psychology and cooking. The first issue shows that it is
concerned with promoting consumer products rather than women's rights: I 7 of
its 64 pages were advertisements.
Out of the mainstream media, there are publications concerned with women's
rights: there are several feminist newsletters and Kobiety online, a journal of
feminist issues, on the internet.
Besides publications which are more socially concerned, there are now a variety of
non-mainstream e-journals, catering for anarchists, model makers, yoga
practitioners, chess players, internet surfers, computer nerds, and astrologers, to
name but a few. 139

9.4

Summary

Can we conclude that Polish journalists are responsive to their audiences?
Journalists may state that they are writing for a target audience, but as Alan Bell has
pointed out, we do not really know if the people that are targeted are actually
reading, and nor do we know who is and why. Journalists themselves have
difficulties in identifying with their readers.
Although letters from readers are welcomed at all of the publications surveyed,
these are not dealt with by the journalists themselves. Apart from the fact that the
number of letters makes it impossible for each journalist to look at each letter,
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journalists do not regard it as part of their task to take readers' letters into account.
Letters chosen for publication generally do not reflect criticism from readers, or
viewpoints that contradict the newspaper's.
Because of the large percentage of income from advertising that characterises most
of the publications in Poland, the type of audience that is targeted is more likely to
be chosen on the grounds of what will bring the most profitable advertising.
However, as I have pointed out, Polish print media exist in a niche market, with low
levels of readership overall. Therefore, newspapers and magazines have only a
limited amount of room to manoeuvre, and favouring a desired group of readers
could alienate existing readers. This is why some of the smaller newspapers, like
Tygodnik Powszechny and J..t'iez, prefer to keep to the same style and content, and

have not succumbed to the advertisers. By contrast, some of the larger publications,
like Gazeta Wyrorcza, Rzeczpospolita and Wprost, have been actively involved in
creating markets for advertisers.
As this chapter has shown, press readership changes cannot be explained simply in
terms of circulation. In a more open media system, media use is a reflection of
social and cultural trends. In Poland, national and local daily readership has
declined for the reasons mentioned above: first, because of their lack of disposable
income, and second, because of their preference for television. And thirdly, people
who seek an alternative to the mainstream national and regional dailies choose to
read special interest magazines and journals.
In communist Poland, people believed that the role of the journalist should be
simply to inform, to tell them what was really happening in Poland and the world.
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However, the official media were not seen to be performing this role, which is
where the underground media took over. In Poland today, the desired role for a
journalist is still that of an objective reporter, although what exactly people want
from the media depends on their own interests, and the extent to which they are
able to choose in the first place.
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10 CONCLUSION

10.1 The Polish Media System

Dennis McQuail observed in Media Performance, Mass Communication and the
Public Interest, "[u]nfortunately, the attachment to the notion of "freedom from the

state" and other forms of structural pressures such as owners sources and the like

'

'

'

may have diverted attention away from an equally important criterion of "freedom
for" such things as diversity, and equality of access to a wide range of media
content as well as communication structures" (cited in Negrine 1994:27). This
point is certainly relevant to Poland, for although there is now less regulation by the
state than under communism, this has been replaced by other forms of regulation
which limit media content in different ways.
This research has addressed the problems of how to describe a media system, and
what the journalist's role is in that media system, using Poland as a case study. To
begin with, the concept of ''transition", which has been applied to postcommunist
societies, was discussed, and proved difficult to apply. The present cannot be
separated from the past, nor can a predicted outcome determine the present. Terms
such as "freedom" and "control" are also not applicable, as the reality is somewhere
in between. The concept of a "free" media, as the second chapter pointed out, is an
ideal that is based on political and economic categories. Also, this is a subjective
term which implies a positive state. Instead, the terms "open" and "closed" can be
used to describe media systems.
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This study proposed a theory of media systems that begins with the society and its
political and social institutions, the processes of change in that society, and its
culture. Such a theory would include the consumers, as well as the producers, of
media content. This was outlined in the third chapter.
In describing media systems as open or closed, the difference is seen in terms of
orientation rather than politics or economics. A closed system is therefore
characterised by an attempt to stem the flow of information, eliminate input that is
external to the system and determine its entire content. An open system, by
contrast, is one in which there are multiple channels of communication and
potential for change.
Three factors involved in analysing media systems are accessibility, referring to the
availability of the mass media to the public; reciprocity, the extent to which media
represent, respond to and reflect their interests; and regulation, the patterns that
determine how the mass media operate.
Poland was chosen as the case study for this research because of its particularly
interesting past two decades characterised by dramatic economic changes, a famous
resistance movement with an underground media, and some slight deviations from
the usual communist pattern (less repressive, less politically united). In the
communist era, the Polish media system could be described as an "imperfect version
of the closed system".
Not only the media system, but the social system as a whole, was closed off to any
kind of external influence. Social institutions could only relate to each other in a
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very simple hierarchical way. Each component of this system was delegated a
function by the authoritarian government, and expected to perform it. The function
of the media was to report only what the communist party wanted the public to
hear. Therefore, the official communication process was one-way, largely
disregarding Polish people's interests and the outside world. However, the system
weakened when it was no longer able to continue functioning in this manner.
However, the Polish media system was not completely closed, because within the
system there was an oppositional culture, and an alternative media operating
outside official influence. Also, Poland was not closed to the outside world. New
ideas and alternative cultures from the west crossed Poland's borders. It would be
an exaggeration to say that the Polish media system broke down, because although
it underwent great changes, it continued to function.

Poland's current media system could be described as an open system, because
although some restrictions exist, there is no attempt to disconnect Poland from the
outside world, or imposed barriers which prevent people from accessing
information. In the print media, politically diverse publications are now legally
available. However, this does not mean that the Polish media system is one devoid of
any problems. This description of the Polish media system - not be confused with
the idea of "free" media - was based on the observations outlined in the remainder
of the research.
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Firstly, as the fifth chapter explained, legal changes were certainly made after the
first free elections were held, but the reality failed to live up to the Constitution's
guarantee of freedom of speech. Censorship was immediately abolished, but laws
on state secrets were not. Secrets laws and libel laws, which hinder political
criticism, can be seen as a form of censorship. Therefore, the Polish media system is
not entirely open.
Secondly, politicians are in a position to employ means other than legal to regulate
the media. The fact that the media are no longer state-owned does not mean that
there is less political engagement. Interaction between politicians and journalists has
been a consistent practice in Poland throughout the past two decades. In
communist Poland, Communist Party leaders manipulated the media by making
political appointments to editorial positions on newspapers.
Connections between press and politics continue, although Poland is now
politically divided. A variety of relationships between journalists and politicians exist
in Poland, as discussed in the sixth chapter. The many links between politics and the
press benefit both sides, but not the public, as these arrangements make for a
politically biased media.
Thirdly, the print media in Poland today may no longer be owned by a single
dominant political party, but this is no guarantee that they will be subject to fewer
restrictions. Owners of newspapers, with different political-ideological or economic
interests, have their own policies regarding newspaper management, described in
the seventh chapter. In 1990s Poland, a newspaper's success depends on its ability
to survive the market, by finding a niche or attracting the advertisers.
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Finally, chapter nine pointed out that the idea of "freedom of choice" does not
apply to the media in Poland. The broadcast media are available in most, but not all
regions of Poland. Print media would be widely accessible, due to the high level of
national literacy, but the number of titles vary, according to region. Moreover, the
standard of living in Poland is not luxurious enough for many people to purchase
print media regularly, or to purchase more than one title.
Media content addresses urban, rather than rural, concerns. However, this is not a
deliberate attempt to isolate some regions, but a result of the urban location and
orientation of media organisations. There are options for the public to respond to
print media content. However, criticism from the public was not published in the
titles surveyed. Journalists are rarely in contact with their readers.
Overall, the Polish media should not be viewed negatively. The print media are
not "free", but neither are they "repressed". Political criticism is possible, although
still potentially problematic. Journalists have the option of defending themselves
with the "freedom of the press" rhetoric, which can earn the support of their
colleagues or at least more publicity.
Although political bias characterises the Polish media, there is no overall
dominating bias in favour of one party over another, and there are also newspapers
which are not interested in politics. Journalists are expected to adhere to their
organisation's individual guidelines rather than the universal restrictions on
information that characterise a closed system.
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10.2 The Role of the Journalist

The second question addressed by this research is what the role of the journalist is
in the media system. To understand the role of the journalist in the media system,
journalists in Poland were asked this question in interviews. However, as outlined
in chapter two, the definition of a "role" depends on the perspective it is viewed
from. Therefore, this research analysed the role of the journalist in the media
system as it is viewed by journalists themselves, the public, and politicians.
According to journalists, their role is to "report the news" or "tell the truth",
acting as a communicator of vital information. Journalists assume that their role is
central to the process of media content production, shown by their belief that they
had the power to contribute to or restrict press freedom, and to choose whether or
not to be "objective". Moreover journalists also feel that their opinions are an
important contribution to society.
Journalists believe that their role should be an objective one, as this response was
given repeatedly by the journalists interviewed. The public, too, expect the role of
the journalist to be that of objective reporter. However, both public and journalists
recognise that the reality does not live up to the ideal. There is also a belief amongst
journalists that having an opinion is either necessary or unavoidable, and even that
it is very "Polish". Therefore, the role of the journalist is somewhat confused, for
the expectations and the function do not, and cannot, merge.
The idea of "objectivity" is the 1990s equivalent of "professionalism" in the 1980s.
It gives journalists authority, in the form of an often-used word, which in recurring
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continuously reinforces their identity as professionals. Chapter eight focussed on
the influence of the profession of journalism in reinforcing such ideas. However,
while journalists in communist Poland shared the unique and difficult situation of
choosing between the interests of the public or the Party, journalists are now
divided, by political interests and organisational aims. Some are more loyal to their
paper than others; some are still fighting for democracy, while others have
embraced capitalism.
Journalists are divided not only by their political beliefs and approaches to their
work, but also by their attitudes towards journalism itself. The journalist's position
has not been made any clearer by ambiguous media laws, inconsistent standards of
journalism education, and the lack of a unified journalists' organisation - issues
which have been addressed in chapters five and eight of this research.
It is clear that Polish journalists feel that "objectivity" and "truth" are under their

control, and that a condition of "freedom" exists which enables them to pursue
these noble ideals. However, in open media systems, there are many possibilities, not
all of them beneficial to the journalist. Again, this distinguishes the concept of an
open system from a "free" system.
In Poland, the role of the journalist is limited in practice. As this study has shown,
the journalist is only a small part of a system that is largely beyond his or her
control. To start with, the journalist is simply an employee of a media organisation,
and must obey the organisation to remain employed, as chapter seven pointed out.
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Moreover, that organisation is in turn regulated by internal and external forces financial considerations, "market realities", deadlines, staff co-operation,
managerial and editorial decisions, and normative guidelines which are determined
by the nature of the society, discussed in chapters five to nine. What may be
perceived as "freedom" is in fact limited by legal regulations (chapter five), political
influences (chapter six), ownership and organisational structures (chapter seven),
and even their own profession's ethics (chapter eight).
Also, we should add to this list outside interests other than politicians - the
producers of consumer goods and their advertisers, and sources and their managers
(chapter seven). These interests have a significant impact on the way media
organisations, and consequently journalists, work.
All of these factors make it clear that journalists in Poland are not more "free"
under capitalism than they were under communism. The Polish media system has
changed, but in a more complex way than a "transition" from one state to another.
It is now regulated by different conditions, because it is part of a more open society.

Poland is still changing, as is Polish journalism - caught up in the communist past
while catching up with the capitalist present.
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